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This thesis focuses on different aspects of trade theory and policy. One of the main 
objections to the theory of strategic trade policy is that it presumes too much knowledge on 
the part of governments. The design of an optimal tariff in the presence of incomplete 
information is analysed in Chapter 2. In a Cournot duopoly model of international 
competition between a domestic and a foreign firm, it is shown that when the domestic firm 
and government have incomplete information about the marginal cost of a foreign firm, 
trade policy can be effectively designed. It is shown that when the foreign firm’s output 
signals costs, there is a unique separating sequential equilibrium. There is a distortion in 
output due to signalling which is costly in terms of welfare. So, the optimal import tariff 
when signalling is lower than when the firm does not signal its costs through output. 
Expected foreign production is lower when signalling, and domestic firm’s output and 
profits are higher. Incomplete information lessens the rent extracting and profit shifting 
argument for a tariff.
An area of conflicting views in trade policy is that of antidumping (AD). In Chapter 3, a 
descriptive analysis of the use of AD worldwide and in Europe is presented, including an 
explanation of AD laws and of the implementation of these laws in Europe. An analysis of 
European antidumping decisions made by the European Commission between 1985 and 
2003 is presented in Chapter 4. Using data on legal AD investigations, industry, imports 
and political influences, the Commission decision-making on dumping and injury is 
modelled weighing the relative impact of economic and political factors in predicting 
policy outcomes. Two hypotheses are formulated. The empirical findings confirm that 
Europe is operating a double track antidumping mechanism. Mainly economic variables are 
associated with a positive decision on dumping whereas only political variables are 
positively associated with affirmative decisions on injury.
Besides, antidumping laws allow countries to settle antidumping actions either by levying 
duties or by demanding price undertakings from the foreign exporting (or importing) firms. 
A price undertaking is an agreement by the foreign exporter to eliminate injury by 
increasing its price or ceasing exports. However, countries have considerable discretion in 
allowing price undertakings. An empirical analysis of the acceptance of price undertaking 
decisions in Europe is presented in Chapter 5. A number of hypotheses are formulated. The 
econometric analysis indicates that the share of European exports to the country of the 
defendant; indicators of political pressure as well as the country of origin of certain 
defendants (non-market economies) are positively associated with the decision to refuse 
price undertakings.
The research hypotheses in chapters 4 and 5 are examined using a legal database containing 
information about 805 antidumping investigations initiated in Europe published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities and associated trade and industrial statistics. 
An overview of the thesis with a summary of conclusions and contributions is presented in 
Chapter 1. A summary of the main findings of the thesis is presented in Chapter 6.
2
A ck n o w led g em en ts
I owe much to a number of people who, over the last several years, have made it possible 
for me to complete this thesis. My supervisor, Professor Anthony J. Venables, has provided 
the inspiration and support to develop this research. I would like to thank him for his 
patience and for the opportunity to undertake this thesis in the environment of the Centre 
for Economic Performance. I would also like to thank Professor Kevin Roberts, Professor 
Alan Winters and Professor Peter Neary, Dr. Henry Overman and Dr. Steve Redding, Dr. 
Chris Ketels, Dr. Maurizio Zanardi and Dr. Marco Manacorda for comments and 
suggestions. My thanks also go to Dr. Antoine Faure-Grimaud for helpful discussions.
I would like to thank Professor Peter Holmes and Dr. Jeremy Kempton for helpful 
discussions and explanations of the European antidumping law and regulations. Special 
thanks go to Professor Matthew Tharakan and Dr. Linda Springael for advice in 
constructing the data set used in the thesis. Special thanks go to Dr. Hylke Vandenbussche 
and Chad Bown who kindly provided data on the European Antidumping legal cases.
I am pleased to acknowledge financial support from the British government Chevening 
Award Scheme and the London School of Economics.
While doing this thesis I encountered more than the usual number of problems, few of 
which were related to the thesis. My husband Martin and my son Jerome shared these 
challenges with me. Sincere thanks to my husband, who has been a source of support and 
encouragement throughout. My thanks go to my father and to my mother-in-law, Kate. Her 
support has not been forgotten.
Finally, I would like to thank seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the 
European Economic Association, the European Trade Study Group and the European 
Doctorate Jamboree for helpful comments and suggestions.
3
Table o f Contents
C H A PT ER ! AN OVERVIEW OF THE T H E S IS __________________ 11
1 In t r o d u c t io n ........................................................................................ n
2 T ra d e  Policy u n d e r  In co m plete  In fo r m a t io n  a n d
A n t id u m p in g .................................   12
3  Th e sis  St r u c t u r e ............................................................  26
4  Re su l t s  a n d  Co n t r ib u t io n s ........................................................ 28
CHAPTER 2 TARIFFS UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORM ATION___________________ 33
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 33
2  Asym m etric  In fo r m a t io n  a n d  T r a d e  Policy: Rela ted
Lit er a t u r e ................................................................  35
3  T h e  D ynam ic  M o d e l : n o  D o m estic  Pr o v isio n  o f  t h e
Go o d ..............................................   39
4  T h e  D yn am ic M o d e l  w i t h  C om petition ...,............................. 48
4 .1  Separating Equilibria..................................................................... so
4 .2  Pooling Equilibria ...........................................................................ss
4 .3  The effect o f  Signalling on the Optimal Tariff......................... ss
5 Co n c l u sio n s ............................................................................   6i
A p p en d ix  2 .....................................................................................................65
CHAPTER 3 ANTIDUMPING: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS, LAW AND
IN STITU TIO N S___________________________________________________________________ 69
1 I n t r o d u c t io n ........................................................................................ 69
2  A n tid u m p in g : D e s c r ip t iv e  A n a ly s is .......................................69
2. i  Antidum ping a t the W orld Level: an Increasing Trend. 69
2 .2  Antidum ping Investigations in Europe..................................... 73
3  T h e  l a w ...................................................................................................76
3 .1  The Antidum ping L aw  a t the GATT-WTO L evel.....................76
3 .2  The Antidum ping Regulations in Europe..................................79
3 .3  The Investigation Procedure in Europe.................................... S2
4  Co n c l u d in g  Re m a r k s .....................................................................se
A p p en d ix  3 ..................................................................................................... 87
CHAPTER 4 TH E POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTIDUM PING IN  EU R O PE 105
1 In t r o d u c t io n .......................................................................................105
2  Th e  Political Eco no m y  o f  An t id u m p in g : Rela ted
Lit e r a t u r e ...................................................................................................107
2 .1  The Political Economy o f  Trade Policy in General................107
2 .2  The Political Economy o f Administered Protection and 
Antidumping................................................................................................109
3 T h e  Hy po t h ese s  a n d  Va r ia ble  D e f in it io n s ...................... 114
4  Eco no m etric  S pec ificatio n ........................................................123
5 Em pirical  Re su l t s ........................................................................... 126
5 .1  Dumping Decisions.........................................................................m
5 . 2  Injury Decisions...............................................................................131
6  S ensitivity  Ana ly sis ............................................................. 135
7 T h e  D e te r m in a n ts  o f  A ffir m a tiv e  F in d in g s ................... 143
8  Eco no m ic  S ig n ific a n c e .................................................................147
9  C o m p a r iso n  o f  t h e  R e s u l t s  w i t h  t h o s e  f o r  t h e  U S ... 149
10 Co n c l u sio n s .......................................................................................151
Ap p e n d ix  4 A .................................................................................................155
A p p en d ix  4 B ................................................................................................ 169
Ap p e n d ix  4 C .................................................................................. 175
CHAPTER 5 THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE UNDERTAKINGS IN EUROPE 179
1 In t r o d u c t io n .......................................................................................179
2 R e la t e d  L i t e r a t u r e ........................................................................183
3 D escriptive  Analysis  o f  Price  U n d e r t a k in g s  in
Eu r o p e , 1 9 8 5 -2 0 0 3 ................................................................................. iss
4  Th e  Hy po t h ese s   .............................................................................1
5 Th e  Va r ia bles  a n d  t h e  Eco n o m etric  S pecificatio n  ... 194
6  Em pirical  Re su l t s ........................................................................... 198
7 Co n c l u sio n s ...................................................................................... 208
A p p e n d ix  5 A ................................................................................................ 213
Ap p e n d ix  5 B ................................................................................................ 223
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................... 227
REFERENCES.........................................................................................................231
List o f Tables
3.1 Total Number of AD Investigations: 1987-2000 ..................................................  70
j 3.2 Average Dumping Margin in the United States for Different Periods.................  71
3.3 Antidumping Cases: Main Users and Main Targets, 1997 ....................................  71
3.4 Cases Filed from Europe to other Countries and against Europe, by Blocks
of Countries............................................................................................................ 74
3.5 Cases Filed Against Europe and from Europe to other Countries, by year  74
3.6 Cases Filed Against Europe and From Europe to other Countries,
by Individual Countries..........................................................................................  75
3.7 Final Outcome and Average Annual Imports of AD Investigations initiated in
Europe 1985-2003 ................................................................................................... 76
3.8 Final Outcome of AD Investigations initiated in Europe 1985-2003,
by year....................................................................................................................... 84
3.9 Antidumping Investigations Worldwide, by Reporting Country.......................... 87
3.10 Traditional and New Users of Antidumping, Worldwide........................................ 87
3.11 Antidumping Investigations by Main Blocks: Reporting Countries........................88
3.12 Antidumping Investigations by Main Blocks: Affected Countries..........................88
3.13 European AD Investigations (sub-cases) by Economic Status of Country..............88
3.14 Investigations Initiated against Europe, by Industrial Sectors.............................. 89
4.1 Variables and Expected Signs: Dumping and Injury Decisions............................ 120
4.2 Number of Cases Initiated and Investigated: Dumping and Injury Decisions
(1985-2003)........................................................................................................... 123
4.3.1 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions by the
European Union (1985-1994): Main Specification...........................................  129
4.3.2 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions by the
European Union (1995-2003): Main Specification...........................................  134
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Domestic Political Influences and Comparative Costs.
Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping Decisions by the European 
Union (1985-1994)..............................................................................................  136
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Domestic Political Influences and Comparative Costs.
Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Injury Decisions by the European
6
Union (1985-1994)................................................................................................. 138
4.6.1 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions, by the 
European Union (1985-1994): Cumulation.......................................................... 140
4.6.2 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions, by the 
European Union (1995-2003): Cumulation.......................................................... 142
4.7.1 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Affirmative Findings by the European 
Union: 1985-1994............   144
4.7.2 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Affirmative Findings by the European 
Union: 1995-2003 ................................................................................................  146
4.8 Economic Significance: Percentage Changes in the Probability of Dumping
and Injury...............................................................................................................  148
4.9 Number of AD Investigations (cases) and Sub-cases in Europe (1985-2003),
by Year.................................................................................................................  155
4.10.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Dumping Regressions (1985-94) . .  156
4.10.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Dumping Regressions (1995-03) . .  156
4.11.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Injury Regressions (1985-94)........  157
4.11.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Injury Regressions (1995-03)........  157
4.12.1 Correlation Matrix (1985-94)..............................................................................  158
4.12.2 Correlation Matrix (1995-03)..............................................................................  158
4.13 Correlation Matrix, Sensitivity Analysis..................................................................159
4.14 Correlation Matrix, Sensitivity Analysis (continuation)......................................... 159
4.15.1 Numberof Cases (1985-1994), by Sector of Economic A ctivity ....................... 160
4.15.2 Number of Cases (1995-2003), by Sector of Economic A ctivity ....................... 160
4.16.1 Industrial Indicators (mean), by Sector of Economic Activity (1985-1994)____161
4.16.2 Industrial Indicators (mean), by Sector of Economic Activity(1995-2003)........  161
4.17 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping Decisions by the European 
Union (1985-1994), Main Specification (with and without controls)................. 162
4.18 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Injury Decisions by the European Union 
(1985-1994), Main Specification (with and without controls)...............................163
4.19 Industrial Sectors, Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping Decisions
by the European Union (1985-1994)......................................................................  164
4.20 Industrial Sectors, Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Injury Decisions by
the European Union (1985-1994)..........................................................................  165
7
4.21 Comparison of results for U.S. (1975-1979), the EC (1980-1987) and the
EU (1985-1994)..................................................................................................... 166
4.22.1 Major Sectors of Economic Activity (1985-1994)  .....................................  167
4.22.2 Major Sectors of Economic Activity (1995-2003).............................................  168
4.23 Capital Stocks Benchmarks..................................................................................  170
4.24 Capital Stocks (millions US dollars constant prices 1990), per Industry  171
4.25 Capital Stocks (1985 = 1), per Industry...............................................................  173
5.0 Final Outcome of AD Investigations in Europe (1985-2003), by year..............186
5.1 Variables and Expected Signs: Acceptance of Price Undertakings...................... 192
5.2.1 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Acceptance of Undertakings
Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994): Main Specification...................200
5.2.2 Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Acceptance of Undertakings
Decisions by the European Union (1995-2003): Main Specification...................204
5.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis I: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Acceptance
of Undertakings Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994)...................... 206
5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis I: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Acceptance
of Undertakings Decisions by the European Union (1995-2003)...................... 207
5.4 Number of Cases and Value of Imports in European Antidumping. Investigations
Terminated by the Imposition of Definitive Duties and the Acceptance of 
Undertakings: (1985-2003)..................................................................................  213
5.5 Final Outcomes of AD Investigations in Europe (1985-2003), by year  215
5.6 Number of AD Investigations and Average Value of Imports Terminated by
the Acceptance of Price Undertakings, yearly (1985-1994), by Region  216
5.7 Number of AD Investigations and Average Value of Imports Terminated by
the Acceptance of Price Undertakings, Yearly (1985-1994), Less Developed 
Countries...............................................................................................................  217
5.8 Number of AD Investigations (Sub-cases) Terminated by the Acceptance of
Price Undertakings, Yearly (1985-1994), by Sector of Economic Activity. . .  217
5.9.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in European Price Undertakings’
Regression (1985-1994)....................................................................................... 218
5.9.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in European Price Undertakings’
Regression (1995-2003)....................................................................................... 218
5.10.1 Correlation Matrix (1985-1994).......................................................................  219
5.10.2 Correlation Matrix (1995-2003).........................................................................  219
5.11 Sensitivity Analysis II: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Decisions to
Accept Price Undertakings by the European Union (1985-1994)....................... 220
5.12 Economic Significance: Percentage Changes in the Probability of Acceptance
of Price Undertakings (1985-1994) ....................................................................  221
5.13 Number of cases ending with AD duties and undertakings, ranked in
descending order by share of EU exports (1985-1994).......................................  214
9
List o f Figures
2.1 Sketch of the Model....................................................................................................42
2.2 Separating Equilibria..................................................................................................63
2.3 Pooling Equilibria.....................................................................................................  64
3.1 Antidumping Investigations Worldwide ............................................................... 90
3.2 Number of Cases, Traditional and New Users........................................................  91
3.3 Affected Countries in 1987 and 1997    ................................................................  92
3.4 AD Investigations in the U S ................................................................................... 93
3.5 Reporting Countries in 1987 and 1997....................................................................  94
3.6 Reporting and Affected Countries .........................................................................  95
3.7 Antidumping Investigations (legal cases) in Europe............................................... 96
3.8 Antidumping Investigations in Europe...................................................................  97
3.9 European AD investigations, Main Affected Countries......................................... 98
3.10 European AD investigations, Who Files AD against Europe?................................ 99
3.11 Who Files against Europe and Who Gets Hurt? ..................................................  100
3.12 Investigations in Europe (%), by Sector of Economic A ctivity...........................  101
3.13 Investigations against Europe (Number of Cases), by Sector of
Economic Activity.................................................................................................. *102
3.14 Number of European Investigations (Sub-cases, yearly) by Industry: 1985-03 . 103
5.1 Number of European Antidumping Investigations Ending in Duties and Price
Undertakings 1985-03 (1985=100)......................................................................  214
10
Chapter l  An overview o f the thesis
l  Introduction
This thesis focuses on different aspects of trade theory and policy. It analyses the design of 
trade policy when a domestic government decides on an import tariff on a foreign 
competitor whose costs it does not know. It shows that an optimal tariff can be chosen and 
that strategic trade policy can effectively be designed in the presence of informational 
asymmetries.
It also analyses a particular tool of trade policy, that of antidumping (AD). It 
empirically analyses the European dumping and injury decisions in the period 1985-2003, 
based on the Finger-Hall-Nelson’s (1982) model of the political economy of administered 
protection. This model distinguishes between political and technical determinants of the 
antidumping decision. The hypotheses tested are that technical determinants are significant 
in the determination of dumping and political determinants are significant in the 
determination of injury decisions. The empirical analysis confirms that Europe operates a 
double track AD mechanism. The thesis also analyses the determinants of the acceptance of 
price undertakings in the European Union. The European legislation on antidumping allows 
the administration to settle antidumping actions by levying duties or by demanding price 
undertakings from the foreign exporting firms. A data set of European legal documents and 
associated trade and industrial statistics is constructed to analyse the determinants of the 
AD decisions of the European Commission.
This introduction gives the background to the research questions examined in the 
thesis. It describes the motivation and the relevance of the research that has been carried out 
and discusses the methodology used as well as how this research fits into the previous 
literature. The third section of this chapter presents the thesis structure, which summarises 
the key elements of each chapter. The fourth section, presents the results and contributions.
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2 Trade Policy under Incom plete Information and
Antidumping
A body of literature has investigated the implications of incomplete information in strategic 
trade policy theory, especially following the seminal paper by Brander and Spencer (1985). 
The theory of strategic trade policy presumes too much knowledge on the part of 
governments. Several papers have relaxed the assumption of complete information and 
have explored different types of informational asymmetries in international trade and trade 
policy. Some research has focused on the idea that governments could be less informed than 
firms are about production and markets (asymmetry between governments and firms). Other 
research has concentrated on the fact that, in certain industries, governments know the 
characteristics of domestic firms but not those of foreign competitors. In certain industries, 
what the government knows about domestic and foreign firms could be extremely important. 
So, the analysis of asymmetries between domestic and foreign firms has deserved special 
attention in the literature. When a government supports R&D projects, for example, in 
microelectronics and aerospace, there is a high degree of government intervention and 
informational asymmetries could be important. A government that knows the cost structure of 
the industry can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of domestic firms to 
international markets. The theoretical model analysed in this thesis is relevant for those 
industries in which domestic firms and the government are uncertain about foreign competitors' 
costs. The model discussed in Chapter 2, concentrates on the design of trade policy when a 
domestic government and a local firm do not know certain characteristic of the foreign 
competitors. While previous work has concentrated on asymmetries of information about 
the nature of competition and about the demand function, this chapter has focused on the 
unknown cost efficiency of a foreign firm. It is shown that the government has the ability to 
impose a different tariff (separate the different types) on foreign firms according to their 
efficiency and that strategic trade policy could effectively be designed in the presence of 
informational failures.
Several types of asymmetries of information have been analysed in the related 
literature. The trade policy instruments that have been most commonly analysed are export 
and import subsidies and export and import taxes and tariffs. Collie and Hviid (1993) and 
Qui (1994 and 2003) examine the design of optimal export subsidies in the presence of 
asymmetries of information between a domestic producer and foreign firms. Collie and
12
Hviid (1993) analyse a situation in which foreign competitors do not know the cost 
structure of domestic firms but the domestic government does. The domestic government 
can use an export subsidy to signal how competitive the local firms are to its foreign 
competitors. When the export subsidy is big the foreign firm infers that the domestic firm 
has low costs. In a rational response, it reduces its output conferring higher profits for the 
domestic firm. There is an extra signalling effect that reinforces the profit shifting effect 
and the export subsidy is larger than the one that would prevail if information was 
complete. The authors also analysed the presence of a rival interventionist government. 
There is a strategic interaction effect but it is not big enough and the original results still 
hold. In a similar context, Wright (1998) studies export subsidies when foreign competitors 
and a domestic government do not know the cost structure of a domestic firm. In a 
signalling model, he shows that optimal subsidies are smaller than under uncertainty.
Qui (1994 and 2003) analyses the importance of governments in facilitating 
strategic information revelation. In these papers a domestic government and a foreign firm 
are uninformed about a domestic firm’s costs. The government uses two policy instruments 
to induce information revelation: a per-unit subsidy and a lump-sum transfer. In this way, 
the domestic firm reveals its type. Moreover, because the foreign firm is also uninformed, 
there is a mixture of signalling and screening. The domestic firm signals its costs through 
its policy selection. Screening also takes place when selecting the policy menu. The paper 
shows that, under Cournot competition, a government would choose a menu of subsidy 
programs that induces separation by the firms and that the allocation that results is the same 
as in the full information case.
Brainard and Martimort (1996, 1997 and 1998) consider the role of cost-based 
informational asymmetries when subsidies are imposed on exports to third markets. 
However, the asymmetry of information they consider is between governments and firms. 
These models differ from the one developed by Collie and Hviid (1993) and Qiu (1994 and 
2003) in that the foreign firm knows the domestic firm's costs, so that only governments are 
uninformed. The government faces a trade-off between increasing the profits of possibly 
wealthy firms and raising funds from the taxpayer. The cost of public funds becomes an 
important determinant in the design of the optimal export policy. Policy objectives are to 
reinforce the strategic position of local firms and to minimize the informational rent, which 
is socially costly. Lacking precise knowledge of the firms’ profits functions, the 
government faces a trade-off between manipulating the payoffs to the local firm in a way
that enhances its strategic advantage, and preventing the firm from deriving distortionary 
rents from its private information. In Brainard and Martimort (1997) there is a downward 
distortion of the optimal subsidy, which may be severe enough to force the subsidy below 
zero. This is a "screening" effect. A two dimensional policy is used to deal with both 
distortions: strategic pre-commitment and informational rent seeking. They found that the 
optimal policy is to implement a menu of contracts specifying a per-unit subsidy and a 
lump-sum tax as a function of the firms reported costs. The announcement of the subsidy 
serves as a credible commitment to expand the firm's output, while the lump-sum transfer 
serves as a screening device. They show that under unilateral intervention (one 
government) there is a downward distortion in the optimal subsidy.
Governments have limited information not only about the cost structure of the 
industry but about the nature of competition. Maggi (1996) analyses the sensitivity of 
strategic trade policy to the type of competition. By developing a model of capacity-price 
competition, he shows that capacity subsidies can increase the welfare of the domestic 
country regardless of the type of competition that prevails. Kolev and Prusa (1999) examine 
the incentives of a government to impose an import tariff on a foreign monopolist in a 
model with an infinite number of periods. The government does not know a foreign firm’s 
costs. They show that a policy of optimal uniform tariffs (pooling equilibrium) is better 
than a discriminatory one. Matschke (2003) examines the equivalence of tariffs and quotas 
in the presence of asymmetric information. She shows that asymmetric information 
destroys the equivalence of tariffs and quotas that exists under complete information 
assumptions.
Chapter 2 explores the effects of asymmetric information on trade policy when a 
domestic government decides on the level of an import tariff on a foreign competitor whose 
costs it does not know. In the presence of incomplete information and Cournot competition, 
output can be taken as a signal of costs to the government and a domestic firm. A firm that 
has low costs has an incentive to misrepresent them and to pretend it has high costs in order 
to obtain a lower import tariff on its exports. In equilibrium, this incentive does not exist 
because the government can anticipate the action of the foreign firm and act rationally to 
choose the optimal tariff. The government faces a trade-off. The optimal policy should 
equate the marginal loss of consumer welfare with the marginal gain from profit shifting 
and tariff revenue. It is shown that a unique separating sequential equilibrium exists and 
strategic trade policy can effectively be designed in the presence of informational
14
asymmetries. Signalling creates a distortion that is costly in terms of welfare so the specific 
tariff is lower than in the absence of signalling. Incomplete information lessens the rent 
extracting argument for a tariff. In a model with domestic competition the results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. In a dynamic setting, tariffs are higher in duopoly than in the case 
of a foreign monopoly because the government has an additional incentive to shift profits 
from the foreign to the domestic firm. While previous work has concentrated on 
asymmetries of information between governments and domestic firms, Chapter 2 focuses 
on the unknown cost efficiency of a foreign producer. Strategic trade policy can be 
designed in the presence of informational asymmetries.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the analysis of optimal tariffs on imports in the presence 
of asymmetric information. However, it could be argued that the problem of choosing an 
optimal tariff under incomplete information is of limited practical relevance. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has delivered substantial tariff reductions during 
the post-war period through a sequence of negotiating rounds. These rounds of trade 
negotiations have narrowed the scope for the widespread use of tariffs as a trade restrictive 
device. Instead, in the mid-seventies the trade liberalising effects of tariff reduction began 
to be offset by a growth in non-tariff barriers. The attempt to tariff discriminate among 
exporters is not feasible under the most favoured nation (MFN) clause of GATT/WTO. The 
presence of domestic production has allowed the proliferation of contingent protection such 
as antidumping duties. Among other non-tariff barriers, antidumping has emerged as an 
increasingly used trade restrictive device. Antidumping laws allow countries to impose 
unilateral measures against dumped imports that cause material injury to domestic firms. In 
the presence of dumping, governments can apply an antidumping duty on a foreign product.
The problem of choosing an optimal tariff under incomplete information could be 
compared with that of choosing an optimal antidumping duty on dumped foreign imports. 
The model discussed in Chapter 2 could be seen as a repeated game in which a domestic 
government that does not know foreign firms’ costs has to choose an AD duty based on the 
level of output observed. The model shows that the government could effectively separate 
both types of firms and impose a higher AD duty on those foreign firms that have the 
lowest costs. This comparison constitutes an oversimplification of the workings of AD laws 
on at least two counts. First, the model assumes that when firms compete in quantities AD 
duties are automatically imposed (without the need for an investigation to be carried out). 
Second, it assumes that AD duties are chosen according to the observed levels of
15
production of the foreign firm, whereas in reality the imposition of AD duties is based on 
the dumping margin, which is the price difference between the import price and the “fair” 
value. In a model where a domestic government has incomplete information about a foreign 
firm’s costs, Kolev and Prusa (2002) show that the rise in AD protection may be related to 
increases in voluntary export restraints (VER) since firms with low costs will voluntarily 
restraint exports before an AD investigation. These and other considerations are discussed 
in further detail in the analysis of antidumping presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
A growing amount of research in the area of trade policy has concentrated in the 
study of antidumping. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 
(GATT 1994) regulates antidumping. It allows countries to impose unilateral measures 
against dumped imports causing material injury to domestic firms. But, it is more often 
being used as pure protection than as a trade remedy. Antidumping legislation is intended 
to remedy a situation in which foreign firms sell at a price that is below the “fair” or 
“normal” value. By doing this, foreign firms will be dumping their products in the recipient 
country. When dumping exists and the industry in the host country is materially injured (or 
threatened with material injury), the government of the host country can apply an AD duty 
equal to the dumping margin on the foreign firm’s product1.
The problem with this definition of dumping mainly relates to its implementation. 
The important questions are how to define “normal” value and how to calculate it and what 
constitutes “material” injury or the threat of such injury. In practice, there are two main 
ways to calculate “fair” value. One is the price charged by the exporting firm in its own 
market for the same product. The other one is the cost of the product constructed from firm- 
level accounting data. The measure most commonly used is that of total costs (including 
fixed costs) adding an estimate for what should be a normal profit. Practices like price 
discrimination and setting prices below cost are included as “unfair” under the antidumping 
laws but are not necessarily considered as harmful by economists. It is not pricing below 
total cost that is per se harmful and it should not be considered illegal. It must be shown 
that this practice is intended to harm competition.
The most recent research on antidumping has been directed at understanding the 
effects as well as how the determinants of antidumping actions legitimise selective 
protection and an excellent review of it is presented in Blonigen and Prusa (2003a). Earlier
1 In the European Union the level of the antidumping duty has to be limited to the amount required to 
eliminate injury if this is less than the margin of dumping. This rule is sometimes called “the lesser duty rule”.
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research has focused on the existence of a rationale for antidumping laws but the several 
substantial revisions of the statutes over the past 25 years had made the legal definition of 
dumping to be totally divorced from the economic notion of dumping. Conventional 
economic rationale for antidumping actions is based on the notions of predatory pricing, 
discriminatory monopoly and cyclical dumping. The argument against predation states that 
if dumping is predatory domestic producers and consumers could be harmed, because in 
spite of the short-run gains to the consumers, it will lead to the failure of domestic 
producers and subsequent exposure to monopoly pricing. An extensive literature exists on 
the theory of predatory pricing (Milgrom and Roberts 1982a, 1982b, Saloner 1987, Kreps 
and Wilson 1982b). This justification is the motive that originally prompted the 
implementation of AD laws in the early twentieth century. Another situation in which firms 
might sell abroad at lower prices than in their domestic market is due to discriminatory 
pricing. Discriminatory pricing is likely to make some firms in the industry smaller and 
gain lower profits than if their rivals did not price discriminate but it will benefit 
consumers, since they can buy the goods at lower prices. It is sometimes argued that selling 
in foreign markets at prices different from the one prevailing for their own consumers is not 
a sufficient reason to justify AD action, unless there is predatory intention. However, the 
predatory motive for antidumping has rarely been found to exist. Very few cases in the 
1980’s were brought against instances of possible predatory pricing as shown by Messerlin 
(1996) and Shy (1998).
The definition of dumping based on the comparison of prices charged in different 
national markets has led to a cost-based definition of dumping in some countries. In the US, 
the implementation of the Tokyo Round made it easier to claim cost dumping. It is argued 
that selling at prices below average cost could be an indication of dumping since a 
discriminatory monopoly will not normally sell at a price below cost. Making domestic 
sales at prices below cost are, however, not prohibited by antitrust laws if  they are to unload 
inventories of seasonal items or apparel out of style. If there is uncertainty about demand, 
pricing below cost is normal behaviour for any firm as a short-run response to a depressed 
market. This leads us to the notion of cyclical dumping where exporters would price their 
exports cyclically while setting stable prices in the home market. Ethier (1982) shows that 
even when firms are perfectly competitive, but there is uncertainty about demand coupled 
with imperfect adjustments in factor markets, cyclical dumping can emerge. In the presence 
of rigidities, it is possible to explain why certain industries and countries are prone to
cyclical dumping where others are not (i.e. to maintain stable employment conditions). 
Under these circumstances, AD policy could end up being used to avoid structural 
adjustment.
There are a growing number of countries that are using antidumping as an effective 
device to restrict imports. An overview of the changes in the geographical distribution in 
the use of AD worldwide is presented in Chapter 3. The traditional users of AD were 
Canada, the United States (US), Australia and Europe. But a growing number of “new” 
users have made intensive use of these laws since the 1980s. The widespread use of AD 
actions in the last two decades has raised concerns about its implementation and use. The 
increasing use of AD by developing countries has raised concerns about the motives of the 
users of AD. Strategic motives - like retaliation -  have been found to be important (Prusa 
and Skeath, 2002). There is an asymmetry in the geographic distribution of AD actions. 
The South East Asian (SEA) countries and the non-market economies have become the 
main targets and their share as users of the mechanism is still below 6%. Europe is 
considered to be one of the “traditional” users and is still one of the main users of this trade 
protective device. However, the number of antidumping investigations in Europe has 
remained relatively constant in the period 1985-97. Europe is overall a net “importer” of 
investigations. More investigations are launched against Europe than from Europe towards 
other countries. These and other features of AD activity are analysed in Chapter 3.
An extensive body of literature has concentrated on the implications of the existing 
AD laws for the strategic behaviour of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. Blonigen 
and Prusa (2003a) present a survey that distinguishes the different stages of antidumping 
trade policy: the pre-investigation, the investigation and the post-investigation. Several 
studies have examined various aspects of AD, countervailing duty (CVD) and the decisions 
made by the International Trade Commission (ITC) in the US.
The generally liberalising trend in world trade is perhaps being undermined and the 
rules that, in theory, were there to constrain “unfair” practices serve as an effective tool for 
protection. The vagueness of the antidumping code has allowed countries to unilaterally 
interpret the laws that claim consistency with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, 
especially in the definition of dumping, the determination of “normal” value and more 
significantly in the determination of injury. The AD laws and its implementation contain 
loopholes that could introduce influences other than the criteria for determining dumping 
and injury. This makes an affirmative finding more likely and broadens the scope for its
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use. This thesis empirically analyses the determinants underlying the European 
antidumping decisions. It analyses economic factors (technical) and the political influences 
that affect the AD cases decided in the European Union in the period 1985-2003.
The AD regulations are of a complex nature. The legal and institutional framework 
contained in Chapter 3 provides the necessary background information to empirically 
analyse the determinants of antidumping decisions presented in later chapters.
A controversial administrative practice that introduces a bias in favour of protection 
is that of “cumulation” by which investigating authorities aggregate imports originating in 
all the countries named in an investigation. When an investigation is initiated, the 
complaint refers to a narrowly defined product and the accusation“'of dumping could refer to 
several countries. However, a decision is made for each individual one. More specifically, 
when dumping is found, the investigating authorities proceed to a calculation of the 
dumping margin for the product involved for each individual country included in the legal 
case. In a similar fashion they have to find “material” injury and decide on each country of 
origin separately. In 1984, the US Congress amended the AD and CVD laws, mandating 
that the ITC “cumulate” imports across countries. The WTO Antidumping Agreement of 
1994 explicitly allows for imports to be cumulatively assessed. From 1994, the European 
regulations allowed the cumulation of imports from several countries under certain 
conditions. They provide discretion to decide whether or not to cumulate the imports from 
the different countries under consideration. However, European firms have tended to file 
investigations against multiple producers and the European Commission (EC) has made 
ample use of this practice even before 1994. To clarify how this rule introduces a bias 
towards protection, imagine that an investigation refers to imports originating from Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand. Assume that each individual country has a market share 
of 5%. The four countries considered together will represent 20% of the EU market. It 
would be difficult to argue that a market share of 5% is causing material injury to the EU 
industry, if considered individually. However, cumulating imports allows the authorities to 
easily find injury. This rule provides discretion in the injury decisions and will be, 
therefore, taken into account in the statistical analysis of the determinants of the dumping 
and injury decisions.
The European AD legislation differs from that of the US. The differences are 
outlined and the investigation procedure in Europe is explained in detail in Chapter 3. The 
regulations contain a very precise timing in which a decision has to be made. The main
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stages are the opening of the investigation, the preliminary decision stage and the definitive 
decision stage. The explanation of the workings of AD law in Europe will prove useful in 
understanding the econometric results discussed.
Research into the political economy of trade policy has tried to give answers to the 
question of why industries receive protection and why certain industries receive more 
protection than others. In the second section of Chapter 4, I present a brief survey of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy and 
antidumping.
The main findings of the empirical research on the political economy of trade policy 
are summarised in what follows. There is support for the voting model that suggests that 
elected officials tend to favour industries with the greater number of voters, so that 
protection is related to employment. It is also found that industries with low wages and 
high levels of labour per unit of output tend to receive more protection. There is also 
support for the pressure group model (Olson, 1965), since the number of firms in an 
industry has been found to be negatively related to the level of protection. Comparative 
advantage factors such as the import penetration and export ratios matter a lot in the 
determination of non-tariff barriers (NTB). Treffler (1993) finds that they are at least five 
times as important as business interest factors, as measured by concentration and capital 
measures.
Although legislative delegation is at the core of the implementation of AD laws, the 
extent to which agencies are isolated from political pressure varies across countries. The 
investigations on dumping and injury in Europe are carried out independently by two 
different administrative units within the European Commission. Accordingly, two separate 
equations are estimated.
The model analysed in Chapter 4 makes a distinction between economic and 
political determinants of antidumping decisions. The model distinguishes between the low 
and high track of decision-making. In the low or technical track cases are determined 
according to rules and decisions are delegated to government agencies. In the high track 
cases are decided and they are less constrained by rules and regulations.
In Chapter 4, the hypotheses tested are:
• Hypothesis 1 - The political variables are not significant in the determination of
dumping
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• Hypothesis 2 - The technical variables (comparative costs) are not significant in the 
determination of injury
In each regression, economic and political variables are included but it is expected 
that mainly economic variables (comparative costs) are significant in the dumping 
decisions whereas mainly political variables are significant in the injury decisions.
Law specialists have documented the bias that exists in the decisions against non- 
market economies, so a dummy variable is used to capture this effect. The political 
variables can be divided into international and domestic. Among the former is the 
proportion of European exports that are exported to the country of the defendant as a 
proportion of total European exports. One could expect that the main channel through 
which retaliation can affect the decisions made may operate at the level of the government 
agency involved, namely the Commission. It is expected that the higher the proportion of 
European exports to the country of the defendant on the volume of total exports, the less 
likely it is that there would be a positive finding of dumping. Another variable included as 
an international determinant is an indicator one, which takes value one if the country of the 
defendant is a less developed country (LDC). The sign of this variable is left unspecified. 
On the one hand, the Antidumping Agreement establishes that “...special regard must be 
given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing country 
Members when considering the application of antidumping measures...” But, on the other 
hand, Bown et al. (2003) find evidence of a bias against developing countries in the 
analysis of US antidumping. They argue that some of the factors that may explain the 
observed bias facing developing countries could be the differences in administrative and 
institutional “capacity” as well as limited retaliatory ability.
Among the domestic political variables several measures of political influence are 
used. A measure of concentration is included in order to capture the potential for lobbying 
in the industry that initiates the case. It is the market share of the five biggest firms in an 
industry in the European Union. The sign of this variable is expected to be positive, 
reflecting the presumption that the more concentrated the industry the more likely it is to 
overcome free rider problems and the more likely to lobby for the case. Another domestic 
political variable is the size of the case as measured by the imports of the products in the 
year in which the investigation was initiated. Higher imports are expected to increase the
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probability that a final decision on dumping will be affirmative. Moreover, the larger the 
industry filing a complaint the greater the electoral impact it could have, so the hypothesis 
is that larger industries can exert greater political pressure either directly on the 
Commission or on country members’ representatives. The variable that best captures this 
effect is employment.
The economic determinants attempt to capture any bias in favour of producers with 
a comparative disadvantage in international trade. They refer to relative factor endowments, 
factor prices and costs. The first variable included in this group is the capital-labour ratio. 
Based on the Hecksher-Ohlin model, a highly developed country is expected to have a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries. Therefore, the sign of the capital- 
labour ratio is expected to be negative. Another variable in this group is the average wages 
and salaries per worker employed in the industry concerned. This variable could be 
expected to have a negative (on neo-factor proportions grounds) or a positive (on strategic 
trade policy grounds) sign. In the latter it would capture the extent to which Europe tends to 
protect industries with high human capital content. To check for robustness of the 
comparative cost measures the labour share was also used. The specification included the 
number of different products covered by the case, as the decision on dumping is a pricing 
decision and it applies better to specific products than to larger aggregations. The more 
narrowly defined the products and industry affected by the imports, the easier it becomes 
for domestic producers to demonstrate dumping and injury. Finally, a variable that 
represents the number of countries involved in a case was defined. The firm or group of 
firms requesting an investigation provide the information that documents the existence of 
“unfair” trade. This and additional information will be used as evidence in the case. This 
information is costly and assumed to increase with the number of countries involved in the 
case. I explore the possibility that this could have an impact on the AD decisions since the 
information provided by the petitioning firms constitutes the starting point on which the 
Commission investigates.
The empirical findings suggest that Europe is operating a double track AD 
mechanism. Mainly economic determinants are significant in the dumping regression 
whereas only political determinants are important in the injury regression. Several 
comparative costs variables are individually significant in the determination of dumping but 
only one political variable was found to be significant in the determination of injury. 
Europe has a technical and political track for the dumping decisions and a political track for
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the injury decisions. This pattern is similar to that found for the US. The results are in 
accordance with the findings of Finger et al. (1982), Moore (1992), Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck (1994) and Hansen and Prusa (1997), who have found that antidumping 
decisions are captured by political pressure.
A distinctive feature of European AD is that when an affirmative decision is made, 
the investigating authorities can choose whether to end the case with the imposition of a 
duty or whether to accept price undertakings. In chapter 5, I empirically assess the 
determinants of the European Union’s choice of accepting price undertakings as opposed to 
imposing definitive antidumping duties in those cases in which both dumping and material 
injury have been found. The price undertakings could take the form of a price increase by 
the exporter or of a restraint of the volume of exports. From a welfare point of view the 
acceptance of undertakings will always be costly. There will always be a welfare loss 
compared with the imposition of AD duties. The acceptance of price undertakings 
generates rents for the foreign firms, because it raises European prices, with a negative 
impact on welfare. The price increase of imports will accrue to foreign producers, not to the 
importing country.
In spite of the fact that undertakings are disadvantageous for Europe, they have been 
widely used in the 1980s. They may be suggested by the exporters) or by the Commission. 
A similar provision, called the Suspension Agreements, is available in the US antidumping 
law. These agreements can remove dumping or the injury or they may require a temporary 
withdrawal from the market, but they are very rarely used in the US. Prusa (1992) points 
out that while the US does not have a formal mechanism for price undertakings as the EU, 
private price arrangements could occur and lead to withdrawals of petitions, motivated by 
collusion agreements.
In Europe, it is not clear what the criteria for suggesting undertakings are. No 
information is available in the legal documents published in the Official Journal as to what 
the motive might be. On the other hand, the EU administration has considerable discretion 
in allowing price undertakings and there are no written guidelines in the European 
regulations.
Theoretical papers that analyse the motives for the acceptance of undertakings are 
few. Belderbos et al. (2004) show that the decision to accept undertakings depends on the 
objective function of the EU administration that may range from caring only about industry 
interests to including the interest of consumers and other users. They analyse price
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undertakings when there is a possibility of foreign direct investment (FDI). They show that 
if the EU values producers’ surplus only, it is more likely to negotiate price undertakings 
rather than impose duties. In their model, the option of undertakings acts to persuade the 
foreign firm not to engage in FDI, since FDI increases price competition in the EU market 
due to the cost advantage of foreign producers.
Some other papers have concentrated on the effects of price undertakings instead of 
their motivation. Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001) show that price undertakings lead to 
lower product quality in the protected industries. Their framework considers vertical 
product differentiation. In their model, although price undertakings loosen price 
competition when the quality of products is given, quality choices are affected in a 
detrimental way to European firms compared to free trade. When quality is endogenous, 
price undertakings make the foreign firm compete more aggressively in quality terms. 
Everaert (2003) shows that price undertakings always delay technology adoption compared 
to free trade. This result is valid whether protection is temporary or permanent.
The determinants of price undertakings in Europe have been analysed by Tharakan 
(1991b). This paper analyses the decisions made in the period 1980-87 in which the 
majority (72%) of affirmative cases ended with the acceptance of undertakings. Factors 
such as the prevalence of bilateral trade deficits, the country of origin of certain defendants 
and the lobbying potential of the domestic industry were found to be correlated with the 
decision to refuse the offer of undertakings.
However, the popularity of undertakings has decreased enormously since. The 
number of investigations in Europe has remained relatively constant between 1985 and 
2003. Price undertakings have been used decreasingly less as a form of imposing definitive 
measures in Europe. Its use has decreased dramatically towards 1990 and has continued to 
decrease in recent years. It is likely that the determinants of its acceptance may also have 
changed considerably.
In this thesis, I analyse the determinants of the undertaking decisions in Europe. A 
data set of all European AD investigations initiated between 1985 and 2003 together with 
other associated trade and industrial statistics is constructed and used to empirically test 
several hypotheses.
In Chapter 5, the hypotheses are:
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• An important factor influencing the decision to accept price undertakings is the 
possibility to monitor the price agreement. This ability to monitor is clearly 
established in the WTO AD Agreement (1994) and in the EU regulations;
• There is a rent transfer to exporters implicit in price undertakings. It is feasible that 
these transfers will be conceded to countries that do not have excessive surpluses in 
their trade with the EU. Several measures of bilateral trade are included;
• Deciding on “softer” remedies like the acceptance of undertakings instead of duties 
might reduce the potential loss from retaliation. The potential loss from retaliation is 
expected to be high when the share of exports from the EU to the country of the 
defendant is big;
• The GATT/WTO Agreement recommends the possibility for constructive remedies 
to be explored when developing countries are involved. To test whether the EU is 
being especially tough or soft with less developed countries, a set of dummies is 
included to account for this possibility.
• It is possible that the political influences relative to industry size or bargaining 
power could play an important role in the acceptance of undertakings. The bigger 
the lobbying potential the less likely that the softer remedy is imposed. Several 
measures of industry size and bargaining potential are used;
• The Commission may be more reluctant to accept the offer of price undertakings by 
foreign exporters in high technology industries in order to foster these EU 
industries;
• Many practitioners describe that in cases involving Japanese firms price 
undertakings are likely to be rejected. A dummy variable is included to analyse this 
effect;
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• In cases involving exporting firms in non-market economies the Commission could 
be more likely to accept price undertakings. Some firms in non-market economies 
operate under a “soft budget constraint” in this period. More importance is given to 
quantity targets than profitability. Imposing AD duties can induce firms to decrease 
prices even more with no effect on imports because the state would absorb the 
firms’ losses. So, the Commission may choose to use undertakings instead of duties, 
forcing exporters to increase their price.
A probit model is used to analyse the data. The sample includes information on 343 
investigations initiated between 1985 and 2003 that ended either with the imposition of 
definitive AD duties or with the acceptance of undertakings. The results of the empirical 
analysis are consistent with some of the hypotheses formulated.
3 Thesis Structure
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of different aspects of trade theory and 
policy. It is composed of six chapters. This introductory chapter provides an overview of 
the research together with the motivation and relevance of the study and a summary of the 
contribution it has made in the field. In Chapter 2 the focus is on the design of optimal 
policies in the presence of incomplete information. Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the 
design of an optimal import tariff in the presence of incomplete information from the part 
of governments. Another controversial area of a conflicting view in trade policy is the 
existence of international dumping and the implementation and use of antidumping 
regulations. The political economy aspects of antidumping decisions are analysed in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 3 is dedicated to provide the descriptive analysis and the 
background information that would help to understand the issues analysed in the 
subsequent two chapters. Political economy aspects are important in administered 
protection, in general, and in antidumping, in particular. The first two sections of this 
chapter use a variety of data sources to map the evolution of antidumping investigations 
worldwide and in Europe. The third section describes the antidumping laws at the 
GATT/WTO level as well as the implementation of these laws in Europe. It also contains a
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description of the differences of these regulations with those of the US. A detailed 
description of the whole investigation procedure in Europe and of its timeline as well as the 
main institutional features is discussed. Finally, a description of the institutions involved in 
European AD investigations is presented together with an analysis of the final outcomes of 
all antidumping investigations carried out by the European Commission (EC) for every year 
between 1985 and 2003.
Chapter 4 includes the analysis of the determinants of European dumping and injury 
decisions in the period 1985-2003. This chapter includes a review of the theoretical 
framework with a focus on previous work to explain the political economy of antidumping. 
Before the technical analysis is made, an overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the political economy of trade policy and antidumping is introduced. Then, I 
empirically analyse the European decisions on dumping and injury based on the Finger- 
Hall-Nelson model of the political economy of administered protection, using a newly 
constructed data set on legal cases and associated trade and industrial statistics. This model 
distinguishes between political economy and technical (economic) determinants in the 
antidumping decisions. First, two hypotheses are tested. Second, the robustness of the 
model is discussed. Third, the impact of the cumulation rules, by which the European 
Commission aggregates the imports from all the countries named in an investigation, is 
analysed. Fourth, I analyse the determinants of positive findings where both dumping and 
injury have been found. This enables to explore whether the determinants of “affirmative” 
decisions are driven by political economy factors or not. Finally, the economic relevance of 
the econometric findings is discussed. Chapter 5 analyses empirically the determinants of 
the decisions to accept price undertaking in Europe. After dumping and injury have been 
found, legal provisions allow the European administration to settle antidumping actions 
either by levying duties or by demanding price undertakings from the foreign exporting 
firms. Price undertakings are price agreements between firms that allow the dispute to be 
settled, as long as the price changes by foreign firms eliminate the margin of dumping or 
injury. A data set of European antidumping decisions initiated in the period 1985-03 
together with other trade and industrial statistics is compiled to analyse the hypothesised 
determinants of the acceptance of undertakings versus the imposition of definitive 
antidumping duties. First, the legal framework that regulates price undertakings at the 
GATT/WTO and European level is introduced. Second, a brief review of the literature that 
has analysed price undertakings in Europe is presented. The discretion held by the
European Commission in allowing price undertakings makes it important to assess the 
determinants of these decisions empirically. Building on the previous studies, several 
hypotheses are presented and empirically assessed. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the main 
findings of the research and frames them within the broader context of trade theory and 
policy. The theoretical and empirical relevance of the thesis is discussed.
4 Results and Contributions
The motivation of this thesis is to understand different aspects of trade theory and policy. 
One of the aspects analysed is the design of an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist that 
faces competition from a domestic firm in the presence of incomplete information. The 
other main focus of the thesis is the empirical analysis of the determinants of European 
antidumping investigations.
One of the main objections to the theory of strategic trade policy is that it assumes 
the government has prefect knowledge of things such as the nature of competition or the 
cost structure of certain industries. There is an established body of literature that has 
investigated the implications of incomplete information in strategic trade policy theory. 
The analysis discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that a firm that has low costs has an incentive 
to misrepresent them and to pretend it has high costs in order to obtain a lower import tariff 
on its exports. In equilibrium, this incentive does not exist because the government 
anticipates the action of the foreign firm and acts rationally when choosing the optimal 
tariff. First, it is shown that a unique separating sequential equilibrium exists and that 
strategic trade policy can effectively be designed in the presence of informational 
asymmetries.
Second, the government chooses a tariff that is lower to the tariff that would prevail 
in the absence of signalling. The efficient firm has an incentive to mimic the inefficient 
firm. So, the latter should distort output away from the complete information output. The 
firm with low costs chooses to produce at the full information output level while the high 
cost firm distorts equilibrium output downwards. Overall expected foreign output is 
smaller; therefore, the tariff is lower than in the absence of signalling. Third, pooling 
equilibria can be ruled out because it requires unreasonable beliefs to support them.
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Finally, because expected foreign output is lower when signalling, domestic output 
and profits of the domestic firm are higher. Because a lower specific tariff is needed to 
commit the home firm to greater expected output, the efficient firm output is higher due to 
a “lower tariff’ effect. The firm with low costs is able to obtain full information profits but 
its output is greater than when no signalling occurs, due to the lower tariff on imports. On 
the contrary, for the inefficient foreign firm the signalling effect is stronger than the lower 
tariff effect. Therefore, for a given level of the tariff and domestic firm’s output, the 
equilibrium output chosen by the high-cost foreign firm is lower. Overall, the signalling 
effect prevails over the lower tariff effect. Expected foreign production is lower and 
domestic production is higher. Incomplete information lessens the rent extracting argument 
for an import tariff.
The descriptive analysis in the third chapter provides the background information 
about the antidumping activity worldwide and in Europe that helps understand the 
empirical analysis described in Chapters 4 and 5. First, it describes the changes in the 
geographic distribution of AD activity worldwide since 1987. Antidumping emerges as the 
most widespread impediment to trade. Over time, rules have changed so that dumping is 
easier to be found and dumping margins are higher over time. The South East Asian 
countries (including Japan) and the non-market economies are the target of most activity. 
Second, it includes a descriptive analysis of the investigations initiated by European firms. 
Although relatively constant over in the period 1985-2003, the composition of industries 
filing investigations has changed. Firms in the chemical and iron industries were 
traditionally heavy users of antidumping but those in the textile sector have taken an 
increasingly predominant role. Third, it describes the workings of the intricate AD law and 
its recent evolution at the GATT/WTO level. Fourth, it presents a detailed account of the 
procedures followed to establish dumping and injury and highlights the mains differences 
with the regulations prevalent in the US.
The institutions in Europe have in common with other countries the delegation of 
the investigation procedure to a government agency. However, there are some distinctive 
features in the European case that may have implications for the way the political 
influences can affect the decision making process. In particular, final AD decisions in 
Europe have to be approved by the Council of Ministers (COM). Lobbying efforts can, 
therefore, be directed at the European Commission and/or the Council. Even tough the
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decision making process is supposed to be purely statutory and purely reflecting market 
circumstances, the institutional setup suggests that political influences may be prevalent.
Chapter 4 and 5 analyse the determinants of the decisions on dumping, injury and 
the acceptance of price undertakings in Europe. Chapter 4 considers the role of the double 
track model of administered protection. The main empirical findings are:
• First, the evidence suggests that Europe operates a double track AD mechanism. 
Mainly economic variables are significant in the dumping decisions whereas 
only political variables are important in the injury decision;
• Second, the number of countries named in the investigations is significant. 
There is a non-linear effect on the probability of a positive decision being made. 
Filing investigations against a larger number of countries decreases the 
probability of dumping and injury to start with until it reaches a critical value of 
four countries. When more than four countries are named in the investigation 
the probability of dumping and injury increases;
• Third, the model is robust to the use of different proxies;
• Fourth, the main results remain unchanged when cumulated imports from the 
other countries named in the case are considered;
• Finally, the main significant determinants remain unchanged when excluding 
different sectors of economic activity.
The present study improves upon previous research in that by using a unique dataset 
with information collected from the reports published in the Official Journal of the 
European Commission and other sources, it gathers a data set of 805 legal cases covering 
the period 1985-2003. The econometric analysis improves on previous studies in that it 
explicitly controls for industry heterogeneity and macroeconomic effects. It is shown that a 
decision on dumping and injury being positive can be explained by the general features of
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the double track model of administered protection as captured by the main regressors. The 
economic significance of the results is analysed.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the analysis of the determinants of European price 
undertaking in the period 1985-2003. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent 
with some of the hypothesis formulated and can be summarised as follows:
• First, the estimates show that there is a statistically significant effect of the share of 
European exports to the country against which an investigation is carried out on the 
probability of acceptance of price undertakings. The evidence suggests that the 
potential loss from retaliation has not prevented the Commission from imposing AD 
duties. Greater exports to the country of the defendant may be associated with a 
lower probability that price undertakings are accepted. Instead, the “tougher” 
remedy of AD duties is more likely to be imposed to those countries that are 
receivers of EU exports. This result is very robust since it is found in all 
specifications of the model. This proxy, however, could also be referring to stable 
trade relations between the EU and its trade partners, in which case it can be argued 
that the choice of imposing “tougher” measures on AD investigations is less likely 
to affect the volume of exports to trade partners.
• Second, there is some evidence that bilateral trade deficits have an impact on the EC 
choice between the acceptance of price undertakings and the imposition of duties.
• Third, there is some evidence to confirm the alleged ease or ability to “monitor” the 
price undertakings hypothesis, as indicated in the guidelines of the GATT/WTO 
Agreement.
• Fourth, political economy and bargaining power variables are significant in the 
decision to refuse price undertakings. Domestic political influences as represented 
by the level of industrial concentration result in “tougher” measures being imposed. 
The level of industrial concentration result in the “tougher” measures (duties) being 
imposed. There is also some evidence that industry and case size, increases the 
probability of acceptance of price undertakings.
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• Fifth, some of the countries’ characteristics are found to be significant. Some of the 
evidence suggests that the EU is less likely to apply the “softer” remedy of price 
undertaking in cases involving non-market economies.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following respects. It 
analyses the decision to accept price undertakings for investigations initiated between 1985 
and 2003. It uses a data set of 517 European legal cases in which a positive affirmative 
decision has been made, and either AD duties have been imposed or price undertakings 
have been accepted. The econometric analysis improves on previous studies in that it 
explicitly controls for macroeconomic effects and industry heterogeneity. It assesses the 
importance of political economy factors influencing the decisions. It includes a sensitivity 
analysis and it presents the economic significant of the results.
Overall, this thesis makes a contribution to our understanding of several aspects of 
trade theory and policy. In particular, it contributes to the analysis of optimal tariff policy in 
the presence of incomplete information as well as to the understanding of the determinants 
of European decisions on dumping, injury and the choice of antidumping measures.
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Chapter 2 Tariffs under Incom plete Inform ation2
l  Introduction
This chapter explores the effects of asymmetric information in trade policy when a 
domestic government decides on an import tariff on a foreign competitor whose costs it 
does not know. It is shown that when a foreign firm's costs are private information, its level 
of output can signal costs to the government. The competitive firm has an incentive to 
misrepresent its costs - by pretending its costs are high - in order to obtain a lower tariff and 
make higher profits. In a two-period signalling equilibrium, the government anticipates this 
incentive and sets a first period optimal tariff that is lower than would be if the firm does 
not signal cost through output. The optimal tariff could be chosen and strategic trade policy 
could be effectively designed in the presence of informational asymmetries.
One of the main objections to the theory of strategic trade policy is that it presumes 
too much knowledge on the part of governments. To implement an optimal tax or subsidy 
the government must have a good idea of the cost structure in the industry, demand and the 
nature of competition. It seems reasonable to believe that governments are less informed 
about such things than the firms themselves. It seems desirable that the role of asymmetric 
information be explored. Recent research has focused on the specific ways in which 
informational failures might affect policy and modifying policy recommendations to 
account for such failures.
Under asymmetric information firms have an incentive to mislead governments if 
they are able to. If governments do not know firms' costs, there is adverse selection. When 
the government does not know the cost of a foreign competitor, the latter could have an 
incentive to persuade it that its marginal cost is higher than it actually is. In this way, it 
could obtain a lower import tariff in order to produce more output and obtain higher profits.
This chapter contributes to understanding the role of strategic trade policy under 
incomplete information and it can be related to antidumping. It analyses the role of 
asymmetries of information in trade policy for a simple case where a domestic government
2 This chapter is based on the paper “Tariff under incomplete information” which is published as a Discussion 
Paper in the Discussion Papers Series of the University of Bristol, DP No. 00/510, December 2000.
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faces a foreign firm whose costs it ignores. In practice, there are often deviations from the 
uniform tariff levels and are due in part to the government’s desire to fine-tune the tariff 
structure to the exporter’s efficiency. Cost-based antidumping can be viewed as a vehicle 
for implementing cost-contingent tariff policies. Under cost-based dumping, the domestic 
government estimates the foreign firm’s production costs and then imposes and AD duty 
designed to insure “fair” prices. Two different situations are explored. First, I present a 
model in which there is a single foreign provider of a homogenous good. Second, I analyse 
the case in which the foreign firm competes with a domestic producer. In the first case, the 
government is concerned about consumer welfare and tariff revenue. In the second one, it is 
also concerned about profits of the domestic producer. It is assumed that the foreign firm 
know the cost structure of the domestic firm, whereas neither the domestic government nor 
the domestic firm know the cost structure of the foreign firm. This assumption captures the 
situation in which a well-established domestic firm faces competition from an emerging 
market. The cost structure of the incumbent is known but the cost structure of the foreign 
potential entrant is not.
The domestic government faces a trade-off. If setting a high tariff it can obtain 
higher revenue but a lower output reducing consumers' welfare. The optimal policy should 
equate the marginal loss of consumers' welfare with the marginal gain from tariff revenue, 
shifting profits from the foreign firm to the domestic country (when there is competition). 
In a dynamic setting, the domestic government can anticipate the incentive of the foreign 
firm to misrepresent its costs and, therefore, set a tariff that differs from the complete 
information case and from the case where the firm does not signal its costs through output.
The chapter addresses two main issues. The first is the consequences of a signalling 
effect on the incentive of the government to impose a tariff on imports, when there is no 
domestic production in a dynamic framework where interaction occurs in two periods. We 
want to know what happens when the government anticipates the incentive of the foreign 
firm to misrepresent itself. This repeated interaction is analysed in a two-period setting. 
Secondly, competition is introduced. I allow for the existence of a domestic firm that 
supplies the same good to which the tariff is imposed.
This chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical issue of strategic trade policy 
under incomplete information is reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, I present the basic 
model and a characterization of the optimal policies. I analyse the case in which there is no 
domestic competition. The good is only produced by a foreign firm. The game and the
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government's objective function are discussed. The informational asymmetry is analysed in 
the form of adverse selection between the domestic government and the foreign firm and 
the optimal unilateral policy is derived in a dynamic setting. I compare the optimal policy 
when the firm's output signals its cost with the case where no signalling occurs and with the 
full information case. Section 4 analyses the optimal policies when a foreign firm competes 
with a domestic producer. Section 5 concludes.
2 Asymmetric Information and Trade Policy: 
Related Literature
Several papers have investigated the role of asymmetric information have investigated the 
role of informational asymmetries on trade policy theory. These asymmetries are about the 
nature of competition (Maggi 1996), the cost structure in the industry (Qui 1994, Brainard 
and Martimort 1996, 1997 and 1998; and Kolev and Prusa 1999) and demand (Collie and 
Hviid 1994 and Maggi 1999). Some research has concentrated on the implications for the 
rent-shifting trade policy of the type proposed by Brander and Spencer's (1985) model of 
optimal export subsidies. Under complete information, the government is able to give its 
firm a strategic advantage because it has full pre-commitment power. Under incomplete 
information, if governments ignore the real cost of domestic firms, the latter would have an 
incentive to persuade him that its marginal cost is lower than it actually is. In this way, they 
could get higher subsidies and would make foreign firms produce less output. When this is 
the case, the domestic government might anticipate the domestic firm's incentive to 
misrepresent its costs.
Collie and Hviid (1993) and Qiu (1994 and 2003) examine the use of strategic trade 
policy as a signalling device when the informational asymmetry is between domestic and 
foreign firms. The informational asymmetry considered in these models seems a realistic 
one for some industries. It is plausible that foreign competitors in an oligopolistic industry 
would not know the domestic firm's costs, but the domestic government does. This kind of 
asymmetry may be present when government supports R&D projects, as it is the case in 
high technology industries, i.e. microelectronics, aerospace. In these industries there is a 
high degree of government intervention. Collie and Hviid (1993) show that a domestic
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government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firms to its 
foreign competitors. A larger export subsidy leads the foreign firm to infer that the 
domestic firm has lower costs. In response it reduces its output, which increases the profits 
of the domestic firm. The firm then receives a larger export subsidy than it would under 
complete information. There is then a signalling effect that reinforces the usual profit 
shifting effect. When the action of a rival interventionist government is introduced there is 
a strategic interaction effect that emerges where the foreign government has an incentive to 
increase its export subsidy, but this effect is not big enough and the previous results still 
hold. The export subsidies under incomplete information are larger than the profit-shifting 
export subsidies under complete information. In a signalling model in which neither 
domestic government nor the foreign firm know the costs of a domestic firm, Wright 
(1998) shows that optimal subsidies are smaller than under uncertainty. The model in this 
chapter is similar but it analyses the role of an import tariff as a rent-extracting and strategic 
policy instrument. In contrast with Collie and Hviid (1993), Qiu (1994) and Wright (1998), 
the model analysed here focuses on import tariffs and on an unknown cost efficiency of a 
foreign firm. The type of informational asymmetries analysed is between a domestic 
government (and firm) and a foreign competitor.
Qiu (1994 and 2003) highlights the importance of the government in facilitating 
strategic information revelation. The government can design a menu of policies to induce 
information revelation. By setting up a menu of per unit subsidies it is able to make the 
domestic firm reveal its type. But, because the foreign firm is also uninformed, there is a 
mixture of signalling and screening. When information revealing is desirable, a policy 
menu plays a role in inducing this revelation. Each choice of the menu consists of two 
policies: a specific export subsidy and a level of lump-sum transfer. By setting up a menu 
of subsidies, the domestic firm is able to signal its cost through its policy selection. The 
government carries out screening but signalling also occurs when the domestic firm selects 
from the menu proposed by the government. It is shown that, under Cournot competition, a 
government would choose a menu of subsidy programs that induces separation by the 
firms. The interesting result is that the allocation that results is the same as if the 
government had full information about costs.
Brainard and Martimort (1996, 1997 and 1998) study the same basic economic 
environment, in the sense of considering the role of cost-based informational asymmetries 
when subsidies are imposed on exports to third markets. However, the asymmetry of
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information they consider is between governments and firms. This kind of asymmetry may 
be present in the airframe manufacturing industry, where manufacturers have a precise 
knowledge about the costs of their rivals and governments have only access to consolidated 
profits for tax purposes. The model is different to the one presented by Collie and Hviid 
(1993) and Qiu (1994 and 2003) in that the foreign firm knows the domestic firm's costs, so 
that only governments are uninformed. They assume that the government faces a trade-off 
between increasing the profits of possibly wealthy firms and raising funds from the 
taxpayer. The cost of public funds becomes an important determinant in the design of the 
optimal export policy. Policies therefore have two objectives: to reinforce the strategic 
position of local firms and to minimize the informational rent, which is socially costly. The 
effect of government pre-commitment and asymmetric information works in opposite 
directions. Lacking precise knowledge of the firms’ profits functions, the government faces 
a trade-off between manipulating the payoffs to the local firm in a way that enhances its 
strategic advantage, and preventing the firm from deriving distortionary rents from its 
private information. Brainard and Martimort (1997) show that the government's lack of 
information weakens the commitment value of the subsidy. There is a downward distortion 
of the optimal subsidy, which may be severe enough to force the subsidy below zero. This 
is a "screening" effect. A two dimensional policy is used to deal with both distortions: 
strategic pre-commitment and informational rent seeking. The optimal policy is to 
implement a menu of contracts specifying a per-unit subsidy and a lump-sum tax as a 
function of the firms’ reported costs. The announcement of the subsidy serves as a credible 
commitment to expand the firm's output, while the lump-sum transfer serves as a screening 
device. Qui (1994) uses a combination of signalling and screening whereas Brainard and 
Martimort (1996, 1997 and 1998) develop a screening model. In both papers it is assumed 
that the government can use two policy instruments, a per-unit subsidy and a lump-sum 
reimbursement. Instead, the model in this chapter is a signalling model. I assume that there 
is only one policy instrument (a specific tariff) available to the government.
Governments cannot only have limited information about firms’ competitiveness or 
the level of demand, but they may have limited understanding about the nature of 
competition in an industry. Maggi (1996) develops a model of capacity-price competition
3 In choosing a tariff it seems unfeasible that any government could suggest a contract to foreign firms that 
would involve lump-sum transfers to foreign producers.
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to analyse the sensitivity of strategic trade policy to the type of competition. The 
equilibrium outcome (in the absence of trade policy) ranges from Bertrand to the Cournot 
result as capacity constraints become more important. He shows that capacity subsidies can 
increase the domestic country’s income regardless of the type of competition. Maggi (1999) 
analyses the role of non-linear subsidies. He shows that when firms are better informed 
than governments about the profitability of the industry, information asymmetries* may 
increase trade policy distortions and worsen the “prisoner’s dilemma” between 
governments.
A similar line of research has concentrated on the use of tariffs in the presence of 
incomplete information. Collie and Hviid (1994) focus on the case where a domestic 
government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign 
monopolist that exports into the domestic market. Then, the government can use its tariff to 
signal about demand. In a signalling equilibrium, the domestic government uses a tariff that 
is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information. The signalling effect 
strengthens the usual rent-extracting argument for the tariff. In the signalling equilibrium, 
however, welfare is lower than when the government is uncertain about demand. There is a 
cost of signalling that can be avoided by delegating tariff setting to a revenue-maximizing 
agent. The model analysed in this chapter takes a different approach. It considers a cost- 
based asymmetry and the dynamic interaction between a government (and domestic firm) 
and a foreign firm in a two-period policy setting. It examines the design of an optimal tariff 
in the presence of a foreign monopolist and compares the outcome with a situation in which 
there is a domestic firm competing with foreign imports. Tariffs are higher in duopoly than 
in the foreign monopoly case because there is an additional incentive to use the tariff to 
shift profits from the foreign to the domestic firm.
Collie et al. (1999) analyse trade policy under asymmetric information when 
integrated, instead of segmented markets are considered. They show that in the presence of 
incomplete information about the level of domestic costs there is an incentive for the 
domestic government to use its trade policy to signal about the costs of the domestic firm. 
If there was complete information, the optimal policy would be an import tariff (export 
subsidy) when the domestic country is a net importer (exporter). In equilibrium, the low 
cost country gives an export subsidy, which is countervailed by the import tariff of the 
other country. The signalling effect increases the export subsidy (and decreases the import 
tariff).
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Similarly, Kolev and Prusa (1999) examine the incentives of a government to 
impose an import tariff on a foreign monopolist with unknown costs in a framework where 
exports take place over an infinite number of periods. They show that a policy of optimal 
uniform tariffs (pooling equilibrium) is better than a discriminatory one. Matschke (2003) 
analyses the equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the presence of asymmetric information. 
Using a screening model, she shows that asymmetric information destroys the equivalence 
of tariffs and quotas that exists when complete information exists. In common with Kolev 
and Prusa (1999), the model in this chapter analyses a cost-based informational asymmetry 
in a signalling framework. In contrast with this paper the model examined in this chapter 
does not limit the ability of the government to intertemporally change its policy. The 
government is allowed to change its policy in the second period.
In the context of antidumping protection, Kolev and Prusa (2002) show that the rise 
in AD protection may be related to an increase in voluntary export restraints (VER). In a 
model where a domestic government has incomplete information about a foreign firm’s 
costs, they show that firms with low costs will voluntarily restraint exports before an AD 
investigation. They show the resulting AD duties are much higher. They assume that the 
foreign firm chooses its output first and then its rival (the home firm) chooses quantity. The 
home firm is a Stackelberg follower. In contrast with this paper, the model presented in this 
chapter assumes that firms choose output simultaneously.
3 The Dynamic Model: no Dom estic Provision o f 
the Good
A quantity setting foreign monopolist supplies the domestic market for the product and the 
domestic government uses a tariff to extract rents from the firm. Assuming that the 
monopolist has constant marginal costs and that the markets are segmented, the domestic 
market can be analysed independently of the foreign market. The government is assumed to 
have incomplete information about the firm’s costs, whereas the firm is assumed to have 
complete information. This asymmetry means that the firm can use output to signal about 
costs. The government is assumed to announce and commit to a tariff in each period. This
39
implies that trade policies are made public and cannot be secretly renegotiated. If trade 
policies are observable to foreign firms they keep their commitment value.
The foreign firm chooses quantities to maximize profits. The inverse demand 
function is assumed to be linear, p  = a - q. Let us consider an economy with two goods 
where good q represents imports and goody represents the consumption of all other goods. 
In the domestic country the representative consumer has utility function U (q, y) that is 
strictly quasi-concave and has positive marginal utility for each good. Assume that the 
utility function is additive separable, U (q, y) = / (q) + y, a utility function of this form is 
quasi-linear and implies that there are no income effects in the demand functions for q and
y. Consumer surplus is given by CS(q) = £(a  -  x)dx - { a -  q )q .
The information structure of the game is as follows. The foreign firm's costs are 
private information, they are unknown by the domestic government. There are two types of 
firm: a high-cost (inefficient) firm and a low-cost (efficient) firm. The domestic 
government ignores which firm is which but knows the probability distribution of the 
unknown cost level. This is common knowledge. The government knows that the foreign 
firm has superior information about costs and the foreign firm knows that the government 
knows this, and so on. The structure of the game is common knowledge.
The sequence of this two-period signalling game is described in Figure 2.1. At the 
beginning of the first period, nature chooses the foreign firm's type: cl or ch• Marginal costs 
take the value ch with probability ju and cl with probability (1 -  p ) , where ci < ch
and // g (0,1). I assume that cL (cH {a . In the first stage, the domestic government chooses 
and commits to a tariff and, in a second stage, the foreign firm chooses its output. First 
period output level of the firm signals foreign firm's costs to the policy maker. At the end of 
period one, the domestic government updates its beliefs about the foreign firm’s costs. The 
beliefs of the domestic government are conditional on the firm’s first period output. After 
observing the firm’s output it can make an inference (update beliefs) of firm’s costs. If the 
government does not have any means of extracting information about costs from the firm, it 
sets an optimal tariff as if the cost parameter equalled // * cH + (1 -  p) * cL. At the beginning 
of the second period, with this updated probability assessment, the government announces 
an import tariff. I assume that the government commits to the level of tariff chosen. In a 
second stage, the firm chooses output. The solution concept is sequential equilibria. A 
sequential equilibrium is a set of first and second period output levels for each type of firm,
a tariff for each period and a system of beliefs that is consistent with each other and 
satisfies sequential rationality at every information set. Equilibrium output in the first 
period is chosen after the policy maker has set and committed to a tariff. Similarly, 
equilibrium output level is chosen optimally given second period tariff and the updated 
beliefs.
The optimal tariff under complete information, when the government first sets and
(a — c)commits to a tariff in the first period and then a foreign firm chooses output, is t = — -— .
A tariff leads the foreign firm to increase its price by less than the amount of the tariff. 
Thus, a small tariff will increase domestic welfare since the loss of consumer surplus is less 
than the gain in tariff revenue.
Under incomplete information, because the foreign firm prefers a low tariff, it 
clearly wants to convey the information that it has high costs. The problem is that it has no 
direct means of doing so, even if it indeed has high costs. The indirect way is to signal by 
choosing a low level of output (corresponding to a high cost type). The foreign firm wants 
to signal a high cost output level, even if it has low costs. But this does not mean that the 
government will set a low tariff in the second period after observing this level of output. A 
rational government, knowing that it is in the foreign firm's self-interest to lie in this 
manner, will not necessarily infer that the foreign firm has indeed high costs. In turn, the 
foreign firm knows that the government knows about this incentive, and so on (common 
knowledge). The correct way to analyse this dynamic game of incomplete information is 
to find a sequential equilibria. I consider pure strategies only. There are two possible 
potential equilibria in such a model: separating and pooling equilibria.
Separating Equilibria
In a separating sequential equilibrium, the foreign firm does not choose the same first and 
second period output when its costs are high as when they are low. The first period quantity 
fully reveals the cost of the entrant. In a pooling equilibrium, the first period quantity is 
independent of the cost level. The government leams nothing about costs and its posterior 
beliefs are identical to its prior. For a separating sequential equilibrium to exist two 
necessary conditions must hold: the low-cost firm must not choose the high cost
equilibrium quantity and vice-versa, in both periods. The characterization of the equilibria 
is complete when beliefs that are off-the-equilibrium path are chosen (for quantities that are
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Low costHigh cost





Nature draws firm’s type
Government updates beliefs
Output high cost Output low cost
Figure 2.1: Sketch of the Model
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off-the-equilibrium quantities) and that deter the two types from deviating from their 
equilibrium strategies. Thus, the necessary conditions are also sufficient in the sense that 
the corresponding quantities are equilibrium quantities. I solve the game backwards.
The separating equilibrium in the second period is a game of complete information. 
The policy-maker knows the foreign firm's costs. Given these costs, it chooses the tariff to 
maximize welfare. The foreign firm incurs a fixed cost of entry F  and maximises profits 
conditioned on the tariff M d X qi = (p' - c x —t\ )ql2 - f }  (1). The first order condition 
for profit maximisation gives equilibrium output. Once output is substituted into the profit
function, maximized profits are =
/  A A \ 2a — c —t2 -  F . In the tariff-setting stage of the
2
game the domestic government sets its specific tariff to maximise domestic welfare. I
assume that the government cares about consumer surplus and tariff revenue
(2 ) where, K p V i( 4 ))) = 'jfe (< ,i)J' is consumer
surplus. Solving the first order condition of this problem gives the optimal tariff
g
t*2 = —-— (3). The home country has an incentive to levy a tariff proportionate to the
efficiency of the exporter.
Before analysing the solution in the first stage of the game, let's define n 2 k as 
maximized profits when the true costs of the firm are i but the firm signals that its type is k.
v 6  J
The marginal cost of the foreign firm in the first period is private information and 
unknown to the government. The tariff is announced and committed to before output is 
chosen. In a separating sequential equilibrium, the foreign firm chooses different levels of 
output when its cost is low than when it is high. The first period output fully reveals the 
cost of the firm. The two necessary conditions for the existence of separating equilibria are 
that the high-cost firm would prefer to produce q"  in the first period and be perceived as 
high-cost in period two, rather than be perceived as low-cost in second period and be forced 
to produce q f in the first period ; and, vice-versa for a low-cost firm. Equilibrium output 
must also satisfy incentive rationality constraints (profits should be non zero, interior
2 a -  3cl + ch
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this context, it means that —
dc
solutions should exist). The necessary conditions are also sufficient when appropriate 
beliefs are specified. When a quantity that differs from the equilibrium quantities is 
observed, beliefs are arbitrary. The easiest way to obtain equilibrium is to choose beliefs 
such that the two types will not be tempted to deviate from their equilibrium strategies. So 
can be associated with the updated belief that the firm is of high-cost type ju (cH/qH)  = 
7. Conversely, can be associated with the belief that the firm is indeed low-cost fx 
(cll/q )  = 0 and it suffices for any other signal to be associated with beliefs (x (cH/q') = 0 for 
i ^  H. The government sets a higher tariff if it believes that the foreign firm has low costs 
rather than high costs, so that output and profits are higher when the high-cost firm signals 
the true type. However when a low-cost firm "mimics” a high-cost one, the government sets 
a lower tariff, so that the output and tariffs are higher when a low-cost firm signals she is a 
high-cost one. The low-cost firm has an incentive to deviate.
To derive the intervals of separating equilibrium quantities, one should note that it 
is more costly for the low-cost type to reduce output. This is the monotonicity property. In
djt ^  < 0. This condition is satisfied here. The lower the
d<]i j
foreign firm's cost the more the benefits from deviating.
Using these properties one can obtain the intervals (0, ] and ( q(*, (fl-c)] in which
incentive compatibility for the low cost firm (ICi) is satisfied given 
<7jL (/, ) = arg max n \ (q f , tx) and tj. However, not all of these output levels survive as part 
of equilibrium once dominated strategies are eliminated. In signalling games one can 
exclude some of these equilibria by eliminating dominated strategies when forming out-of­
equilibrium beliefs. The only equilibrium output levels are q\ (tx) and q^{tx)< q^  (fj). The
efficient firm achieves the first best profit level whereas the inefficient firm must distort its 
output away from the complete information profit maximizing output.
The unique separating sequential equilibrium is obtained from simultaneously 
solving q \ (tl) = arg max n \  (q f , 7,) (4), (tf/V,) + ^  < ,tx) + n L2m  (5)
and q” (tx) = arg max n 1? (q” , tx) (6 ). Equation (4) gives optimal output for the low-cost
st qi (f, )=argmax ^  ( q f )
firm. Condition (5) makes incentive compatibility for the low-cost firm binding. Equation 
(6 ) gives optimal output for the high-cost firm subject to the constraint that the low-cost
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firm has an incentive to deviate. The firm would choose the level of output that gives the 
minimum distortion. Condition (5) when satisfied with equality is a quadratic expression 
that has two levels of output as a solution, from which one dominates the other and is to be 
chosen by the high-cost firm. The solution to the above problem gives the unique sequential
.... . _ , . . a - c L - t ,  , H,  ^ a - c L- t .  V©equilibrium of the signalling game, (tj) = ----------------- - and q" (tj)  --------L-------
2 • 2 6
where © = (c11 -  cL)(4a -  5cL +cH). These are equilibrium output levels as a function of 
government beliefs. The domestic government takes the unique equilibrium as given and 
chooses the tariff to maximize expected welfare.
M a X ,. {E ff'*»[v(p (qH(t1)))+tlq H(t1)] + ( l- /u W {p (q L(t,)))+tlqL(0 ]}  (7). The
optimal tariff is: t, =
3
(8 ); and optimal outputs are:
( a - c L)+ —V© (9) and q” = — (a - c L) ~ ——— V©
6 6
(10).
Proposition 1 The solution defined by equations (8), (9) and (10) constitutes a
unique separating sequential equilibrium o f the signalling game, when the foreign firm's 
output signals costs and there is no domestic provision o f the good.
Proof See Appendix 2.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Proposition 1 has revealed that when 
choosing output in the first period, the efficient firm has an incentive to misrepresent itself 
as having high costs because if it is thought to have high costs the government fixes a 
smaller tariff. The government anticipates this incentive and allows for it when determining 
the optimal tariff and when updating its probability assessment at the end of the first period. 
Expected foreign production is lower when signalling, because of the distortion due to 
informational asymmetries.
It can also be shown that, provided that the probability of a high cost firm is not too 
low, the tariff in the first period is lower than under the full information case.
Pooling Equilibria
A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the low and high-cost firms choose the 
same action in the first period. For the game of incomplete information described in the
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previous section, there is a continuum of pooling equilibria as well as a separating 
equilibria presented. In the Cournot game that we are analysing the foreign firm 
independently of its type would choose a level of output q [ . In a pooling equilibrium, the 
government sets a tariff that does not depend upon the level of costs of the foreign firm and, 
therefore, cannot infer the true value of the marginal cost. It does not update beliefs when 
observing the equilibrium action and has to make its choice of tariff based on its prior 
beliefs about costs. No additional information is provided by first period output. At the 
beginning of the second period, the government continues to use its prior beliefs as the 
probability assessment.
Given beliefs and the tariff, the foreign firm chooses q\ in order to maximise
A/OX,; &  =(/>' -  c‘ ~ h  Wi -  ■P}. i= H , L (11)
The first order condition gives equilibrium output: q‘2{t2) = ——C——— .
f a - c l - t  ^2
J
- F . TheSubstituting into the firm's profits, maximized profits are: n2 {t2) =
V ^
policy maker chooses the tariff to maximize expected domestic welfare
M a x ,  [EW  -  it2)))+ t2q2 (t2)] + ( ! - M W (p{qL2 (t2)))+ t2q L2 (t2)]} (1 2 )
where V(p(ql2{t2))) denotes consumer surplus. The optimal tariff in the second period
Cl ~~~ cis t2p = —-— (13). Note that c = pcH + (1 -  p)cL represents the expected level of foreign
2.a — 3c* + ~cfirm’s costs. The firm’s optimal output is q2p = --------------- (14). The low-cost firm is
6
better off when pooling than when revealing its type, while the high-cost is worse off, 
because qL < q2p and q" < qH.
In each period the tariff is announced and committed to before output is chosen by 
the firm. A necessary condition for a quantity to be a pooling equilibrium is that none of the 
types of firm wants to deviate. The necessary conditions are also sufficient when
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appropriate beliefs are specified. The conditions that should hold for a pooling sequential 
equilibrium to exist are
ICH + ^  > < ( ^ , 0  + ^
ICL •■*tp(.qtl>,tl) + &?p
With beliefs ft (c"/q) ; 0 if q < q\ , fi (c"/q) = 1 if q > q f  and ft (c"/q) = ft if 
q = q( the above quantities can form part of a pooling sequential equilibria when forming 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. This means that any level of output between q? and q\ 
constitute pooling equilibria (Figure 2.3). Multiple equilibria are common in games of 
incomplete information and a number of equilibrium refinements have been proposed to 
eliminate some of them. In this model, there are only two types of firm and it is appropriate 
to use the intuitive criteria as an equilibrium refinement (Cho and Kreps 1987). The 
government perceives each out-of-equilibrium quantity as a possible signal and place 
probability zero on a type that is unlikely to send it.
It can be shown that multiple equilibria are eliminated when the intuitive criterion is 
applied.
The effect o f Signalling on the Optimal Tariff
In this section, I compare the optimal tariff and associated equilibrium output levels of the 
foreign firm between the signalling and no signalling equilibria. Differences in tx and t2p,
q \  and q\p , q\l and qffp reflect the role of the foreign firm's output as a signal of costs.
A comparison of output levels and tariffs allows the analysis and decomposition of the 
different effects.
Proposition 2 The optimal tariff when the foreign firm signals its costs through
output is smaller when than when the firm does not signal cost, as indicated by the 
inequality in (15).
fi < t2p (15)
Proof See Appendix 2.
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The intuition behind Proposition 2 is clear. Because expected foreign production is 
lower when signalling, the optimal tariff is lower than when the firm does not signal its 
costs through output. This in turn means that a lower tariff tends to increase output for both 
the high-cost and the low-cost firm. In the first period, a low-cost firm has an incentive to 
misrepresent its costs as high because if it is thought to be high-cost it gets a lower tariff. 
Therefore, for a high-cost firm to convince the government that in fact it has high costs 
requires it to distort its output below the level that would maximize profits in the absence of 
signalling. There are two forces influencing the output of the high-cost firm. A signalling 
effect induces output downwards while a lower tariff induces higher level of output. 
However, the signalling effect dominates and finally output is lower than when signalling 
does not occur. On the contrary, only the lower tariff effect influences the output of the 
low-cost firm, inducing a higher level than when output does not signal costs. Overall, 
expected output of the foreign firm is lower when signalling. Because expected output is 
lower under signalling, there is a distortion that is costly in terms of expected output and 
domestic welfare. Accordingly, the policy maker reduces the tariff below the no-signalling 
level, t2p.
4 The Dynamic Model with Competition
Alternatively, the tariff game can be modelled introducing competition in the industry 
concerned, the simplest case being a Cournot duopoly. One firm in each country compete in 
quantities and produce identical commodities. Assuming that the markets are segmented, 
the domestic market can be analysed independently of the foreign market. This assumption 
is made to isolate the profit shifting effect of the tariff from considerations of terms of 
trade. The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear p  = a - (q + q*). Consider an 
economy with two goods: good q for which there is domestic production and imports q* 
and good y, which represents all other goods. In the domestic country the representative 
consumer has utility function U(q,q*,y) that is strictly quasi-concave and has positive 
marginal utility for each good. Assuming that the utility function is additive separable, 
U(q,q*,y) = f(q,q*) + y- A utility function of this form is quasi-linear and implies that
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there are no income effects in the demand function for q and q*. Consumer surplus is given 
by CS(q) = £  (a-x-q )dx - (a-q-q )q  .
The information structure is similar to the previous model. The foreign firm’s 
marginal cost is private information. The foreign firm has complete information about the 
marginal cost of the domestic firm but the foreign firm’s costs are unknown by the 
domestic government and the domestic firm. Marginal costs are of two types: cL and cH . 
The domestic government and firm do not know the foreign firm’s marginal cost but they 
know the probability distribution of the unknown cost level. This is common knowledge. 
This assumption captures the situation in which a well-established domestic firm faces 
competition from an emerging market. The cost structure of the incumbent is known but the 
cost structure of the foreign potential entrant is not.
The signalling game has the following stages. At the beginning of the first period, 
nature chooses the foreign firm's marginal cost parameter: cL or cH. In the first stage, the 
domestic government chooses and commits to a tariff and, in the second stage, firms choose 
their outputs. First period output of the foreign firm signals foreign firm’s costs to the 
domestic firm and policy maker. At the end of period one, the domestic government and the 
home firm update their beliefs about the foreign firm’s costs. At the beginning of period 
two, with this updated probability assessment, the government announces an import tariff. 
Then, firms choose output. In the first period, output form Bayesian Cournot equilibria and 
in the second period outputs are chosen optimally given the updated beliefs.
The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibria. At any decision node, a player 
takes an action that maximizes its expected payoff, given its updated beliefs and given that 
other players will follow the prescribed equilibrium strategies. Beliefs must be consistent 
with the players’ initial beliefs, with any information that may be available (directly or by 
inference) and with the hypothesis that play has evolved to each point under the equilibrium 
strategies. As usual in signalling games, there is a continuum of pooling and separating 
equilibria because of the wide range of beliefs that can be specified off-the-equilibrium 
path. Most of these beliefs are unreasonable and we will refine the sequential equilibria by 
employing the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criteria.
Under complete information, the model can also be interpreted in a slightly different 
way. It captures a situation in which firms compete in prices but face capacity constraints. 
Each firm has a constant marginal cost of production up to the capacity level and then it
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becomes infinitely large. In a two-stage game both firms simultaneously choose capacities 
and then, knowing each other’s capacity, simultaneously choose prices. By introducing 
capacity constraints and considering the Cournot profit function as a reduced-form profit 
function in which later price competition has been subsumed, Kreps and Scheinkman 
(1983) have shown that if demand functions are concave and if the rationing rule is the 
efficient one, the outcome of this two-stage game is the same as that of a one-stage Cournot 
game.
4 .1  S ep a ra tin g  E q u ilib ria
A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the two types of the foreign firm 
(denoted by * in what follows) choose two different actions in the first period. Here, it 
means that the low-cost firm chooses to produce its optimal low-type equilibrium output 
and vice-versa for the high-cost firm. In a separating equilibrium the home firm and home 
government have complete information in the second period. Therefore, f i ( c H / q*H) = 1 
and n ( c L/ q L) = 1. They correctly infer the marginal cost of the foreign firm from the 
level of output chosen by it.
The separating equilibrium in the second period is a game of complete information. 
Both the policy-maker and the home firm know the foreign firm's costs. Given these costs, 
the policy maker chooses the tariff to maximize welfare. The tariff is chosen before the 
output game is played. The foreign firm's solves
M a x ^ M ' 3  (p* - c-< ~ p ) (16>
where t ‘2 is the tariff in period two. The home firm only produces for the domestic market 
and faces a similar problem. The home firm’s problem is
M a x w M  = _ c ^ }  (17)
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From each maximization problem the first order conditions for a maximum give the 
following reactions functions: ^2 (^2 ) = “—~—~~— ~  and ^2(^2 ) = “ — • The
second order conditions for existence of a maximum are satisfied. Solving simultaneously, 
the equilibrium output levels are obtained. Considering an interior solution, the equilibrium 
outputs are given by
q*(ti2) = —  C~ 2c"2‘ ~ 2t‘2 and =
a - 2 c  + c l + t2
3 3
Substituting into the profit functions, we obtain maximized profits for both firms
*7(4) s r a + c - 2 c l -2 t\  ^ -  F  and n 2 (t2) = ^ a -2 c  + c*1 + tl2 ^
The government's problem is to maximize consumer surplus, domestic firm’s profits 
and tariff revenue. Then, solving the following expression
M ax,- fa* s  wip' (<7(4 U 't t )))+ U ’Oi) ) + (t‘)]} (is)
we obtain the optimal tariff
a _ C ' (19)
Substituting, maximized profits become n 2 =
✓ r . X 2
4a -  6c + 2c
'  a + 3c-4c*' ^ - F and
A I lr. Following the same steps as in Section 3.1, let’s define n 2 as
maximized profits when the true costs are i but the firm signals k. Then,
^ lk{qil k{ c \ t 2{ck) U 7 \ c ’iJ 2{c’k))^*k i / k  {  *i u / * k \ \  _ a + 3 c -6 c i + 2ck > - F . In this case, the
*  H  ^  * H / Linefficient firm has no incentive to misrepresent itself in the second period fc2 > n
while the efficient firm does, becausen 2 < n2 ,H. By "mimicking" the inefficient firm it 
obtains a lower tariff.
We assume that the level of tariff is known at the beginning of period 1 and that the 
government can commit to the level of tariff chosen. The government and the domestic 
firm do not know the marginal cost of the foreign firm. This is private information. We
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solve the model backwards. First, the equilibrium of the Cournot game is found. Then, the 
optimal tariff is chosen, given equilibrium levels of output of foreign and domestic firm. 
Each level of output chosen by the foreign firm signals its costs. A level of output q*^ is 
associated with the updated belief that the firm is of high-cost type = 7.
Conversely, a level of output q*L can be associated with the belief that the firm is of low- 
cost type ju(c*H/q*L)  = 0. In this context, incentive compatibility means that
W  „  4  \  , , + L  „  . \  . ~ * H/ L
rr> . ' 4 \  , **L v. * L / * H  „  4 \  , * * L I H
Because the government fixes a higher tariff and the home firm produces a lower 
output if they believe the foreign firm has low costs rather than high costs, foreign output
and profits are higher when the high-cost firm signals the true type, n 2H > n 2HIL. In 
addition, n \H {q\H ,ql,tl)> n \H (q\L ,qx,tx) (see Figure 2.2). However, note that 
it2 < n 2L,H, which means that the low-cost firm has an incentive to deviate. Given 
q*\ (/,) and //, there are many outputs q*\ (/,) that satisfy ICl. In Figure 2 .2 , these are
represented by q\H such that q\H <q \ and q\H > q*\ . In spite of there being two
intervals of multiple equilibria, only one survives as part of a separating sequential 
equilibrium. Dominated strategies are eliminated when considering out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs4.
4Any output smaller than q^  is a separating sequential equilibrium because posterior belief after observing
* H  /  * H  \  r \an out-of-equilibrium output like q i is that JLl(c ,q^ ) =  0 .  But any output smaller than q^  is a 
dominated strategy for the low-cost firm by output qx L . If the home firm and the government believe that the
* Hforeign firm would never choose a dominated output, the only posterior belief after observing q i is that
ju(c ,q^ ) =  1. This overturns any equilibrium involving output smaller than q  ^ because the beliefs
*//
are implausible. The high-cost firm would deviate from output smaller than q^  to q^  , because it yields
 *
higher profits. A similar argument shows that any output bigger than qx cannot be an equilibrium. The 
only separating sequential equilibrium after dominated strategies are eliminated when forming out-of-
equilibrium beliefs are qxL (tx) and q^1 <q i .
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The low-cost foreign firm is able to obtain complete information profits given the 
tariff because q\L (tx) would only be chosen by a low-cost firm. On the other hand, the 
high-cost foreign firm must distort its output away from the complete information profit 
maximizing output, given the tariff, to convince the home firm and the government that it 
has indeed high costs. The minimum distortion necessary to achieve this involves 
outputq^H. The information asymmetry imposes a cost on the high-cost foreign firm. To
derive the intervals of separating equilibrium quantities, one should note that it is more 
costly for the low-cost type to reduce output. This is the monotonicity property.
d 2( ( p ( g ,) - c - t ) g ,- F )  d2( (a -q l - c - t ) q 1- F )  Q
dcdqx dcdqx
The equilibrium output of the foreign firm that satisfy ICl are q*L (tx) and q ^  (tx).
Given that the efficient foreign firm maximizes profits, ICl binds
7i(q\H) = max{n(q*^H ),7t(qlH)} , the high-cost foreign firm does not choose a dominated
output and the domestic firm maximizes expected output, the unique separating sequential 
equilibrium is obtained from simultaneously solving
qxL(tx) = arg max nXL (q*xL,qx,tx) (2 0 )
+ ^ l )  + ^ 2L,H (21)
n \  (*!) = arg max n \  (<q[H ,qxitx) (2 2 )
st<hL (t, )=argm ax n 'L ( q * \ )
qt = arg max {Ett = (? '"  ,9 , )  + (1 -  (q 'L,q ltt ,)} (23)
The first condition gives optimal output for the efficient foreign firm. The second 
one states that incentive compatibility for the efficient type binds and gives a quadratic
expression in qxH which has two solutions q ^  and q*\ (see proof of proposition 3 in
Appendix 2). The high-cost foreign firm would choose a distorted output in order to 
convince the home firm and the government that it has indeed high costs. One of these
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output levels gives higher profits to the high-cost foreign firm than the other one and it is 
reasonable to expect that the foreign firm will not choose a dominated output. Therefore,
the unique sequential equilibrium is given by q\L and . The equilibrium output levels
for domestic and foreign firms are qtf t)  = ~ — + ,
q;Lft) = .(a + c —2<l ~ 2c‘"} -JLJq  and :H( ) = (^ C- 2 / , - 2c - ) _ ( 3± i f ) ^  
ni 1 3 27 3 27
where Q = (cH - c L)(4a + \ 2 c - \ l c L + c H) .  These output levels are used to analyse the 
tariff-setting stage of the game where the domestic government sets its specific tariff to 
maximise domestic welfare. The domestic government takes this equilibrium as given and 
chooses its specific tariff to maximize domestic expected welfare. The government's 
problem is
1(1 -  mW ( p L (<7(1,), q (t, )))+*" (9(7,), q (7,)) + h q L (7,)] J
The optimal tariff is obtained by solving the first order condition of this problem
*L'
{ ( £ - 0 _ ( i + M v S
3 27
Substituting into optimal output gives
(25)
4 a -6 c  + 2c 1 + (4 ju - 1) 
3 27
(26)
q |H = -  
3









Proposition 3 The solution defined by (25), (26), (27) and (28) constitute the unique 
separating sequential equilibrium o f the signalling game, when the foreign monopolist’s 
output signals costs and it faces competition o f a domestic firm.
Proof See Appendix 2.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is clear. In the duopoly case, deviating is 
beneficial for the low-cost foreign firm. The low-cost foreign firm has an incentive to 
deviate since it induces the government to set a lower tariff. There is a distortion of foreign 
output level.
4 . 2 P o o lin g  E q u ilib r ia
A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both the low-cost and high-cost foreign 
firms choose the same action in the first period. In a pooling equilibrium, no additional 
information is provided to the domestic firm and government by the choice of first period 
output. Therefore, in the second period, the home firm and the government continue to use 
the prior beliefs as their probability assessment. The domestic firm and the government 
choose output and commit to a tariff that does not depend on the competitiveness of the 
foreign firm.
In the second period, given the tariff, the foreign firm maximizes profits conditional 
on beliefs
(29)
The home firm's problem is to maximize expected profits by choosing sales in the 
domestic market. Therefore, the home firm maximizes expected profits
M a x , \En = n (p L -  c)qlp + (1 -  fi)(pH -  c)q2p } (30)
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Bayesian-Coumot equilibrium output are obtained by solving for the market-stage
.... .  ^ a - 2 c  + t2+c 2a + 2 c -4 t7 -3c*L - cequilibnum outputs q2p = ----------- f-----, qlp ----------------- --------------  and
3 6
* 2ci “I- 2c — 41 — 3 c*H — c
q2p = ----------------------   . Substituting optimal output into the home firm's expected
6
profits we get maximized expected profits 7r(c, c x ,t2) = ——2c + *2 + jn presence
3
of a domestic firm, the domestic government cares about consumer welfare, profits of the 
domestic firm and tariff revenue. Using domestic firms' maximized profits the policy maker 
maximizes expected domestic welfare.
aX'2 l(i -  MW(pL(q2 (*2)> q'i (h )))+* ‘ (?2 (t2), q\(i,))+t2q’2‘- (t2)] J
The optimal tariff is
a - c
t2P=—  <32>
Substituting into optimal outputs gives
4a -  6c + 2c 
9~<?2, = -------   (33)
2a + 6 c -9 c > +c 
18
2a + 6 c -  9c H + c
=  s   (35)
The pooling equilibrium output represents an attractive option for the low-cost 
foreign firm (q*2p > q L) but not for the high-cost one ( q2p < q H ). In the first period,
foreign firm’s output is a pooling sequential equilibrium if the same output level is chosen 
by the high and low-cost firm. A necessary condition for the existence of a pooling
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equilibrium is that none of the types wants to deviate. When appropriate beliefs are 
specified the necessary condition becomes also sufficient. The following incentive 
compatibility conditions should hold
ic„
ICL : S ^ L(ql\ qi,tl) + r 2L
An interval of multiple equilibria exists (see Fig. 2.3). A pooling equilibrium output 
for the foreign firm would be such that q*H < q\p < qx . These output levels constitute a
pooling sequential equilibrium if and only if reasonable beliefs are specified. One possible 
specification of government and domestic firm’s beliefs that will support these quantities to 
be equilibrium are n(c*H,q*) = 0  if q <q]p , jti(cH,q ) - \  if q*>q\p and
ju (cH,q*) = ft if  q* = q\p . However, no equilibrium output level survives as a pooling
sequential equilibrium if one uses the intuitive criteria. The argument is similar to the one 
used in Section 3, when the foreign firm faces no competition in the domestic market. 
Output level q\p forms a pooling sequential equilibrium only because after observing output
q\L the home firm and government believe that the firm has high costs, n { c H,q\L) = 1. 
But, due to the concavity of the profit function, output q*x is dominated by q\p for the
high-cost firm. Therefore, if  the home firm and the government believe that the foreign firm 
would never choose a dominated equilibrium output, the only posterior belief on observing 
q\L is n(c*H,q\L) = 0. This destroys the equilibrium involving q\L. The posterior beliefs 
in which it is based are unlikely5. Consequently, there is no pooling equilibrium.
e • 4
Similarly, consider output qXp . This output constitutes equilibrium because the home firm and the domestic 
government's posterior beliefs after observing an out-of-equilibrium output like qj is that the firm is low
*H  *cost. However, qx is dominated by the equilibrium output qlp for the high-cost firm. Then, if the home
firm and the government believe that the foreign firm would never choose a dominated equilibrium output, 
they should think that the firm has high costs. This destroys the original belief. The only consistent belief after
*Hobserving an out-of-equilibrium output like <7j is that the foreign firm is of a high-cost type. The
government would accordingly choose a low tariff. Accordingly, the only consistent and sequentially rational 
equilibrium output for the high type firm is qx .
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4 . 3  T h e e ffe c t  o f  S ig n a llin g  o n  th e  O p tim al T a r iff
Similar to the analysis in section 3 ,1 compare the level of the optimal tariff when signal and 
compare it with the situation in which no signalling exists. The main result is summarized 
below
/j < t2p (36)
Proposition 4 The optimal tariff, when the foreign firm signals its cost through
output and faces competition o f  a domestic firm, is smaller than when the firm does not 
signal costs, as indicated by the inequality in (36).
Proof See Appendix 2.
The intuition behind the results presented above can be analysed and summarized 
by a decomposition of the effects as follows. There is a signalling effect. An efficient 
foreign firm has an incentive to misrepresent its cost and “mimic” an inefficient one 
because if it is thought to have high costs it gets a lower tariff and makes higher profits. 
Due to the monotonicity property, it is more costly for the efficient firm to deviate from its 
optimal output level. Therefore, in order for an inefficient foreign firm to convince the 
home firm and the government that in fact it has high costs requires it to choose its output 
below the level that would maximize profits in the absence of signalling. This distortion is 
costly in terms of welfare. As a consequence of this distortion expected foreign output is 
lower when signalling. For a given level of domestic firm's output and tariff, signalling 
commits the high-cost foreign firm to a smaller first period output. This increases the 
domestic firm equilibrium output and shifts profits to the domestic firm. The overall 
signalling effect benefits the domestic firm. As a result of this, a lower specific tariff is 
required to commit the home firm to greater expected output. The optimal tariff when 
signalling is lower than when the firm does not signal its costs through output. In addition, 
the efficient firm’s output is higher due to a lower tariff effect. The low-cost foreign firm is 
able to obtain full information profits but because the tariff is smaller the level of output is 
greater.
In summary, the expected foreign production of the good is lower when signalling 
due to a distortion in foreign output. This, increases domestic firm equilibrium output and
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shifts profits. Incomplete information lessens the rent extracting and profit shifting 
argument for a tariff. The signalling effect prevails over the tariff reducing effect.
The optimal tariff under asymmetric information is lower than under the full 
information case provided that the probability of a high cost foreign firm is sufficiently 
high as it is shown in Lemma 1 and 2. I compare the level of the optimal tariff under 
incomplete information with the situation of complete information. Note that for a firm 
with costs i, the optimal tariff under complete information is
a — c'
Lemma 1 The optimal tariff under asymmetric information - when the foreign firm  
signals its costs through output and there is domestic competition - is smaller than under 
fu ll information i f  the foreign firm has low costs, as indicated by the inequality t{  < t LFI.
Proof -  See Appendix 2
The intuition is as follows. Under incomplete information the optimal tariff in 
period one decreases with the probability that costs are high (fi). If it is more likely that 
foreign firm’s costs are high it is more likely that a there is a distortion of optimal output 
chosen by the foreign firm. The government, in turn, takes this into account when 
maximising expected welfare in period one and chooses a tariff that is smaller than it would 
be under full information.
Lemma 2 The optimal tariff under asymmetric information - when the foreign firm  
signals its costs through output andfaces domestic competition - is smaller than under full
9 I (c» _ CL) i
information i f  the foreign firm has high costs and U > — /----------- :----- ---------- , asJ J  J  s  j  s  2 \ ( 4 a - 5 c L + c H) 2
indicated by the inequality tf* < tFI.
Proof -  See Appendix 2
The intuition is as follows. Under incomplete information the high cost foreign firm 
has to distort output away from the full information case in order to persuade the 
government that it has indeed high costs, given that the low cost foreign firm has an 
incentive to “mimic” the high cost firm. This distortion is costly in terms of welfare. The
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government anticipates this distortion and allows the tariff in the first period to be smaller 
than under full information if the probability of high cost is sufficiently high.
When the domestic firm files an AD investigation
In order to introduce a filing decision of the domestic firm the setting of the game has to 
change to allow for sequential decisions about output. One way of doing this would be to 
allow the foreign firm to move first. The game will be such that at the beginning of the first 
stage, nature chooses the foreign firms costs type and foreign exports are subject to an 
initial tariff. Then, the foreign firm chooses first period output. Following the decision of 
its rival, the domestic firm chooses output and whether or not to file an AD investigation. 
At the end of the first stage, the government observes the level of foreign and domestic 
output and forms beliefs about foreign firms’ costs. If an investigation is filed, the 
government selects a per-unit AD duty, t2>0 , which will remain in effect during the second 
period and is higher than the initial tariff. Given the level of the AD duty the two firms 
compete simultaneously in quantities in the second stage.
I assume that the domestic government uses a cost-based policy to implement an 
duty that maximises welfare. Although AD procedures do not always follow this rule, this 
is consistent with the objective of designing efficient protection policies. Interpreting the 
game in this manner would require that the home government has and AD statute and the 
home firm can file an investigation at the end of the first period. It would be the high level 
of trade associated with an efficient firm what would trigger the domestic firm’s decision 
and not the foreign firm’s costs themselves as these are private information. As before, if 
the domestic government could observe the true cost of the foreign firm, the optimal AD
duty would be t[ = a ^  .
The foreign firm has an incentive to reduce exports in the first period in order to 
avoid the potential AD duty. The incentive compatibility constraint for a foreign firm of 
type can be visualised using the isoprofit curve consisting of combinations of duty t[ and 
output q*‘ that give the same total profit. The curve is implicitly given
by n?  (cl -  q*' -  2c*' -  2tx + c) + ^ (a  + c -  2c*' -  2t l2)2. Two candidates for
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equilibria will exist: separating and pooling. In a separating equilibrium, the government 
correctly infers the true costs of the foreign firm and will set an optimal duty. It is easy to 
check that the incentive compatibility constraint implicitly defines a function that is 
concave in#*'and symmetric around#^ and a separating equilibrium would exist.
Regarding the pooling equilibria, the government does not learn anything about foreign 
firms’ costs after observing output. It will maximise welfare based on its prior beliefs. 
However, the equilibrium might not be unique.
When the outcome is a separating equilibrium, the effect on policy is that the 
potential imposition of a higher duty in the second period distorts trade for some types who 
voluntarily restrain production in order to separate themselves. The outcome will have the 
desirable property that optimal duties are imposed.
5 Conclusions
Incomplete information lessens the rent extracting and profit shifting argument for a tariff, 
when a foreign competitor is better informed than a domestic government and firm about 
the cost structure of a foreign competitor. When foreign firm's costs are private 
information, output can signal costs to a domestic government. The competitive foreign 
firm has an incentive to misrepresent its costs - by pretending to have high costs - in order 
to obtain a lower tariff. In equilibrium, this incentive no longer exists and this type chooses 
its first best equilibrium output. However, because the efficient foreign firm has an 
incentive to "mimic1' the inefficient one, the latter should distort output away from the 
complete information optimal production level. The foreign firm with high costs distorts 
equilibrium output downwards. When the incentive of the foreign firm to misrepresent its 
costs is anticipated by the government, a separating sequential equilibrium exists. The 
government uses a tariff in the first period, which is lower than the optimal tariff when no 
signalling occurs. Signalling creates a distortion, which is costly in terms of domestic 
welfare. Because signalling is costly, it is optimal to lower the tariff on imports in the first 
period. Pooling equilibria can be ruled out because they require unreasonable beliefs to 
support them. This leaves the separating equilibrium as the unique reasonable outcome of 
the game.
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In a dynamic model, I allow the government and the domestic firm to learn about 
foreign firms' costs over time. Because of informational rents, there is a distortion in the 
level of foreign output and consequently the optimal tariff is lower when there is signalling. 
Incomplete information, when a foreign firm is better informed about costs than a 
government who designs trade policy and a domestic competitor, allows government to 
discriminate the two types of foreign firm and gain efficiency. The optimal tariff is lower 
than under complete information.
The model can be related to antidumping. Cost-based antidumping can be viewed as 
a vehicle for implementing cost-contingent tariff policies. Under cost-based dumping, the 
domestic government estimates the foreign firm’s production costs and then imposes and 
AD duty designed to insure “fair” prices.
The model can be extended to analyse the filing decision of the domestic. One way 
of doing this would be to allow the foreign firm to move first. At the beginning of the first 
stage foreign exports are subject to an initial tariff. Then, firms choose output sequentially. 
The foreign firm chooses first period output. Following the decision of its rival, the 
domestic firm chooses output and whether or not to file an AD investigation. At the end of 
the first stage the government, after observing the level of foreign and domestic output, 
forms beliefs about foreign firms’ costs. If an investigation is filed, the government selects 
a per-unit AD duty that is higher than the initial tariff. Given the level of the AD duty the 
two firms compete simultaneously. This should not alter the results in any qualitative 
manner. The government would design policy optimally and the outcome will have the 
desirable property that optimal duties are imposed.
The importance of informational problems for the design of strategic trade policy 
has recently been considered in the literature. While previous work has concentrated on 
asymmetries of information from governments and domestic firms, this chapter has focused 
on the unknown cost efficiency of a foreign firm. It has been shown that the government 
has the ability to separate the different types of firms and that strategic trade policy could 
effectively be designed in the presence of informational failures.
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Figure 2.3: Pooling Equilibria
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Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1. To obtain q f  and qf1. Given that the low-cost foreign firm 
maximizes profits ICl binds and the high-cost firm chooses the level of output that gives 
the minimum distortion and higher profits, the unique separating sequential equilibrium is 
obtained by simultaneously solving equations (4), (5) and (6 ). The low-cost firm
chooses qx (tx) = arg max n[ (qx Then, substitute this solution, q[ (tj) =
a - c  - t x .mto
n \ (<7i > O  + i -  (qx ,/j) + ^ 2  • Substituting gives the following quadratic equation in
<11
ra - c L - t x'
2
+ f a -  cL>
2
r2a-2>cL +cH>
{  2 J I  3 J I  6  J
=  0
Solving this equation, gives the following solutions: qx {tx) = a - c  - t x I V® ~| ±— . But,
only one of these solutions gives higher profits to the high-cost firm. One can disregard the 
dominated equilibrium output. The unique solution should satisfy: (A))> n
( a - c L - t  \  V©Then, the unique solution to the problem is: qx (/,) = --------- L --------- . For a sufficiently
large level of demand, © = (cH - c L) (4a-5cL +cH)is positive. Considering an interior
/ L \
solution, the equilibrium output for the low-cost firm is:   —  > 0. Multiplying the
(cH - c L)numerator by 4 and adding -— -— - > 0, we obtain (4a -  5cL + cH) > 0. It suffices to
multiply the previous expression by (cH - c L) to obtain 0  -  (cH -  cL)(4a -  5cL +cH) 
which is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from the comparison of equilibrium output levels 
chosen by the foreign firm and the equilibrium first period tariffs when it signals costs 
though output and output and tariff when the firm does not signal costs. To show that the 
inequality in equation (15) holds, tx < i2p, it suffices to compare the tariff when




after operating and simplifying, it is simple to show that tx K *2P if and only if
a > 2c H - c L . This inequality always holds for a sufficiently large demand level, a.
In order to decompose the different effects of the separating sequential equilibrium 
outcome, it is necessary to compare the output of the inefficient firm when signalling exists
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with that of no signalling and accordingly prove that the inequality qx < q2 holds. Since
n H  ^
91 = I
(a-cl ) - £ ^ V e and q2p = ---------   it can be shown that,(2a - 3 c "  + c)
6
operating and simplifying, qx < q2p if and only if a > l c H -  c L. This inequality holds if 
the demand intercept, a, is sufficiently large.
Similarly, the following inequality qx > q2p allows us to compare the signalling 
equilibrium output with that in the absence of signalling. In this case, since
t H  —  2.M (a - c L) + — 
6
, „L ( 2 a - 3 c L +c)  . , m i  i «and q2p = ------------------  it can be easily shown that after
6
operating and simplifying qx > q2p if and only if a > 2cu -  c L. This inequality holds if 
the demand intercept, a, is sufficiently large.
Finally, the inequality Eqx < Eq2p shows that domestic firm’s output is higher in the 
signalling equilibrium, by calculating expected output Eqx = fiqH +( l  — fi)qL which
becomes Eq. = — 
1 3
,  L //V©( a - c (a - c )  .and comparing it with Eqlp = — -—  it can be
shown that Eqx < Eqlp if and only if a > 2cH -  c L . This inequality holds if the demand 
intercept, a, is sufficiently large.
Proof of Proposition 3. To obtain q[L and q[H . Given that the low cost foreign firm 
maximizes profits ICl binds and the high cost foreign firm chooses the level of output that 
gives the minimum distortion and higher profits, the unique separating sequential 
equilibrium is obtained by simultaneously solving equations (20), (21), (22) and (23). The 
low-cost foreign firm chooses q\L (tx) = arg max n \L (q\L ,qx,tx) . The domestic firm 
chooses^ =argmax{Eff = {inf{(q*iHiql,t1) + ( \ - ju)nx (q*lL,ql,tl)}. Solving (20) and (23) 
gives q*1 and qj which are then substituted into the binding incentive compatibility 
constraint (ICl): 7c\l (q\L,qx,tx) + n 2 -  nx (q\H,qx,tx) + n 2 ,H. This is a quadratic equation 
in q\H : ( a -  q\L - q x-  c L -  tx )q\L - ( a -  q\H - q x-  c L -  tx )q\H -  (nL -  n L,H ) = 0. Solving,
gives two solutions. But, only one of them gives higher profits to the high-cost firm. We 
choose the non-dominated solution that satisfies: 7i(q" (tx)) > n(qx (tx)). The unique
, « , N a + c-2(t ,  - c L) (3 + u)yllisolution to the problem is: qx f t)  = ----------^ ---  — -------- ,
a + c - 2 ( t x- c L) a - c  + tx+ c L) 2 ju jc i  .
qx (tx) = -------------  27 311 ~ -------- 3 -------  ~ 2 7 — r a su^ cient y^
high demand level Q = ( c H -  c L )(4a +12c - 1 7c*1 + c H ) is positive. Considering an 
interior solution, the equilibrium output for the low-cost firm is given by
^ ^    / j  (*  ^  * *
qL =  > 0. Multiplying the numerator by 4 and adding ( c H -  c*L) it becomes
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4a + 12c -  17c*1 +c*H > 0. It suffices to multiply the previous expression by (c*H -  c L) to 
obtain Q = (<c H -  c L){4a + 12c -  \ l c L + c H) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows from the comparison of equilibrium output 
levels chosen by the foreign, the domestic firms and the equilibrium tariff when the foreign 
firm signals costs through output and when the foreign firm does not signal costs. This is
A A
represented in the following inequality (36), t x < t 2p. From equation (25) and (32) 
'L {\ + 2/j )4 q.respectively, tx = 
if
a - c
(4a + \ 2 c - \ l c L + c H)>
a - c
27 and ‘2p = .
. It follows that, tj < t 2p if and only
1
(1 + 2 MY
Because 0 < ju < 1, then
2 < —. Therefore, for a demand intercept a sufficiently large the above0 < — ^
(1 + 2 n Y  9
inequality holds.
To show that output of the inefficient foreign firm is lower in the presence of signalling it 
suffices to prove that qJH < q*” . From equations (27) and (35) respectively,
a + 3c -  4 c L (// -  7)Vq






*1 < 0 2?
*H 2 a + 6 c -  9 c H + c
18
if and




2  ( 1 - f i )
0 < ^ —^ < ^ s 5 .8 . Therefore, for a demand intercept a sufficiently large the 
above inequality holds.
To prove that the output of the efficient firm is higher when signalling, it is enough to
*L
ipprove that the following inequality, q[L > q2Lp , holds. From equations (28) and (34)




a + 3c -  4c*L (2 + fj)‘J q
if (4a + 12c -  17c + c ) >
3 27
simplifying
*L , _ * / /  \  _  *L
and = Tp 3
2a + 6 c -  9c 1 + c
18
* * L  ^  ~ * L  
< ll > < h p if and
. After 
only
(l + 2 //) :




< 9. Therefore, for a demand intercept a sufficiently large the above
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In order to prove that expected foreign output is lower when signalling it suffices to prove 
that the following inequality holds, Eq\ < Eqlp . Expected output of the foreign firm in the
presence of signalling is Eq\ -  nq \H + ( \ -  [i)q\L obtained using (27) and (28). After
operating, Eq\ = i a + 3 c - 4 c l ( 1 - 8  
3 27
is obtained. Similarly, for
 ^ *
Eqlp  --------------- . Then, after substituting and simplifying Eq\ < Eqlp , if and only if
9
(4a + 12c -17c 1 +c*H)> 1296— —— t ( c *h  - c l ) .  Because 0 < u < 1, then,
(8/ / - 1)
  1296
(1 -8 / / ) 2 "  49 
inequality holds
0 < 1296—— ^ =26.  For a demand intercept a sufficiently large the above
Finally, in order to prove that expected output of the domestic firm is higher when 
signalling, it suffices to show that q, > q2p. From equations (41) and (50) respectively,
! r ~4a -  6c + 2c 1 (4 fi -1  )Vq 
3 27
and^2p = —— • After operating and
simplifying, Eqx > Eq2p if and only if (4a + 12c- \ l c L + c H) > 324^  ^  ■( c H - c L) .
Because 0 < jj. < 1, then, 0 < 324— —— -  ^ 36. Therefore, for a demand intercept a
(4 /i- l )
sufficiently large the above inequality holds.
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows from the comparison of the optimal tariff under separating 
equilibrium in period one tx = c  ^ and the optimal tariff under full
information when the costs of the foreign firm are low^ 7 =    . It is simple to show
that fj < tpj since fi>0.
Proof of Lemma 2. It follows from the comparison of the optimal tariff under separating 
equilibrium in period one tx = ^   ^ and the optimal tariff under full
(a — cH)information when the costs of the foreign firm are high----= --------  . After operating and
simplifying, it is easy to show that the optimal tariff under asymmetric information is lower
9  I (CH -  c L) 1
than under full information if and only if/i > —J ---------- :-----------   . This mequality is
2 y (4a - 5 c  + c ) 2
easily satisfied for a sufficiently high demand intercept, a (relative to cost differentials).
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Chapter 3 Antidumping: Descriptive Analysis, Law 
and Institutions
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, there has been a reduction in the average tariff and other traditional 
trade tools after several multilateral trade talks at the GATT/WTO level. At the same time, 
the number of AD investigations has been growing over time as well as the protection 
granted through this policy instrument. This suggests that perhaps in the absence of tariff 
barriers AD has remained a valid available tool to grant protection. However, the several 
modifications introduced in the law at the GATT and the organisation of the AD code in the 
WTO may also have contributed to its widespread use.
This chapter provides the background information necessary to understand the 
issues discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Since the nature of the AD mechanism is quite 
intricate and complex, the legal issues and the institutional background are explained that 
would help to understand the hypotheses formulated and empirically tested in subsequent 
chapters. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis of the proliferation of this trade policy 
tool and the geographical distribution in the use of AD worldwide. It also presents a 
descriptive analysis of the investigations initiated by European firms. Section 3 describes 
the workings of the AD law at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
World Trade Organization (WTO) level and the regulations prevalent in Europe. It presents 
a detailed description of European AD regulations, the decision making process and the 
institutions involved. Section 4 presents a concluding summary.
2 Antidumping: Descriptive Analysis
2 . l  A n tid u m p in g  a t th e  W o rld  L evel: a n  In cr ea sin g  T ren d
The number of antidumping petitions initiated has been growing over the years (See Fig. 
3.1 in Appendix 3). Although this increasing trend is not statistically significant, it is an 
indication of the increasing use of AD worldwide. During the period 1987-91 the average
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number of cases per year worldwide was around 147 and during the period 1992-97 this 
average was 244, indicating an increase of more than 65%, as can be seen from Table 3.16.
Not only has the number of cases increased over time but also the protection granted 
seems to be growing substantially. The average dumping margin between 1980 and 1989 
for the EU is estimated to be 37% (Bourgeois and Messerlin, 1993) and 33% for the US 
(Morkre and Kelly, 1994). Besides, these estimated dumping margins tend to increase over 
time. The US cases have weighted average dumping margins that are becoming higher over 
time (U.S.I.T.C., 1995) making AD actions very attractive as shown in Table 3.2. Blonigen 
(2003) also documents that the percent of cases ruled affirmative by the US International 
Trade Commission -  which investigates injury -  has also been rising over time, from 45% 
to 60% between 1980 and 2000. The analysis shows that the upward trend in US dumping 
margins occurs primarily through evolving discretionary practices at the US Department of
Table 3.1: Total Number of AD Investigations initiated: 1987-1997
Years U.S. EU Worldwide
1987 28 15 120
1988 27 40 124
1989 18 24 96
1990 48 34 165
1991 29 63 228
1992 42 83 326
1993 21 32 299
1994 43 48 228
1995 33 14 156
1996 25 22 221
1997 41 16 233
199800 28 44 299
1999(b) 43 41 320
2000(b) 17 49 250
2001(b) 77 29 337
Total 520 554 3402
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping 
Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998) 
(b) Zanardi (2004b)
6 A new and improved GATT/WTO data set is presented in Zanardi (2004b). The data is corrected for 
mistakes and inconsistencies, missing data but more importantly it covers countries that were not members of 
the WTO (China, Taiwan, Russia, Ukraine, etc.). In this data set the role of new users is more prominent but 
only from 1997, which is beyond the period of analysis considered in this thesis.
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Commerce, with little or no role for changing country composition of investigated cases or 
legal changes. Using a computable partial equilibrium model Tharakan et al. (1997) find 
evidence that in Europe the injury margins are excessive.
The increase in the number of countries using AD measures may suggest that AD 
legislation is being used as a mechanism for retaliation. Twenty-nine countries initiated 
antidumping investigations in 1987-97. Over this period the number of users for a given 
year has tripled, from seven in 1987 to twenty-two in 1997 (Table 3.9). Whereas the 
traditional users of AD were the US, Canada, Australia and the EU, the number of other 
countries using AD has increased quite dramatically in recent years (Table 3.10 and Fig. 
3.2).




Source: US-International Trade Commission in Messerlin and Reed (1995)
The use of antidumping has been rapidly growing in less developed countries. Table
3.3 shows that South Africa, Argentina, India and Brazil have become important users of
this instrument. There has been a dramatic change in the composition of countries that use 
antidumping in the last decade. The OECD countries initiating AD investigations 
represented 84% of the total in 1987 whereas they only represented 53% ten years later
Table 3.3: Antidumping Cases: Main Users and Main Targets
Main Users 1997(a) 1995-2001(b) Main targets 1997(a) 1995-2001(b)
Australia 42 127 China 31 236
EU 41 242 South Korea 16 137
South Africa 23 183 Taiwan 16 84
U.S. 16 230 U.S. 15 101
Argentina 15 157 Germany 14 66
South Korea 15 46 Japan 12 84
Canada 14 102 Indonesia 9 68
India 13 183 India 7 67
Brazil 11 85 Britain 6 39
Total 233 1785 233 1785
Source: (a) WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based 
on Miranda et al. (1998) and (b) Zanardi (2004b)
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(Fig. 3.5). Mexico has become the fifth main user of the instrument worldwide reporting
8 .6 % of the investigations followed by Argentina, Brazil and South Africa with 5.6%, 4.4%
and 4.0%, respectively (Table 3.9). The percentage of new users has gone from 20% in
1987 to a maximum of 67% in 1996 (Table 3.10 and Fig. 3.2).
There is also a geographical asymmetry in the use of AD (Table 3.11 and 3.12).
The countries most frequently targeted have been the South East Asian countries, including
Japan, and the countries with non-market economies7 with more than 50% of all cases.
While these countries are the targets for AD actions in 50.2% of all cases, their share in the
use of this policy instrument against other countries represents only a minor 5.8% (Fig.
3.5). The country that seems to be a net "exporter" of investigations is the United States of
America. The number of AD investigations initiated by the US more than doubles the
number of investigations undertaken by other countries against it (Figure 3.4).
Every year, countries that have been investigated by others in the past begin to
initiate their own AD complaints against other countries. Prusa and Skeath (2002) suggest
that countries are using AD law for reasons other than punishing unfair trade. They analyse
the motives for AD actions. They distinguish between the traditional response to unfair
trade and a newer idea that describes AD as “special protection” (Bagwell and Staiger,
1990) - as the protection tacitly agreed to maintain cooperation in volatile trade periods.
They find that strategic considerations are an important explanation for AD filings.
Blonigen and Bown (2003) investigate the effects of the threat of foreign retaliation on US
antidumping case filing behaviour and find that the threat of foreign reciprocal AD duties
• 8can reduce the likelihood of US AD cases being filed against certain countries .
Some studies even suggest that the impact of AD enforcement is even greater than 
that reflected by the imposition of AD duties. Prusa (1992) has pointed out that from the 
number of petitions initiated, only one third of antidumping cases actually result in 
dumping duties and nearly as many are withdrawn or are voluntarily terminated and shows 
that the withdrawn cases have at least as big an effect as the cases that resulted in duties. 
The amount of investigations that are withdrawn seems to be smaller in Europe. Only 9%
7 This group is defined in a broad sense and includes all Eastern European countries, the USSR and the 
independent Republics, China, etc.
8 Several studies (Prusa, 1997; Konings et al., 2002) analyse the existence of trade diversion from named to 
non-named countries. Prusa (1997) finds that when considering a period of six years after the initiation of a 
case most of the protective effect of import duties is offset by increased imports from non-named countries. 
However, Konings et al. (2002) show that trade diversion in the European Union is limited.
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of investigations initiated were withdrawn in the period 1985-2003. However, this figure 
may be understating the real number of withdrawals as suggested in Kempton (2001).
2 . 2 A n tid u m p in g  In v estig a tio n s  in  E u rop e
The number of antidumping investigations9 initiated in Europe has decreased or remain 
nearly constant in the period 1987-97 as shown in Table 3.5 below and Figure 3.7. 
Although this trend is not statistically significant, the average number of cases per year was 
twenty-eight between 1985 and 1990 and it amounted to twenty-two between 1991 and 
1997. Moreover, Europe seems to be using AD against other countries with nearly the same 
strength as it is a target of all other countries.
The number of AD investigations initiated by Europe against other countries 
amounted to 355 in the period 1987-97 whereas the number of AD investigations initiated 
against Europe is 400 in the same period10. Europe is overall a net "importer" of 
investigations. However, a year-by-year analysis of the figures shows a clearer pattern. 
Over this period, Europe was a net "importer" of AD cases for all years of lower economic 
activity such as the periods 1991-93 and 1996-97 (Table 3.5). Knetter and Prusa (2003) 
confirmed the hypothesis that AD activity is cyclical for Australia, Canada, the European 
Union and the US. However, Europe more than other regions seems to be loosing in favour 
of other countries in periods of economic downturn and in quite a dramatic way (Figure 
3.8). The average size (value of imports at the 8 -digit product level) of a legal case is 104 
million 1990 dollars in the period 1985-94. The maximum case size is of 1,520 million 
dollars. On average, it amounts to of 1.3% of total EU imports per year.
Some interesting features of AD in the European case emerge from analysing its 
geographic dimension. Nearly three quarters of all European investigations against other 
countries are concentrated in South East Asian countries (33%) and non-market economies
9 The term antidumping investigation in Europe will be used loosely to refer to antidumping and 
countervailing duties, since previous to Council Regulation 384/96 of 15 December 1995, the regulations 
referred to dumped and subsidised imports.
10 The information contained in the Tables and Figures in Appendix 3 originate from two sources: the WTO 
Secretariat and the European Commission. Data from WTO does not match perfectly with the information 
reported by the European Commission because the time of reporting is different. The cases reported by the 
WTO correspond to the 12-month period from 1st July until 30th June whereas the cases reported by the 
European Commission refer to the calendar year.
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Table 3.4: Cases filed from Europe to Other Countries and Against Europe (1987-1997),
by Blocks of Countries
Reporting % Affected %
OECD 41 11.5 276 77.7
South East Asia 117 33.0 17 4.8
Non-market economies 142 40.0 23 6.5
Others 55 15.5 120 33.8
Total 355 436
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
(40%). On the contrary, nearly two thirds of investigations against Europe are concentrated 




Cases filed by Europe 
against Others % Balance
1987 25 6.3 28 7.9 3
1988 18 4.5 27 7.6 9
1989 11 2.8 18 5.1 7
1990 22 5.5 48 13.5 26
1991 59 14.8 29 8.2 -30
1992 66 16.5 42 11.8 -24
1993 46 11.5 21 5.9 -25
1994 29 7.3 43 12.1 14
1995 30 7.5 33 9.3 3
1996 37 9.3 25 7.0 -12
1997 57 14.3 41 11.5 -16
Total 400 355 -45
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
The number of investigations filed by Europe against other countries seems to be 
geographically more dispersed than the number of countries that act against it, as shown in 
Table 3.6. The most affected country by European investigations is China (15%), which is 
followed by Japan, Korea, India, Thailand, Turkey, Russia, etc. However, only three OECD 
countries, namely Australia, the US and Canada amount to 56% of all investigations 
initiated against Europe. The rest of the users are in descending order South Africa (8 %), 
Argentina (6 %), Poland (5%), Brazil (5%), Mexico (5%) and South Korea (3%).
The biggest economies in Europe are the ones who face more investigations 
initiated by other countries. The European nation against which other countries file more 
investigations is Germany, having received 21.3% of all filings between 1985 and 1994, 
followed by the UK (12.4%), France (11.9%), Italy (11.4%) and Spain (8 .6 %). A 
breakdown of investigations against European firms by industry indicates that the basic
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metal industry concentrates nearly one fourth of all cases in this period and the chemical 
industry nearly one fifth as shown in Table 3.14.
Table 3.6: Cases Filed Against Europe and From Europe to Other Countries (1987-1997),
by Individual Countries
Reporting____________________________________Affected
Country Number of cases Country Number of cases
China 55 Australia 106
Japan 31 United States 96
Korea 31 Canada 44
India 18 South Africa 37
Thailand 17 Argentina 27
Turkey 14 Poland 23
Russia 13 Brazil 20
Indonesia 11 Mexico 20
Malaysia 11 Korea 13
Poland 11 New Zealand 11
Yugoslavia 10 Israel 10
Hong Kong 10 India 8
United States 9 Costa Rica 3
Romania 9 Turkey 3
Brazil 8
Others 97 Others 15
Total 355 436
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
There is also a sector and country bias in investigations initiated by Europe. More 
than one third of all investigations (sub-cases) involve the chemical sector and, to a lesser 
degree, the electronics and electrical machinery (19%) and the iron and steel sectors (19%), 
as can be seen in Table 4.16 in Appendix 4A. In terms of products, those originating from 
Central and Eastern Europe and Russia are quite homogeneous and compete with European 
producers (mainly chemical products and iron and steel coils and sheets). Contrarily, the 
products originating from Japan, South Korea and Thailand are predominantly 
differentiated products (semiconductors, video players and recorders, CD-players, 
microwaves, etc.). In the period 1985-89, the majority of complaints were against Japan, 
China, Eastern European countries and South Korea; whereas in the 5-year period that 
follows the targeted countries were mainly China, Russia, Japan followed by Thailand and 
South Korea.
When dumping and injury have been found an investigation can end with the 
imposition of AD duties or with the acceptance of price undertakings. Sometimes an 
investigation is terminated because the period in which it should be conducted has expired 
or because the petitioning firms have withdrawn from the case. A summary of the final
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outcome in the period 1985-2003 is presented in Table 3.7 below. The average size in terms 
of imports of those cases that ended up with the imposition of duties is 1 2 % higher than the 
size of those that ended with price undertakings (50.8 versus 45.3 million European 
Currency Units, ECU).
Table 3.7: Final Outcome and Average Annual Imports of AD investigations initiated in Europe:
1985-1994
Final Decision Number of Percentage
Average Annual 
Imports (case size)
cases (%) (In 1,000 ECU)
Rejection of the claim
No dumping or injury 138 26 14,989
Community Interest 2 0 206,817
Imposition of duties 231 44 50,785
Acceptance of Undertakings 112 21 45,268
Withdrawals 35 7 51,011
Expired 7 1 5,712
Total cases initiated 525 100
Rejection of the claim
No dumping or injury 66 23
Average Annual 
Imports (case size)
(In 1,000 US dollars)
93,644
Community Interest 5 2 253,137
Imposition of duties 134 48 64,520
Acceptance of Undertakings 40 14 25,070
Withdrawals 35 13 65,156
Expired n/a n/a
Total cases initiated 525 100
Source: European Commission and EUROSTAT, Intra and extra-EU trade and United Nations COMTRADE.
3 The law
3 . l  T he A n tid u m p in g  L aw  a t th e  GATT-W TO L evel
The agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (GATT 1994) contains the 
definition of dumping. Members may not impose an AD measure unless there are dumped 
imports, material injury to a domestic industry and a causal link between the dumped 
imports and the injury. According to the agreement, dumping occurs when: the price of a 
product exported from one country to another i) is less than the comparable price, in the
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ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the 
exporting country, or ii) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either a) the 
highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary 
course of trade, or b) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable additional amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits11. 
Although the first GATT regulation originates in 1947, worldwide AD rules remained 
relatively infrequently used for several years. The first wave of implementation once the 
GATT entered into force took place in the 1950s. During the Kennedy Round of trade 
negotiations (1964-67) there was the first significant discussion of Article VI in an attempt 
to standardise the implementation of AD laws. The first AD code came into force in 1967. 
From the Tokyo Round (1980) onwards the increase in the use of this instrument took 
place. The agreement included two key amendments that transformed this instrument into a 
highly used tool of protection. First, the definition of “less than fair value” sales was 
broadened in the Tokyo Round to capture not only price discrimination but also sales below 
cost. Cost based allegations are very commonly used in the US AD cases. Cost-based 
allegations account for between one half and two-thirds of cases in the US (Clarida, 1996). 
The second change related to the procedures involved to show material injury. The 
Kennedy Round required that dumped imports be “demonstrably the principal cause of 
material injury” for duties to be imposed. But in response to pressure from a number of 
developed countries, the Tokyo Code made this requirement unnecessary.
The Uruguay Round Antidumping Code came into force in 1995 and brought about 
another important change. Before this date, GATT members had to sign the codes. After 
this date, the code was an integral part of the WTO Agreement and it applies to all 
members (Finger 1993). This could explain the big increase in the number of cases that 
occurred from 1990.
11 Because Article VI alone is not specific enough, the Antidumping Agreement supplements it. The 
Agreement concluded at the end of the Tokyo Round and it was revised in the Uruguay Round. The purpose 
of devising it was to prevent abuse. The revised Agreement provides more precise definitions of critical 
concepts than are contained in Article VI. It emphasizes the triple requirement of determination of dumping, 
of injury and of a causal link between dumping and injury; it includes detailed procedural rules and it limits 
the scope and duration of antidumping remedies (GATT 1994, Articles 1-15). Since 1994, the GATT has been 
administered by the WTO. The 1994 Agreement also provides for an international surveillance and dispute 
settlement mechanism.
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The antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws12 have become the most 
popular form of import relief. Gallaway et al. (1999) provide estimates that place the 
collective effect of AD duties in the US as one of the biggest trade protection programmes. 
They report that the collective US welfare cost of US antidumping and countervailing 
duties are big enough to rank second only to the effects of the Multifibre Agreement in 
terms of most costly US trade protection programmes. Using a general equilibrium model, 
they estimate that the collective net welfare cost in 1993 was 4 billion dollars.
One extremely controversial administrative practice is “cumulation” by which 
investigating authorities aggregate similar imports from all countries under investigation 
and assess the combined impact upon the domestic industry. The most restrictive of all 
countries in this question have been the US and the European Union. In 1984, the US 
Congress amended the AD and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, mandating that the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) “cumulate” imports across countries when 
determining injury. According to Hansen and Prusa (1996) since 1984 the cumulation 
provision has been invoked in over 50 percent of the AD and CVD cases. They estimate 
that the cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 2 0  to 
30 percent and has changed the ITC’s decision (from negative to affirmative) for about one 
third of the cumulated cases. The effect increases with the number of countries involved 
even when the market share remains the same, creating a supper-additive effect on the 
decision-making process13. The WTO Antidumping Agreement of 199414 explicitly allows 
for imports of more than one country subject to the investigation to be cumulatively 
assessed provided the volume of imports of each country is not negligible. The volume of 
imports from an individual country is negligible if it accounts for less than 3% of imports 
unless countries, which individually account for less than 3% of the imports of the product 
collectively account for more than 7% of imports of the product.
In Europe, according to a GATT consistent regulation the firms (usually industry 
federations) requesting an investigation - who are very knowledgeable of the intricacies of 
the injury determination - tend to file AD complaints against multiple exporters of “like”
12 Countervailing duties laws provide for a duty when imported products are subsidised in some manner by a 
foreign government and material injury is caused. They are targeted at specific products and foreign firms or 
government.
13 Tharakan et al. (1998) analyse this for Europe. They estimate that cumulation increases the probability of 
an affirmative decision by nearly 42%.
14 Paragraph 3, Article 3.
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products15. Since 1994, the regulation permits the cumulation of imports from several 
countries under certain conditions. It provides discretion to decide whether or not to 
cumulate the imports from the different countries under consideration and the EC has made 
ample use of this discretion.
3 . 2 T h e A n tid u m p in g  R eg u la tio n s in  E u rop e
Each member state is free to implement GATT/WTO consistent AD policies. The 
vagueness in the WTO guidelines means that each country interprets the guidelines 
differently. There is, therefore, a substantial variation in AD statues. In this section, the 
specificities of this interpretation for Europe are presented. Some of the main differences 
with the US implementation of AD laws are highlighted and the interplay of the different 
units involved in the investigations within the administration is discussed.
European antidumping legislation stipulates that the European Commission is 
allowed to take antidumping measures if i) a foreign firm is dumping on the European 
Market, ii) it causes injury to a European industry and iii) the Community Interest is taken 
into account. The first antidumping regulation dates from 1968 and it was first used in 
1970. Since then and until 1995, there have been five other regulations reflecting either the 
outcomes of GATT Rounds or a need for improvement in the application of existing rules. 
New regulations were introduced in 1979, following the conclusion of the Tokyo Round 
and the new Antidumping Agreement. After that there were regulations in 1984, 1988 and 
1994 -  when the Uruguay Round concluded with a new Antidumping Agreement.
In the EU, the procedures concerning antidumping have to prove the existence of 
dumping, the existence of material injury and the causal link between these two as well as 
consider the community interest. This means that the benefits of imposing AD measures are 
superior to the damages for the European Community. The determination of dumping 
involves the determination of the 'normal value' (exporters' domestic market price), the 
determination of the 'export price' (price in the EU market), the adjustments to assure 
comparability and the calculation of the 'dumping margin' as the difference between the 
two. The community interest provision has always existed in European antidumping
15 Council Regulation (EC) 3283/94 on Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries non-Members of 
the European Communities, L349:l-22, and Council Regulation (EC) 384/96 of 22 December 1995.
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legislation although it was in 1994 that a new article (Article 21) was added providing 
details on how this is applied. It is together with the injury criteria the least well defined. 
Some changes in the regulation of AD were introduced in 1996.16
When a petition is filed the calculation of the dumping and injury margin follows. 
Dumping is caused whenever there is a positive difference between the 'normal value' of a 
product sold by the foreign firm and the actual price it charges in the European market. It 
requires that the foreign firm sell below the 'normal value'. This is a problematic issue for 
non-market economy countries. If the exporter of the good operates in a market economy, 
the 'normal value' is the price charged by the foreign firm in its domestic market. If the firm 
operates in a non-market economy, the 'normal value' is taken to be the price of the like- 
product in a reference country that operates in a market economy regime. The choice of the 
reference country is determined by the Commission and cannot be influenced by the 
exporter. This could lead to some bias if the country chosen is highly protected, has reached 
a higher level of economic development, has higher prices and wages, or if the industry 
used for the comparison is characterized by high concentration. The constructed value is 
expected to be high, making the findings of dumping more likely. This could make 
exporters from non-market economies particularly vulnerable to a decision where dumping 
is found (see Vermulst 1987). For this reason, a dummy variable will be included in the 
econometric specification used in the next chapter, to capture the existence of a possible 
bias in the decisions on dumping.
The legal definition of injury is rather vague. It involves a checklist of injury 
criteria. This checklist includes the volume of “dumped” imports, prices of such imports 
and actual or potential trends in production, capacity utilization, market share, stocks, sales, 
profitability and returns on investment, cash flows, employment and wages. The actual 
calculation of an injury margin is kept confidential. Nevertheless, several authors have 
pointed out (Tharakan 1993, Vermulst and Waer 1991) that the injury margin equals the 
level of price undercutting or price under-selling. When the price of a foreign product sold 
in the European Union is lower than the European price for a similar product, the price 
difference is taken as an appropriate measure of price under-cutting. Price under-selling
16 Especially Council Regulation (EC) No.384/96 of 22 December 1995. This regulation is basically an 
amended version o f regulation 3283/94 that was itself a response to the new WTO agreement. It incorporates 
a few changes to take account of the Uruguay Round Agreement in one or two very technical issues on the 
calculation of dumping and changes to some procedures (voting/ timing of the investigations) but they do not 
affect the sample period.
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refers to the difference between European 'target' prices and the price of the foreign like 
product sold in the EU. A 'target' price is constructed as the European cost of production 
adding a reasonable profit margin for the industry involved. The calculation of price under­
selling is appropriate for measuring injury when, after dumping has occurred, the domestic 
firm has reduced price in order to keep market share. The sales price of the EU producers is 
ignored.
It is worth mentioning that the European AD legislation differs from that of the US 
in several respects. First, in Europe there exists a "lesser duty rule" by which the level of 
any antidumping duty is limited to the amount required to eliminate the injury to the 
Community industry where this is less than the margin of dumping17. Whenever the price 
of the foreign product in the foreign market is higher than the domestic price in the EU the 
injury margin is lower than the dumping margin. In this way the rule partially shifts the 
emphasis from dumping to injury. Second, in the EU a large number of cases in which 
dumping and injury are established are terminated by the acceptance of price undertakings. 
A price undertaking is an agreement by the foreign exporter to eliminate injury by 
increasing its price in the European market or restrict its volume of exports towards this 
market. This will be the subject of Chapter 5. Third, AD duties are levied only after 
dumping and injury have been found. In the US a bond is deposited before the outcome of 
the investigation is known, although this is paid back in case of a negative finding. Fourth, 
the EU Sunset Clause establishes that AD measures lapse automatically after 5 years as 
opposed to the US where measures only lapse if  the foreign firm shows that dumping has
1 o
stopped .
There are separate antidumping rules for coal and steel products falling under the 
European Community Steal and Coal (ECSC) Treaty. The most notable difference between 
the regulations that apply to these two industries and the ones that apply to all others is on 
the relationship between the Commission and the Council of Ministers (COM). More 
precisely, the Commission without the approval of the Council can decide on the 
imposition of definitive measures. This feature will be reconsidered in the econometric 
analysis of the decisions presented in Chapter 4.
17 Article 13 (3) of Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88.
18 In the US, administrative duties can be adjusted by the Department of Commerce “administrative reviews” 
as often as every year to recalculate the dumping margin. In this way, foreign firms can affect future margins 
by their pricing decisions and can capture rents by increasing prices and obtaining lower future duties at 
considerable welfare cost (Gallaway et al. 1999).
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3 . 3  T h e In v estig a tio n  P ro ced u re  in  E u rop e
In the first part of this section, I will explain the steps, duration and possible outcomes of an 
antidumping investigation process in Europe. This will be useful in helping to understand 
the econometric results presented in the following chapters. Only a firm or group of firms 
can initiate an antidumping investigation. The firms should present their evidence to the 
European Commission, which is the institution that carries out the investigations. The 
regulations require that at least 50% of the industry should be represented to initiate a 
petition. For this reason the majority of complaints are filed by a trade association on behalf 
of the firms in the industry. These associations often have coordinating ability, expertise 
and experience in the administrative procedures and requirements.
The regulations contain a very precise timing in which each decision has to be 
made. The main stages involved could be called opening, preliminary decision and definite 
decision. The complaint must contain prima facie evidence of dumping, injury and the 
causal link. The Commission should decide within 45 days of receiving the complaint 
whether or not to initiate an investigation. When a case is opened it is published in the 
Official Journal. The Commission then sends out questionnaires to the relevant parties: 
exporting firms in the targeted third countries, domestic producers and other interested 
parties, typically importers. The questionnaires are extremely detailed. Very detailed 
information has to be produced at the level of the specific product concerned. If detailed 
information is not provided the party concerned will be deemed not cooperating and the 
investigation can be terminated. A crucial aspect is the timescale within which the 
questionnaire must be completed. This is normally 30 days after its receipt. The 
Commission then conducts on-site verifications at the premises of the main exporters, 
complainant producers and importing interested parties. Later, there is a hearing that takes 
place at the offices in Brussels. Questionnaires, verifications and hearings along with other 
written submissions provide the Commission with the information it needs to determine 
dumping, injury and establish the causation of material injury. If the criteria are met, it 
imposes provisional AD measures. These provisional measures are imposed for six to nine 
months after the investigation is launched, although the whole process can take a maximum
82
of fifteen months. Provisional measures could be in place for no more than nine months. 
This is the maximum period allowed by the EU regulations. This preliminary decision is 
published in the Official Journal. If a provisional duty is imposed, it is not paid when the 
product comes through EC customs. Instead, the defendants must give a bank guarantee so 
that as and when the duty is made definitive the provisional duties can be collected. During 
the imposition of provisional duties and the definitive decision, the European Commission 
gives the working documents to the members, but no detailed information is provided.
The Commission has six months to reach a definitive decision. Over this period the 
Commission deals with responses to the provisional findings from the interested parties, in 
particular, the exporters and users/consumers opposing the imposition of measures. The 
conclusions may change, but usually only where new information or evidence is provided, 
errors are corrected, etc. and modifications are not substantial. Once the investigation is 
completed, the Commission makes a proposal to the Council of Ministers for the measures 
to become definitive. If approved, they will be put in place for five years. In the past, the 
decisions in the Council have to be approved by qualified majority. However, since 1994 
decisions have to be approved by simple majority19. This definitive decision is published in 
the Official Journal. The econometric analysis discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 is based on the 
definitive decisions accordingly published.
The information contained in an investigation is kept confidential. The interested 
parties -  for example, exporters and European firms -  receive a disclosure notice from the 
EC prior to the imposition of provisional and definitive duties. The defendant can comment 
on it -  usually on adjustments to the dumping and injury margins -  but they have a very 
tight period in which they can do so. So, in practice, many defendants do not introduce 
modifications or comments on the case. Moreover, the disclosure notice does not contain 
detailed information. The information is similar to what it published in the Official Journal. 
In summary, the information disclosed to the defendant is very little .
Unlike in the US, in Europe two different administrative units within the European 
Commission conduct the investigations on dumping and injury. Both investigations are
19 Council Regulation (EC) No. 461/2004 amends Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 in that it changes the Council 
of Ministers voting rule. It requires that a simple majority of Member States in the Council to reject a 
Commission proposal for imposing definitive measures. Previously, abstentions counted effectively against a 
Commission proposal.
20 Interested parties can have access to non-confidential files like the questionnaire response and other 
submissions in the offices in Brussels and make their own responses.
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carried out independently21. When an investigation either on dumping or injury has been 
carried out a decision is made and it is published in the EC Official Journal. However, some 
investigations on injury are not carried out if the outcome of the investigation on dumping 
on that case is negative and vice versa.
The final outcome of an investigation could be: a) a rejection of the claim where no 
dumping or injury were found or it was in the community interest not to impose penalties, 
b) imposition of an antidumping duty, or c) the acceptance of undertakings. A case can be 
sometimes terminated because the firms withdraw the petition. It can also be terminated 
because the period in which it should have been completed expired22. A summary of the 
final outcomes of all investigations for each year in the period of study is presented in 
Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Final Outcome of Antidumping Investigations Filed in 1985-2003, by year
Year Negative Affirmative
(%)
Withdrawn Expired Total Affirmative
(%)
1985 18 33 0 0 51 64.7
1986 8 37 3 0 48 77.1
1987 5 40 0 0 45 86.7
1988 26 45 0 0 71 63.4
1989 30 17 0 6 53 32.1
1990 21 39 6 0 66 59.1
1991 1 35 1 0 37 91.9
1992 15 36 4 1 56 64.3
1993 8 30 4 0 42 71.4
1994 8 31 17 0 56 55.4
1995* 7 19 8 n.a 34 55.9
1996* 11 16 1 n.a 28 57.1
1997* 12 22 3 n.a 48 45.8
1998* 4 13 4 n.a 21 61.9
1999* 10 46 9 n.a 65 70.8
2000* 9 20 2 n.a 31 64.5
2001* 7 23 1 n.a 31 74.2
2002* 6 8 7 n.a 21 38.1
2003* 0 7 0 n.a 7 100.0
Total 204 517 70 805 100.0
Percentage 25.3 64.2 8.7 100
Note: The unit of observation is the sub-case, a/ Data contains only some review cases 
Source: European Commission, Official Journal, C and L series and Global Antidumping Database
Version 2.0 (Bown 2006)
21 In the US, the Department of Commerce, which is a branch of the executive and the International Trade 
commission (ITC) are the institutions whose members implement AD policy. The dumping investigation is 
carried out by the former while the injury determination is done by the independent but politically appointed 
agency, the ITC.
22 A previous investigation can be reinitiated if  the firms that originally requested ask for a review or if the 
European Commission requests a review.
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There are several European institutions and bureaucratic agencies involved in AD 
investigations. The most important ones are the European Commission (EC), the Council of 
Ministers (COM), the Antidumping Advisory Committee (ADAC) and the Courts. The 
European Parliament has only a very limited influence. It is consulted on proposals to 
change the antidumping regulations but it has no role at all in the investigation procedure. 
The European Commission carries out the investigations as outlined previously. The 
Council of Ministers has to give its approval for the definitive measures to take place. In 
the Council, there is one representative per member state. Before 1994, the decisions had 
to be approved by qualified majority. Since then, they have to be approved by simple 
majority. The regulations require a simple majority of Member States in the Council to 
reject a Commission proposal for imposing definitive measures. Previously, each member 
state was given a certain number of votes in the Council, weighted according to its size and 
population and abstentions counted effectively against a Commission proposal. Under the 
new rules, it is more difficult for a minority of countries to oppose a proposal. The 
requirement of approval by the Council is an exceptional one that does not exist in other 
areas of Community Law, i.e. in the domain of competition policy. Most of the 
involvement of member states comes from the Antidumping Advisory Committee (ADAC). 
It comprises relevant civil servants from national countries. Each member state is 
represented by one person. Its role is only consultative. The main consultations occur at the 
initial stage (initiation) and when provisional and definitive measures are proposed. The 
European Commission is the agenda setter and chair of this committee. From 1994, the 
validity of a decision can be questioned before the Court of First Instance. Before that date, 
any questioning fell under the jurisdiction of the European Courts of Justice. In practice, the 
Court simply ensures that the procedural requirements have been met. On average, eight 
cases are brought before the Courts each year (Kempton 2001). The issues raised are in 
most cases rather technical and on how certain aspects have been investigated. Generally, 
the Court has found in favour of the Commission.
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4 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this chapter has been to present a descriptive analysis of AD investigations 
worldwide, its prevalence in Europe as well as an explanation of the AD law and its 
implementation that provide the background for the analysis of the political economy 
aspects of AD in Europe.
In the next chapter an empirical analysis of the political and technical determinants 
of the dumping and injury decision by the European Commission in the period 1985-2003 
will be presented. A discussion of the related literature on the political economy of trade 
policy, in general, and the political economy of administered protection and antidumping, 
in particular, is presented. This discussion provides the frame in which the empirical 
analysis is conducted. The hypotheses formulated will be analysed.
In chapter 5 of this thesis, the analysis will be extended further. An empirical 
analysis of the determinants of the European Commission’s choice to accept price 
undertakings instead of imposing AD duties will be discussed. After a positive decision on 
dumping and injury has been made, legal provisions allow an AD case to end up with the 
imposition of duties or with the acceptance of price undertakings. In spite of the frequent 
use of undertakings in Europe, there are no clear-cut rules for its acceptance or rejection. 
So, several hypotheses will be presented and empirically analysed.
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Appendix 3
Table 3.9: Antidumping Investigations Worldwide (1987-1997), by Reporting Country
Reporting
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total %
U.S. 15 40 24 34 63 83 32 48 14 22 16 391 17.8
Australia 22 16 21 47 68 71 59 15 5 17 42 383 17.4
EU 28 27 18 48 29 42 21 43 33 25 41 355 16.2
Canada 31 15 13 15 11 46 25 2 11 5 14 188 8.6
Mexico 18 11 7 11 9 26 70 22 4 6 6 188 8.6
Argentina 0 0 0 0 1 14 27 17 27 22 15 123 5.6
Brazil 0 1 1 2 7 9 34 9 5 18 11 97 4.4
South Africa 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 16 33 23 88 4.0
New Zealand 0 9 1 1 9 14 0 6 10 4 5 59 2.7
India 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 7 6 21 13 55 2.5
Korea 1 0 1 5 0 5 5 4 4 13 15 53 2.4
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 21 0 0 4 32 1.5
Poland 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 1 25 1.1
Colombia 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 3 4 1 1 20 0.9
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 6 3 16 0.7
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 7 2 14 0.6
Finland 5 5 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0.6
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 4 13 0.6
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 8 13 0.6
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 2 4 12 0.5
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 1 2 11 0.5
Sweden 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0.5
Austria 0 0 8 2 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 9 0.4
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 3 0 9 0.4
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 6 0.3
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 5 0.2
Japan 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.2
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0.1
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.0
Total 120 124 96 165 228 326 299 228 156 221 233 2,196 100
Percentage 5.5 5.6 4.4 7.5 10.4 14.8 13.6 10.4 7.1 10.1 10.6 100
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998).
Table 3.10: Traditional and New Users of Antidumping (1987-1997); Worldwide
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Traditional Users 96 107 77 145 180 256 137 114 73 73 118 1,376
New Users 24 17 19 20 48 70 162 114 83 148 115 820
Total 120 124 96 165 228 326 299 228 156 221 233 2,196
% of New Users 20 14 20 12 21 21 54 50 53 67 49 37
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998) 
Traditional Users: the United States, Australia, Canada and the European Union.
New Users: all other countries.
87
/Table 3.11: Antidumping Investigations by Main Blocks (1987-1997); Reporting Countries
Year OECD South East Asia Non- M arket 
Economies
Others Total
Reporting % Reporting %. Reporting %. Reporting %. Reporting %
1987 101 84.2 1 0.8 0 0.0 18 15.0 120 100
1988 112 90.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 9.7 124 100
1989 87 90.6 1 1.0 0 0.0 8 8.3 96 100
1990 147 89.1 5 3.0 0 0.0 13 7.9 165 100
1991 185 80.9 3 1.3 24 10.7 16 7.1 228 100
1992 261 80.1 5 1.5 0 0.0 60 18.4 326 100
1993 148 49.5 9 3.0 0 0.0 142 47.5 299 100
1994 135 59.2 14 6.1 0 0.0 79 34.6 228 100
1995 73 46.8 7 4.5 0 0.0 76 48.7 156 100
1996 73 33.0 26 11.8 0 0.0 122 55.2 221 100
1997 122 52.6 31 13.4 0 0.0 79 34.1 232 100
Total 1,444 65.7 102 4.7 24 1.1 625 28.5 2,192 100
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
Table 3.12: Antidumping Investigations by Main Blocks (1987-1997): Affected Countries
Year OECD South East 
Asia
Non- M arket 
Economies
Others Total
Affected % Affected % Affected % Affected % Affected %
1987 55 45.8 35 29.2 18 15.0 12 10.0 120 100
1988 43 34.7 43 34.7 27 21.8 11 8.9 124 100
1989 26 27.1 25 26.0 28 29.2 17 17.7 96 100
1990 53 32.1 39 23.6 34 20.6 39 23.6 165 100
1991 96 42.1 45 19.7 57 25.0 30 13.2 228 100
1992 110 33.7 70 21.5 91 27.9 55 16.9 326 100
1993 94 31.4 52 17.4 94 31.4 59 19.7 299 100
1994 51 22.4 45 19.7 87 38.2 45 19.7 228 100
1995 49 31.4 38 24.4 43 27.6 26 16.7 156 100
1996 64 29.0 38 17.2 72 32.6 47 21.3 221 100
1997 77 33.0 53 22.7 68 29.2 35 15.0 233 100
Total 718 32.7 483 22.0 619 28.2 376 17.1 2,196 100
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
Table 3.13: European AD Investigations (sub-cases) by Economic Status of Country
Type of Country Number of sub-cases (%  of Total)
Industrialised Countries 103 19.6%
Developing Countries 204 38.9%
Non-Market Economies 218 41.5%
Source: European Commission, Official Journal, series C and L 
Note: A sub-case is a subdivision of a petition (legal case) in which each country named is considered as an 
individual unit.
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Austria 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 2 1 3 4 0 1 0 18 4.2
Belgium 1 1 1 0 12 2 0 2 0 3 9 1 1 1 0 34 8.0
Denmark 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 8 1.9
France 1 1 1 2 9 7 0 6 1 1 13 9 0 0 0 51 11.9
Germany 1 3 1 20 11 1 11 2 3 20 13 1 2 2 91 21.3
German Dem. Rep. 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 7 1.6
Greece 1 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1.6
Ireland 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 7 1.6
Italy 1 1 8 0 4 4 1 3 1 2 15 5 0 3 1 49 11.4
Luxembourg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 1.2
Netherlands 1 1 5 0 10 4 0 3 2 0 4 1 0 0 0 31 7.2
Portugal 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1.2
Spain 1 1 3 1 4 3 0 1 0 3 11 8 0 1 0 37 8.6
Sweden 0 1 0 2 3 0 3 0 0 6 4 1 0 0 20 4.7
UK 1 1 1 0 11 6 0 3 2 2 15 9 0 1 1 53 12.4
EC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 1.2
Total 14 12 31 5 78 42 3 39 12 15 103 57 3 10 4 428 100.0
Percentage 33 2.8 7.3 1.2 18.2 9.8 0.7 9.1 2.8 3.5 24.1 13.3 0.7 2.3 0.9 100.0
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.1: Antidumping Investigations Worldwide, 1987-1997
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Figure 3.2: Number of Cases: Traditional and New Users, 1987-1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.3: Affected Countries in 1987 and 1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.4: Antidumping Investigations in the US, 1987-1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.5: Reporting Countries in 1987 and 1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.6: Reporting and Affected Countries, 1987-1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.7: Antidumping Investigations (legal cases) in Europe, 1985-1997
Source: European Commission, Official Journal, C and L
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Figure 3.8: Antidumping Investigations in Europe, 1987-1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.9: European AD Investigations, Main Affected Countries, 1987-1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.10: European AD Cases; Who files against Europe? 1987-1997
Figure 3.11: Who files against Europe and who gets hurt? 1987-1997
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.12: Investigations in Europe (%): 1987-1997, by Sector of Economic Activity
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database, based on Miranda et al. (1998)
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Figure 3.13: Investigations Against Europe (number of cases), 1987-97, by Sector of Economic Activity
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Figure 3.14: Number of European AD Investigations (sub-cases, yearly)
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Chapter 4  The Political Economy o f Antidum ping
in  Europe
1 Introduction
After several trade talks at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) level there has been a 
general reduction of tariffs and a fall in traditional trade policy tools has taken place. At the 
same time, a rise in new forms of protection has occurred. Especially, a rise in the use of 
antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) measures suggests that at least in part 
they may have replaced the tariffs and vertical export restraints (VER). The use of 
antidumping measures can lead to selective protection. Legal experts have pointed out the 
vagueness of the antidumping code (Vermulst, 1990). This has allowed countries to 
implement unilateral interpretation in law or practice and claim consistency with the 
AD/CVD code. This is particularly important in the definition of dumping, the 
determination of ’normal value' and, more significantly, in the determination of injury. The 
AD implementation of the law contains loopholes that could let influences other than 
technical criteria in the determination of dumping and injury. This vagueness makes a 
positive finding more likely and also broadens the scope for its use. Political economy 
reasons for 'administered protection' may be underlying the recent increase in antidumping 
actions.
The purpose of this chapter is to test empirically the incidence of these aspects in 
the European antidumping decisions. The analysis focuses on the AD cases decided in the 
European Union (EU) in the period 1985-2003. The chapter analyses the separate decisions 
on dumping and injury made by the independent administrative units of the European 
Commission. It distinguishes between political and economic determinants of the 
antidumping decisions. Although the nature of the antidumping mechanism is quite 
complex, the legal and institutional information presented in the previous chapter provides 
the necessary background for the empirical analysis that follows. The analysis follows the 
Finger-Hall-Nelson's (1982) model, which distinguishes between technical (economic) and 
political aspects in the determination of dumping and injury. This model can be used to
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compare biases in the way in which different countries implement the antidumping code. It 
is also related to the work on injury decisions by the ITC by Moore (1992) and Hansen and 
Prusa (1997). Finger et al. (1982) empirically analyse the antidumping, countervailing 
duties and escape clause mechanism in the US in the period 1975-79. Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck (1994) have tested empirically this model for the European Union (EU) for the 
period 1980-87. However, the statistical analysis conducted in these studies does not 
control for macroeconomic factors and industry characteristics that may influence the 
decisions. This chapter improves on previous studies in three respects. First, it controls for 
macroeconomic factors and sector heterogeneity. In this way, a decision on dumping and 
injury being positive is explained by the general features of the double track model of 
administered protection as captured by the regressors. Second, it assesses the importance of 
multiple-country filing in the decisions on dumping and injury. The number of countries 
involved in an investigation is analysed as well as the importance of the cumulation rule by 
which the European Commission can cumulate imports when an AD investigation involves 
several countries. Finally, the economic significance of the results is discussed.
The empirical analysis is conducted using a combination of primary and secondary 
data sources. A data set is constructed with information originating in legal documents 
containing information about 805 antidumping investigations initiated in Europe over the 
19-year period between 1985 and 2003 and associated trade and industrial statistics. The 
hypotheses, related literature and the econometric results are presented and discussed in the 
subsequent sections. Two main hypotheses are formulated. The empirical findings confirm 
these hypotheses.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The related literature on the 
political economy of trade policy and AD is presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the 
hypotheses and the variable definitions. Section 4 contains the econometric specifications 
used. Section 5 is dedicated to the discussion of the empirical findings. Section 6  contains 
a discussion of the robustness and sensitivity analysis of the model. Section 7 includes a 
discussion of the determinants of positive findings of dumping. Section 8  presents the 
analysis of the economic significance of the findings. Section 9 compares the results of the 
AD decision for Europe with those for the US. Section 10 offers some conclusive 
comments.
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2 The Political Economy o f Antidum ping: R elated
Literature
In this section we present a review of the literature on the political economy of trade policy, 
in general, and antidumping, in particular. A summary of the main contributions from the 
theoretical literature and of the main empirical findings is presented.
2 . l  T he P o litic a l E co n o m y  o f  T rade P o lic y  in  G en era l
Research into the political economy of trade policy has been very profuse in recent years. 
The “endogenous” trade policy determination explicitly takes into account the political 
circumstances under which policy is set and has been at the centre of the research in this 
area. The central questions have been why industries receive protection and why certain 
industries receive more protection than others. Gawande and Krishna (1993) present a 
comprehensive review of the empirical research in this area. They distinguish a first and 
second generation of models. The first generation is based on several theoretical 
conjectures that have been found to be relevant in the empirical literature. The set of 
models contained in this group could be classified in the following categories (Baldwin 
1985). The pressure group model states that the level of protection in an industry should be 
positively related to variables denoting geographic and seller concentration (Olson, 1965). 
Olson (1983) also argues that economic groups might be organised in a context of rapid 
change that threatens income and employment levels. The comparative cost hypothesis 
suggests that industries in which the export penetration ratio is high and the import 
penetration ratio is low will receive a lower level of protection. The status quo model states 
that government officials have a preference for the status quo. For several reasons, 
governments want to avoid large adjustment costs. So, present protection should depend on 
past levels of protection and higher tariffs should be observed if there exists high import 
penetration and in industries intensive in unskilled workers. The voting approach suggests 
that elected officials tend to favour industries with the largest number of voters, so that 
protection is related to the number of employees in the industry. The social change model
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emphasizes the motives of governments to reduce income inequality by increasing the 
living standards of low-income groups. Under this model protection will be higher in 
industries that employ low-income, unskilled workers. Several empirical studies of these 
first generation models provided evidence of the endogeneity of trade protection. The 
results indicate that industries with low wages and high level of labour per unit of output 
tended to be highly protected, giving support to the social change model. Support for the 
voting model was also found as protection levels were found to be positively related to 
industry employment levels. Finally, the number of firms in the industry was found to be 
negatively related to the level of protection as predicted by the pressure group theory. 
Treffler (1993) finds that comparative advantage factors -  measured by import penetration 
and export ratios - matter immensely in the determination of non-tariff barriers (NTB) and 
that they are at least five times as important as business interest factors -  as measured by 
concentration and capital measures.
A second group of theoretical models provide specific and empirically testable 
predictions. They are mainly contained in the direct democracy (median-voter) approach 
and the interest group theories. Empirical studies do not find support for the former but 
find support for the latter. Political organisation is found to influence the inter-industry 
difference in trade protection in the manner predicted by the theory, namely that tariffs are 
higher in industries represented by organised lobbies. The most popular model of interest 
groups is the model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). This model derives closed form 
expressions for the cross-sectional pattern of tariffs that are directly empirically testable. 
The model considers a specific factors’ economy in which individuals have quasi-linear 
preferences. Some sectors are politically organised and try to influence politicians through 
political campaign contributions. Politicians maximise a linear objective function in which 
they give positive weight to both political contributions and aggregate social welfare. 
Protection across sectors is measured as a vector of import and export taxes. This model 
predicts that if an industry is import competing and is organised it is able to buy protection 
and obtains a protective tax. If it is not organised, it receives a penalising import subsidy. 
The protection the industry receives depends negatively on the degree of import-to-output 
ratio and depends inversely on the elasticity of import demand. The predictions of this 
model have been empirically tested for the US (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999). The paper 
finds support for the theory and confirms that political organisation influences the inter­
industry difference in trade protection in the way predicted by the theory. Ceteris paribus,
tariffs are higher, on average, in industries represented by organised lobbies. One of the 
primary contributions of the Grossman-Helpman model is that it provides a theory of 
interactions between government and lobbies with strong micro-foundations. This model 
presents several challenges for empirical studies on lobbying activity, especially in relation 
to using data on campaign contributions. This data is mostly available on corporate 
campaign contributions that are not specifically targeted at influencing just trade policy. 
Empirical research on voting behaviour and political influences through campaign 
contributions refers mainly to the US, due in part to the availability of data. Research on the 
influence of lobbying in Europe is very scant partly because of the lack of suitable data and 
partly because of its political organisation. The channels of influence exerted are not 
directly through direct monetary contributions to politicians23.
In the political science literature some theoretical research has focused on the 
impact of the power structure within government and the degree of conflict between 
different institutions on trade policy. Lohman and O’Halloran (1994) find that aggregate 
tariffs are linked to political economy variables in the US. In particular, they find US trade 
policy to be more protectionist in the presence of a divided Congress than under a unified 
Congress.
2 . 2 T he P o litic a l E co n o m y  o f  A d m in ister ed  P r o te c tio n  
a n d  A n tid u m p in g
What makes antidumping different from tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restraints, etc. is 
its unique combination of political and economic manipulability and the set of specific 
incentives it generates at the micro level. In spite of the proliferation of political economy 
models of endogenous protection, very few theoretical models have addressed the 
specificities of the antidumping legislation. One of the problems in analysing the political 
economy of antidumping is that the specificities of the “supply” of protection are more 
complex. The institutions involved in the implementation of antidumping proceedings and
23 This does not mean that lobbing activity is small or negligible. In 1993, as many as 525 interest groups 
were officially recognised and regularly consulted by the Commission (Mazey and Richardson, 1993). An
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the decision making process in which it is based are quiet different from those required in 
the setting of tariff and non-tariffs barriers in which the units of decision making within 
government are the executive and the legislature. The institutional set up of antidumping 
raises several political economy issues that range from legislative delegation, to 
bureaucratic oversight and discretion, to logrolling and favouritism. Most of the issues of 
oversight, discretion and logrolling have been dealt with in the political economy literature. 
Some models of delegation refer specifically to administered protection but they do not 
have very strong micro foundations and have, therefore, few testable implications.
Legislative delegation is at the core of AD legislation. All countries that use AD 
delegate the decision making (investigations) to special bureaucratic units. The extent to 
which these units are isolated from political pressure and are independent of the executive 
authority varies across member states. In the European Union, for example, the 
investigations are carried out by two independent administrative units of the European 
Commission. Its members are appointed, so there is no direct political accountability. 
However, the Council of Ministers (body integrated by all member states) is the institution 
that has to agree on the final outcome of each investigation. Whether delegation allows 
pressure groups to lobby at the agency and the executive level or whether the agency is 
more insulated from any kind of political pressure remains a controversial issue in the 
literature. In principle, there is a potential for political pressure to be exerted at the agency 
and at the executive level. But, the delegation of decision making to an agency could also 
mean a lower level of lobbying as suggested by Hall and Nelson (1992). In a related paper, 
Moore and Suranovic (1992) show that a policy reform that lowers the likelihood of a 
protectionist outcome improves expected welfare when an industry has only one channel to 
seek protection. However, if there is more than one profitable source of protection, 
expected welfare may be lower because the protection seeking industry chooses the 
alternative path.
Another important feature of the implementation of AD is that the legislature 
confers a great deal of discretion to the agencies. The decisions on antidumping are usually 
delegated to the domain of independent agencies. The term “administered protection” 
usually refers to protection resulting as a statutory response to specified market 
circumstances or events and is determined by administrative agencies. These statutes are
estimate of the number of people involved in interest representation in Brussels was close to 13,000 in 1998 
(The Economist, 18th August 1998, The Brussels’ lobbyist and the struggle for ear-time).
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allowed by the GATT/WTO, the most common ones being AD and countervailing duties 
(CVD). Therefore, discretion is conferred by the WTO consistent rules, on the one hand, 
and by politicians (principals) who delegate decision-making powers to the agencies, on the 
other. However, the narrowly defined objectives of the Commission and the Council limit 
discretion.
The scope for judicial review is closely related to agency discretion. In 1921, the 
US shifted the enforcement of antidumping law from a legal process to an administrative 
one. From then onwards AD is a legal remedy and is not subject to criminal law or to the 
strict rules of meaning and proof that apply to the law. The courts have also a limited role 
in Europe. The European Courts of Justice, and later the Court of First Instance have had a 
limited mandate over antidumping decisions and the European Parliament has no say at all. 
This implies that the role of the courts’ decision-making is very insignificant24. Agencies 
and the Council instead are the key players in the administration of AD.
Several issues related to informational asymmetries are important in 
antidumping. This is relevant because of the nature of the investigation procedure. All cases 
are initiated by a domestic firm or group of firms and the information provided by these 
firms constitutes an important source to determine whether there is “unfair” trade and 
injury. Although agencies also gather information from other interested parties, a common 
feature in all countries is that confidential business information is collected by the agencies 
involved. In the EU, in particular, only the investigating authority (the Commission) has 
access to all pertinent information and the interested parties only get a summary 
description. Several theoretical papers have modelled lobbying activity as the provision of 
policy relevant information. These are models of information transmission or models based 
on the principal agent theory. Among the first group are the contributions by Austen-Smith 
and Wright (1992), Austen-Smith (1993) and Potters and Van Winden (1991) that analyse 
the role of lobbies in providing policy relevant information. In these papers a lobby 
transmits valuable information to a policy maker who is relatively less informed than the 
lobby about the relevant policy. They show that an influential lobby can coexist at the 
agenda setting stage and at the voting stage. Although these models capture some of the 
features most relevant to antidumping, they have the disadvantage that they have no
24 Some theoretical research has concentrated on the role of the courts (judges) in interpreting the law 
(Daughety and Reinganum, 2000) and the judge’s concern for reputation in decision-making (Miceli and 
Cosgel, 1994).
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testable implications and their validity could, therefore, not be assessed empirically. Due to 
its relatively small size the Commission has limited information gathering capabilities and 
it can adopt the role of intermediation between conflicting interests. In this way, organised 
pressure groups can improve the transmission of information about their collective needs 
(Gorges, 1996).
Within the group of models based on the principal agent theory, several papers 
have analysed the role of delegation in government bureaucracies. Aspects of delegation of 
administrative procedures have been investigated by Epstein and O’Halloran (1994). Their 
paper studies the role of discretion of government agencies when legislators and an agency 
have different preferences. When deciding how much discretion to delegate, legislators 
trade off informational gains from agency expertise and distributive losses from 
bureaucratic drift when policy consequences are uncertain. They show that delegation leads 
to an informational gain. The trade-off between technical competence and political control 
is captured in a model of legislative decision about agency procedures by Bawn (1995). 
Hall and Nelson (1992) analyse the role of institutions in administered protection. They 
argue that administered protection treats protection as a public good in that the returns from 
increased protection necessarily cut across industries. In a model of perfect delegation, they 
show that administered protection induces a lower level of lobbying and lower protection.
Issues of oversight are also important in AD. The Council of Ministers (COM) 
plays an important role in the oversight of the agency’s work. Epstein and O’Halloran 
(1994) show that if politicians have an ex-post veto power there is a discretionary floor, a 
minimum level of discretion that is always optimally granted. The effects and the degree of 
delegation by the executive or legislature to an agency are relevant in the context of 
antidumping. For example, the European Commission has discretion for setting the agenda 
(decides which cases to open, which proposals to make, etc.) and may have preferences that 
are different from those of the member states represented in the Council. But, discretion is 
limited by the control that the COM imposes at the final stage of approval. Unfortunately, 
the voting within the COM is kept confidential making it impossible to conduct empirical 
research on voting and to elucidate the preferences of its members and the existence of 
logrolling or “principle of non-interference”. The research on the voting decisions on AD 
cases in the US has been plentiful. Moore (1992) finds that ITC Commissioners 
significantly differ in their voting behaviour. He analyses whether decisions of the ITC are 
immune to outside influence. More specifically, he analyses whether factors outside the
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reasonable interpretation of the law enter commissioners' decisions. The results indicate 
that getting the “right” person on the Commission affects outcomes. The study finds 
evidence that petitions involving constituencies of the Senate trade sub-committees are 
favoured. Those represented by Congressmen with direct influence over the administrating 
bureaucracy are more likely to be successful in obtaining a positive injury decision. Hansen 
and Prusa (1997) analyse the decision-making process of the ITC in determining injury. 
They find evidence that the political pressure stems from oversight committees. Although 
Congress has delegated decision making powers to the ITC it retains strong influence over 
actual policy decision-making.
Issues of geographical location and political support may also be relevant in 
Europe. One could expect that those countries representing filing firms would be the only 
ones giving the final approval on the decisions. If members of the Council only care about 
the interests of the firms located within their territories, given that each member state has 
one representative in the COM, the only cases that would be approved would be those 
where the firms involved are located in eight or more countries. Kempton (2001) suggests 
that it is not only having an industry located in its territory what makes a country support a 
case and approve final measures. There may be other dimensions that shape member states’ 
preferences. Using a sample of 55 antidumping cases initiated between 1995 and 2000 he 
shows that, on average, producers filing a complaint are located in three or four member 
states. Producers filing AD investigations located in only one country represented 10 out of 
55 cases (one fifth). Producers located in less than eight countries represented 96% of the 
total. Considering that there were 15 member countries in Europe and that decisions in the 
Council have to be taken by simple majority, a minimum of 8  votes are required to obtain 
the approval of definitive measures. This suggests that members of the Council do not only 
vote for measures if the firms are located within their national boundaries. Having an 
industry located in its territory is not the only reason for making a country member support 
an antidumping case and approve final measures. Kempton also suggests that the level of 
country’s approval about the use of antidumping could be taken as an indicator of the 
Council’s preferences. There are countries in Europe that vote more often against the 
imposition of measures (i.e. the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden) and 
others who are more prone to vote for them (i.e. France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal). 
The preferences of the Council may be the same as those of the Commission but there may 
be some logrolling or principle of non-interference. The situation is very different in the US
where information about voting is available. Several studies have analysed antidumping 
decision-making using data on Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions and voting 
behaviour of commissioners at the ITC (Hansen and Prusa, 1997). Moore (1992) also 
examines the role of the control over the ITC by congressional oversight sub committees. 
However, the lack of information on voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers means 
that empirical studies have to rely on indirect measures of political control.
The review of the research on the political economy of antidumping presented 
highlights that there are issues related to oversight, geographical location of industry, and 
voting that although relevant cannot be investigated in European Antidumping. Indirect 
measures have to be used instead. The analysis presented in this Chapter is in line with the 
work by Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982), Moore (1992), Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) 
and Hansen and Prusa (1997) who have investigated how the antidumping decisions can be 
captured by political pressure. Even though the decision making process is supposed to be 
purely statutory -  that is, reflecting market circumstances - I hypothesise that political 
influences are important determinants of the dumping and injury decisions. The hypotheses 
and variable definitions are presented in the next section.
3 The Hypotheses and Variable Definitions
The hypotheses
The model described in this section makes a distinction between economic and political 
variables that influence the antidumping decisions. The model distinguishes high and low 
tracks in the administrative regulation of imports25. The low or technical track is the “rules” 
track. The decision-making is delegated to government agencies by the legislature. In the 
technical track decisions are not subject to political accountability. Cases in the low track 
are determined instead of decided, according to criteria established by law, administrative 
regulations and precedent. However, higher-track decisions are less circumscribed by rules 
and regulations. The government officials are subject to political accountability. Examples
25 This model is empirically tested in relation to antidumping and countervailing duties and escape clause 
mechanism for the US (Finger, Hall and Nelson, 1982). The distinction was introduced by Richard Cooper 
(1972), Trade Policy is Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, No. 9, 1972-73, 18-36.
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of the political track are the escape clause cases and they have been used in the US. 
However, similar provisions in European legislations have been rarely used. In Europe, the 
“special instrument” - similar to section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act - allows the 
Commission to react to “illegal” practices of trading partners but has rarely been used in 
practice. Similarly, the safeguards provisions (article XIX of GATT) have very rarely been 
used.
Decisions such as AD determinations are made administratively and can, therefore, 
be considered low track. In principle, AD decisions have to be done according to certain 
rules and procedures. However, it has also been argued that the implementation of the AD 
laws contains loopholes that could lead in influences other than technical criteria mainly in 
the determination of injury. Several questions will be evaluated in this Chapter. The 
statistical aim of the analysis is to determine the influence of both political and economic 
variables on the likelihood of an affirmative dumping and injury decision. We test two 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 - The political variables are not significant in the determination of
dumping
Hypothesis 2 - The technical variables (comparative costs) are not significant in the
determination of injury
In the regressions, economics and political variables are included. However, it is 
expected that mainly economic variables will be significant in the dumping decisions whilst 
mainly political variables are expected to be significant in the injury decisions. Law 
specialists have well documented that the European implementation of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement seems to be biased against countries with no market economies as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Accordingly, a dummy variable is introduced to capture this in the 
econometric specifications.
In what follows, I present a description of the variables used and the theoretical 
justification for its inclusion in each regression as well as a comment on the hypothesised 
sign of each of them. In the dumping equation, the dependent variable is a binary variable 
that takes the value one if dumping is found to exist and zero, otherwise. Similarly, a binary
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variable is constructed for the injury regression. Finally, I describe the data. A list of data 
sources is presented in Appendix 4C.
The variable definitions
The political variables can be divided into international and domestic. Among the former is 
the share of European exports that are exported to country j  (the country of the defendant) 
as a proportion of total European exports (X). The variable is defined as the
X jratio X j  = —— , where X JEU is the total exports from the EU to country j  and X EU is the
X Eu
total exports of the EU in the year of the investigation. This variable represents the 
dependence of EU exports markets on the country of the defendant. I hypothesise that there 
could be a threat of retaliation in the AD decisions. The main channel through which 
retaliation can affect the decisions made may operate at the level of the government agency 
involved, namely the Commission. The decision to grant protection may be influenced by 
the possibility that an affirmative AD finding leads to retaliation by the foreign countries 
through the use of AD by the country of the defendant or by the GATT/WTO trade dispute 
settlement mechanism.26. Since agencies have considerable discretion, the agencies’ 
decisions may not be completely determined by the facts of the case. It is expected that the 
higher the proportion of European exports to the country of the defendant on the volume of 
total exports, the less likely it is that there would be a positive finding of dumping.
*yn
Therefore, we expect the estimated parameter to be negative .
Another variable included as an international influence is an indicator one, which 
takes value one if the country of the defendant is a less developed country (LDC) and zero, 
otherwise (see Appendix 4C for classification of countries). In principle, there is no 
presumption about whether in cases brought against a LDC dumping is more or less likely 
to be found. Article 15 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 
states:
26 Bown (2002) presents a theoretical model with misuse of AD procedures under a situation where the 
recourse is available to the foreign country under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process.
27 Blonigen and Bown (2001) investigate the effects of the threat of foreign retaliation on US antidumping 
case filing behaviour and find that the threat of foreign reciprocal AD duties can reduce the likelihood of US 
AD cases being filed against certain countries. Bown (2004) finds evidence that countries tend to implement 
various forms of “GATT-illegal” protection against trading partners that are unable to credibly threaten 
substantial retaliation.
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"...special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special 
situation of developing country Members when considering the application of 
antidumping measures..."
and,
"...possibilities of constructive remedies provided by this Agreement shall be 
explored before applying antidumping duties..."
However, it should not necessarily be the case that this aspect is taken into account 
in practice. Bown et al. (2003) analyse the pattern of US antidumping against developing 
countries. They show that lower income developing countries are more likely to be 
targeted, less likely to settle cases, more likely to confront high antidumping duties and less 
likely to bring cases to the WTO. They argue that some of the factors that may explain the 
observed bias facing developing countries could be the differences in administrative and 
institutional “capacity” as well as limited retaliatory ability. The sign of this variable is left 
unspecified.
Among the domestic political variables several measures of political influence are 
used. A measure of concentration (CON) is included in order to capture the potential for 
lobbying in the industry that initiates the case. It is the market share of the five biggest 
firms in an industry in the European Union. The sign of this variable is expected to be 
positive, reflecting the presumption that the more concentrated the industry the more likely 
it is to overcome free rider problems and the more likely to lobby for the case. This is 
consistent with the theory of collective decision-making (Olson 1971). Although the 
channel through which lobbying occurs is left unspecified here, several theoretical studies 
have emphasized that the likelihood of lobbying activity is understood to be greater if the 
number of firms in an industry is relatively small.
Another domestic political variable is the size of the case (SIZE). Two proxies for 
case size (SIZE) were used. The first one (SIZE1) is the total value of EU imports of 
product k .under investigation from country j  (the country of the defendant) at constant 
prices, SIZEX = M%j. Imports are measured in the year in which the investigation was 
initiated. The second proxy of case size (SIZE2) is the percentage of EU imports of the 
product k  under investigation from country y, M ^v , in the total imports of the EU for that 
M kj
year M Eu: SIZE2 = —— *100. The higher the imports the more likely it is that the final
M eu
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decision on dumping will be positive. The results reported in this Chapter refer to (SIZE1) 
but qualitatively similar results are obtained when including (SIZE2).
One of the measures of an industry’s political influence is its size. The larger the 
industry filing a complaint the greater the electoral impact it could have. The presumption 
is that larger industries can exert greater political pressure either directly on the 
Commission or on country members’ representatives. Two variables that capture the size of 
the industry were defined. The first one is the number of people employed in the industry 
(LAB) defined as the number of people employed. The second one is the industry’s value 
added (VA). Employment and output are two alternative measures of industry size. 
Considerations about employment could be very relevant in the investigation since they 
could reflect positive findings justified by adjustment costs. Since these variables are highly 
correlated and the estimation results using either one of them are similar, the results 
reported are those using employment. To analyse the robustness of the model, two 
alternative proxies of industry size are used. The first one is a relative measure of value 
added (RVA). It is defined as the share of value added for European industry i over the
VA‘ '
VA
\  e u  y
Similarly,value added for the total European manufacturing sector:RVA =
(RLAB) is the share of the number of people employed in European industry i over the total 
number of people employed in European manufacturing: RLAB =
v LAB E!J j
The technical track variables should reflect comparative costs. They attempt to 
capture any bias in favour of producers with a comparative disadvantage in international 
trade. They refer to relative factor endowments, factor prices and costs. The first variable in 
this group is the capital-labour ratio (K/L). On Hecksher-Ohlin basis, a highly developed 
country (EU) is expected to have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries. 
Therefore, the sign of the capital-labour ratio is expected to be negative. Series of capital- 
labour ratio were calculated for all the European industries according to the perpetual 
inventory model. The series and the methodology used are presented in Appendix 4B.
A second proxy of costs is the labour share (LS). This is the share of labour costs in 
value added. It is defined as the ratio of European wages in industry i over the European
value added in industry i: LS = '’w a g e 1''
VA'
The third variable in this group is the average
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wages and salaries per worker employed in the industry concerned (AVWAGE) at constant 
prices. This intends to capture the extent of the use of human capital. The sign of this 
variable could be expected to be negative on neo-factor proportions grounds but positive on 
strategic trade policy grounds, meaning that Europe tends to protect industries with high 
human capital content. The fourth variable, measures the relative importance of the labour 
costs in European industry j  as a proportion of labour costs in European manufacturing. It is 
the share of the wage bill in European industry i over the wage bill in the total European
manufacturing sector: R WAGE = WAGE1 x 
WAGEm J
, where WAGE1 is labour compensation in
industry /.
A dummy variable (NME) is included to capture the potential bias in the dumping 
determination and comparison with 'normal value' for non-market economies, as mentioned 
above. To investigate whether there are also biases in determining material injury this 
dummy is also included in the injury regressions. The dummy takes value one if the 
country involved in the case has a non-market economy and zero, otherwise. A non-market 
economy is broadly defined (see Appendix 4C for classification of countries). The sign is 
expected to be positive.
A variable measures the number of different products covered by the case 
(TECH)28. The presumption is that this variable will have a negative sign. The reasoning 
behind its inclusion is that dumping involves a pricing decision and, therefore, it applies 
better to specific products than to larger aggregations. The more narrowly defined the 
industry affected by the imports, the easier it becomes for domestic producers to 
demonstrate dumping and injury. This point seems to be important in the actual 
investigations of both dumping and injury as is documented in the several publications in 
the Official Journal where the cases are presented. Therefore, a bigger number of products 
would mean that the technical criteria for a decision are less clearly met, making it less 
likely that dumping is found.
Finally, a variable that represents the cost of gathering information in the case is 
defined. It is represented by the number of countries (NOC) involved in a case. The firm or 
group of firms initiating a petition have to provide information documenting unfair trade. 
This and additional information will be used as evidence in the case. This information is
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costly and assumed to increase with the number of countries involved in the case. The 
possibility that this could have an impact on the AD decisions is explored. Since the 
information provided by the petitioning firms constitutes the basis on which the 
Commission investigates, one can suspect that it may have an impact in the decisions made. 
The possibility of non-linear effects is explored. Table 4.1 contains a list of the variables 
used in the econometric analysis and the sign expected for each one of them.
Table 4.1: Variables and Expected Signs: Dumping and Injury Decisions
Name Sign
Political Track variables
1) % of EU exports imported by the country of the defendant X -
2) Dummy for Less Developed Country LDC ?
3) Market share of 5 biggest firms in the industry CON +
4) Imports of the product from defendant’s country SIZE +
5) Number of people employed in the industry LAB +
6) Value added in the industry VA +
Technical Track variables
7) Capital-labour ratio K/L -
8) Average wages and salaries per worker AVWAGE ?
9) Dummy for non-market economy NME +
10) Number of products covered by the case TECH -
11) Number of countries named in the case NOC ?
The data
The data set was built from primary and secondary data sources. Two periods are analysed. 
The first one consists of all European AD investigations initiated between 1985 and 1994, 
resulting in 261 legal cases that involve 58 countries . The second one includes 
investigations initiated between 1995 and 2003, totalising 118 legal cases referring to 46 
countries. Each legal case involves only one product but it could involve more than one 
country. Therefore, counting each legal case against each individual country separately, 
there are 805 “sub-cases” in the sample. The average number of countries in each year 
varies between 1.7 and 2.5 as described in Table 4.9 (appendix 4A). In this period, 365 
investigations ended with the imposition of AD duties (45%), 152 in price undertakings 
(19%) and 288 cases were terminated by the Commission (36%). Between 1985 and 1994, 
80% of antidumping cases are against low cost countries (developing countries and non- 
market economies) as described in Table 3.13.
28 Products are defined by an 8-digit code in the Combined Nomenclature (CN) classification of goods from 
1988. Before this date, they were defined by a 6-digit code in the NIMEXE classification.
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Several pieces of information can be obtained from the legal documents initiating an 
AD case and were used to construct the data set: the date of initiation and termination of the 
case, the product name and code, the countries named30. Each legal case initiated has a 
number in the C and L series of the Official Journal of the European Commission31. A 
preliminary investigation follows and a decision on preliminary measures is made and 
published. Finally, a decision about the impositions of definitive measures is made and 
published. The period of investigation following the initiation of a case lasts on average 
twelve months.
The information on a legal case decision is used to build dichotomous dependent 
variables for dumping and injury and was obtained from the Commissioil of the European 
Communities, Official Journals (C and L series) available on CD-Rom. The variables are 
constructed with the information about definitive measures only. All withdrawals are 
classified as terminated by the Commission and are categorised as missing values since no 
decision on dumping or injury is reached in these cases.
For each product investigated, annual import trade data of the EU by source were 
collected from EUROSTAT trade statistics and from the United Nations COMTRADE 
database. Before 1988 EUROSTAT reports data using the NIMEXE 6 -digit product codes. 
After that date the 8 -digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes are used to identify 
products. For the period 1985-94, import values for each product by country of origin were 
collected for the year in which the case was initiated. The import values are translated into 
US dollars using the exchange rate ECU-US dollars (International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics) and expressed in constant prices of 1990 using the US 
implicit value added deflator for the manufacturing sector from the OECD STAN database. 
The Commission has changed the country codes for several countries. For some countries a 
new country code has exactly replaced an old one. A correction was applied to Easter 
European countries that were split into separate countries like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union or have ceased to exist, like the German Democratic Republic. For 
the period 1995-2003, import trade data of the EU by source were collected from United 
Nations COMTRADE trade statistics. The data available in Euros is deflated by the GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) implicit deflator for 15 European countries.
29 After dropping cases for which no trade or industrial data could be constructed there were 379 cases left. A 
detailed account of data sources and methodologies is presented in Appendix 4C.
30 A list of European Antidumping cases was provided by Hylke Vandenbussche.
31 The European AD decisions are a matter of public record and can be found in the Official Journal.
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For each investigated country, annual export trade from the EU was collected from 
EUROSTAT COMEXT in the period 1985-94. For the subsequent period the data was 
collected from COMTRADE. This data is used to define the share of European exports to 
the country named over total European exports.
The econometric analysis refers to industries in the manufacturing sector . For the 
period 1985-94, each product is associated with an industry (3-digit International Standard 
Industrial Classification -  ISIC - Revision 2 and the Nomenclature des Activites dans la 
Communaute Europeenne -  NACE - Revision 3). The industry associated with each 
product was obtained by using the International Concordance published jointly by the 
Department of Commerce, EUROSTAT and Statistics Canada and several correspondence 
tables provided by EUROSTAT. Several industrial series are constructed using the OECD 
STAN and Structural Business Statistics databases for the relevant years. They are industry 
employment, value added, average wages and salaries per worker and, investment. Nominal 
variables are measured in constant prices of local currencies using industry and country 
specific deflators and transformed into US dollars using the exchange rate (OECD STAN) 
for the relevant countries and years. Industrial investment data was used to calculate 
capital stock series based on the perpetual inventory model. Investment in local currencies 
was deflated by the value added implicit deflator for each industry and country, and 
converted into US dollars using the exchange rate. The capital stock series are measured in 
dollars at constant 1990 prices. Appendix 4B contains the capital stock series for the period 
1970-94 and describes the methodology used to calculate them.
A series of industrial concentration was constructed using the market share of the 5 
biggest firms in an industry in 1989. The data was obtained from Lyons and Davies (1996) 
for most industries at the 3-digit level of the (NACE) 1970 Classification. For the textile 
and chemical industries the information was obtained from the European Commission 
(1989) “Horizontal mergers and competition policy”.
A series of the growth rate of GDP for Europe was constructed using GDP at 
constant prices from the World Economic Outlook (GEO) database for the period 1985-94 
and EUROSTAT for the period 1994-03. The composition of Europe has changed in 1985, 
1995 and 2004. A correction was applied to reflect this.




The aim of the statistical analysis is to determine the influence of political and economic 
variables on the likelihood of an affirmative determination in an AD investigation. The unit 
of analysis is the sub-case. There are a total of 379 legal cases initiated between 1985 and 
2003, but each legal case (petition) could involve several countries. Since decisions are 
made for each of the countries involved independently, we define a “sub-case” as an 
investigation initiated against one single country named in the legal proceedings. Defined 
in this way, there are 525 sub-cases in the sample. Since we are interested in the analysis of 
the determinants of the Commission’s definitive decisions, I exclude those cases that are 
withdrawn and those in which the investigation period expired. Two sub-cases that are 
terminated in view of the community interest provision are also excluded .
Not all investigations filed (initiated) reach the final decision stage. This can occur 
for three reasons. First, some investigations are withdrawn by the petitioning firms at 
different stages of the procedure. Second, the investigation period may reach the maximum 
length allowed in the regulations. This usually occurs when the European firms do not 
provide the necessary information requested by the Commission in time. Third, the timeline 
of an investigation on dumping and injury implies that a decision on dumping may be 
reached before the investigation on injury has been carried out and vice versa. Overall, 182 
sub-cases are not investigated for dumping and 153 sub-cases for injury. A description of 
the number of sub-cases investigated and their respective final outcomes are summarised in 
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Number of Cases Initiated and Investigated; Dumping and Injury Decisions (1985-2003)
Dumping Injury
Number of sub-cases, affirmative (Y=l) 566 524
Number of sub-cases, negative(Y=0) 57 128
Number of sub-cases investigated 623 652
Number of sub-cases initiated 805 805
Note: The unit of observation is the sub-case.
Source: Series C and L Official Journal of the European Commission
33 In these cases a provisional decision on dumping and injury was made, the investigation period has been 
much longer than average and measures were suspended for certain periods. These suspensions vary in length 
for each investigation but they introduce considerable noise. The products involved are electronic micro­
circuits (DRAMS from Korea, Regulation L324, September 1992 and EPROMS from Japan, Regulation 
L065, March 1991).
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Although there are decisions reached at different stages in the investigation 
procedure, we only consider the definitive decisions on each legal case. Provisional 
decisions -  those made after an investigation has been initiated but before a definitive 
decision is reached - are not analysed.
Using a probit model, I estimate the probability of an affirmative decision on 
dumping and injury. Two equations are estimated. In the dumping equation, the dependent 
variable, yu is binary and takes the value one if a decision on dumping is positive and zero 
otherwise, where i — 1,2 ... N = 623 sub-cases.
The underlying model is
y , = P ' x , + ui
where jc, is a vector of k regressors and a constant a; /? is a vector of k  coefficients and 
controls and m, is an error term. The residuals, w,, follow a normal distribution and the 
probability that a decision on dumping is affirmative in a case is given by
P(y( =l / x ) = £% (t)d t
The estimates of the coefficients p  are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE). More specifically, the following form for the underlying model for dumping and 
injury is given in
P(y . = l) = f ( a , X,  LDC, CONl, SIZEX, LAB, VA, KI L,  A VWAGE, NME, TECH, z ,) (1)
where a is a constant; z,* is a vector of controls and all variables are as defined in Section 
334. In estimating equation (1) I take into account the effect of aggregate macroeconomic 
shocks and therefore include year dummies, the rate of growth of GDP and the trade deficit 
to control for these effects. Some of the effects of the exchange rate is captured by certain 
variables that are measured in nominal terms such as case size, value added, capital labour 
ratio and average wage per worker (originally measured in different currencies and 
converted by using the exchange rate).' Knetter and Prusa (2003) find evidence that
34 No variable for economies of scale was included, due to lack of good quality indicators at the plant-level. 
The existence of scale economies can equivalently be captured by industry dummies.
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exchange rates and domestic real GDP growth have statistically significant impacts on 
filing activity for Australia, Canada, the EU and the US. We suspect that they may also 
have an impact on the decisions made by the European Commission (EC). Furthermore, I 
control for unobserved fixed effects by including industry dummies. These dummy 
variables are defined at the 2-digit and 3-digit ISIC/NACE-sector to control for sector 
heterogeneity. These dummies could capture a possible selection bias to some extent, in the 
sense that there may be sector characteristics that trigger AD investigations more than 
others. Therefore, controlling for narrowly defined sector dummies one can control for 
unobserved fixed characteristics35. The same specification is used to analyse the injury 
decisions. The dependent variable, is binary and takes the value one if a decision on 
injury is positive and zero otherwise, where i=  1,2 ... N = 652.
A descriptive analysis is presented in Appendix 4A (Table 4.9 to 4.16). The highest 
dispersion in the data referring to the dumping decisions, as captured by the coefficient of 
variation, is displayed by the variable case size (SIZE1 and SIZE2) and the lowest by the 
labour share (LS) and the average wage per worker (AVWAGE). In general, the data on 
injury decisions shows more dispersion than the one referring to dumping decisions. 
Fourteen out of eighteen variables used have highest dispersion in the sample used for the 
injury regressions than in the one used for the dumping regressions. The sample is 
characterized by a high and significant correlation between employment (LAB) and value 
added (VA). This means that industries that are big in terms of value added are also big in 
terms of employment. Including either value added or employment gives the same results. 
The results reported consider only employment. Some other characteristics of our sample 
are that the average wage per worker and industrial concentration are positively and 
significantly correlated. Besides, the dummy variable for less developed countries and the 
share of EU exports to the country of, the defendant, employment and capital-labour ratios 
are negatively and significantly correlated. The partial correlation coefficients are presented 
in Tables 4.12.1 to 4.14 in Appendix 4A.
35 Case dummies were also included, in addition to year and industry dummies, to explore whether there are 
fixed effects in a legal case, for example, some common features to all countries named in each investigation. 
This is a “country group” or “case” effect dummy. The dummy takes the value one for all countries included 
in a legal proceeding and zero otherwise. For the period 1985-94, 261 case dummies were used. This method 
imposes high multi collinearity, many of the case dummies are dropped since they either perfectly predicted 
success or failure and the sample size is significantly reduced. However, the results are consistent with those 
reported in Table 4.3.
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5 Empirical Results
Probit estimations of the model are presented in Table 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 with robust standard 
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. The White’s robust “sandwich” estimator of the 
covariance matrix is used. Observations within a case may not be independent whereas 
observations across cases are. Therefore, the observations (sub-cases) in each legal case are 
considered as one cluster when estimating the standard errors. The results present the 
estimated coefficients and the slope (marginal effects) of the probability of a dumping and
- i r
injury decision being positive, conditional on the firm having filed an investigation .
The models differ from the specifications in Finger et al. (1982) and Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck (1994), in that they control for macroeconomic effects and unobserved 
industry characteristics. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report the estimates for 8 political and 
technical determinants of the dumping decisions including industry and year dummies37. 
The statistical results suggest that Europe operates a double track AD mechanism. Mainly 
technical variables are significant in the determination of dumping. Columns (4), (5) and 
(6 ) report the estimates for the same determinants of the injury decisions. The statistical 
results are consistent with hypothesis 2. The comparative cost variables are not significant 
in the determination of injury. A closer look at the results, in terms of individual variables, 
helps to elucidate the determinants of each type of decision.
5 . l  D u m p in g  D e c is io n s
Mainly technical track variables are important in the determination of dumping, partly 
confirming Hypothesis 1. The results in Table 4.3.1 are presented in what follows and 
correspond to the period 1985-94.
36 The model was also estimated assuming a logistic distribution of the errors. The results are qualitatively the 
same.
37 Twenty industry categories were included (3-digit ISIC). A specification that uses more aggregated industry 
dummies is analysed in section 6.
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The political track
Dumping is more likely to be found in cases that are big in terms of imports, where the 
average wage per worker is high, in labour intensive industries and if the countries named 
are from a non-market economy.
Among the international political influences, the proportion of EU exports to the 
country of the defendant (X) is not a significant variable (z = -1.63,/? < 0.11, for a two- 
tailed test) although it has the expected sign. The results suggest that there is a negative 
association between the proportion of EU exports to the country involved in the 
investigation and the probability that a decision on dumping is positive. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficient is negative in all specifications (see also Table 4.17 in Appendix 4A). 
The dummy for less developed countries (LDC) is not significant. Nevertheless, it enters all 
specifications with a negative sign indicating that Europe tends to favour less developed 
countries in the dumping decisions.
Among the domestic political variable, case size (SIZE) measured by the value of 
imports involved in the case, is significant at the 5% level of confidence. The estimated 
coefficient is positive suggesting that cases that are big in terms of imports are associated 
with a positive determination of dumping. The estimated coefficient of the industrial 
concentration (CON) variable, measured by the market share of the 5 biggest firms in an 
industry in the European Union, is not significant and has a negative sign. This result 
suggests that a lower concentration in the filing industry is associated with a positive 
finding about dumping.
The technical track
The non-market economies variable (NME) is found to be significant at the 5% level of 
confidence (see column 2). Cases against a non-market economy have an 8.1% higher 
probability of a positive decision on dumping at the means of the regressors, everything 
else being equal. This is a moderate effect given that the sample average dumping decision 
probability is 83.5%. The econometric tests verify what could be anticipated from the 
descriptive analysis. Furthermore, this variable is significant and has a positive sign in all 
specifications. The investigations of AD in Europe seem to be targeted at non-market 
economies. As was mentioned in previous sections, this is not a surprising result since there 
seems to be a bias in the implementation of the AD law in Europe against non-market
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economies. The present regulations favour those firms filing petitions against these 
countries, which results in a higher probability of an affirmative decision on dumping being 
made.
The average wage per worker (AVWAGE) is significant only at the 10% level of 
confidence in the dumping regression. Although we have left the expected sign of the 
average wage per worker unspecified, the econometric results show that this variable has a 
positive sign. This is in accordance with the hypothesis of strategic trade policy. After 
controlling for macroeconomic and industry effects the results indicate that European 
decisions on dumping are more likely to be positive when the average wage per worker is 
high.
The hypothesis that more affirmative dumping findings occur in relatively labour 
intensive (low capital-labour ratio) industries is weakly confirmed by the data for the 
European decisions on dumping after controlling for macroeconomic effects and industry 
heterogeneity. The estimated coefficient of the capital-labour variable (K/L) presents a 
negative sign. The estimated coefficient for the technical precision (TECH) variable 
measured by the number of products in the case has the expected sign but is not significant. 
The results suggest that a big number of products involved in an investigation is associated
-JO
with a negative decision on dumping, as hypothesised .
A considerable number of observations are not used in this estimation because for 
certain years and certain industries the results are deterministic. A decision on dumping is 
always positive or always negative in certain years and industrial sectors. In the 
specification in Table 4.3.1 where both year and industry dummies are included, a total of 
78 observations are excluded because for two years -  1987 and 1994 -  all investigations on 
dumping have been positive. Furthermore, 8 8  observations are excluded from the 
regression because in ten industries a decision on dumping has always been positive and in 
one industry it was always negative. Those industries that always succeed in obtaining a 
positive finding on dumping are: the manufactures of footwear (ISIC 324, 2 observations), 
wood products (ISIC 331, 5 observations), paper and paper products (ISIC 341, 12 
observations), chemicals other than industrial (ISIC 352, 13 observations), rubber products 
(ISIC 355, 2 observations), other non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 369, 5 observations),
38 The results in Table 4.3 have been obtained using three alternative econometric methods. In the first 
method, all variables and controls are included. The second procedure included all variables and controls 
eliminating the less significant variable from each regression, one at the time, until a specification with only 
significant variables was reached. The third method included only significant variables.
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Table 4.3.1: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions by the 
European Union (1985-1994): Main Specification_____________________
Dumping Injury
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Share of EU exports - -7.16 -0.937 -1.63 -3.83 -0.823 -1.28
(4.39) (0.553) (2.99) (0.602)
Less Developed Country 9 -0.616 -0.060 -1.17 0.109 0.024 0.31
(0.525) (0.041) (0.359) (0.083)
Domestic Political
Influences
Concentration + -0.013 -0.002 -0.82 0.0005 0.0001 0.03
(0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003)
Case size (value imports) + 2.46** 0.322** 2.46 0.848** 0.182** 2.49
(1.000) (0.088) (0.340) (0.057)
Industry size: + 2.26 0.296 0.83 -0.502 -0.108 -0.56
employment (2.72) (0.369) (0.894) (0.193)
* Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital intensity - -0.936* -0.122* -1.67 -0.176 -0.038 -0.80
(0.561) (0.084) (0.221) (0.048)
Average wage 9 0.325* 0.043* 1.86 0.053 0.011 0.57
(0.174) (0.027) (0.093) (0.020)
Non-market economy + 0.623** 0.081** 2.03 0.170 0.036 0.86
(0.307) (0.046) (0.199) (0.042)
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) - -0.062 -0.008 -1.51 -0.004 -0.0008 -0.12
(0.041) (0.005) (0.032) (0.007)
Constant -0.566 -0.13 2.42* 0.94
(4.290) (1.471)
GDP growth rate 0.422 0.055 0.567 0.122**
(0.264) (0.039) (0.226) (0.051)
Trade Deficit 0.003 0.0004 0.002 0.0003
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0003)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
No. observations 253 422
Waldx2 36.4** 61.9***
(df) (23) (30)
Log. Likelihood -90.0 -169.1
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.26
Notes: z-values presented in italics. The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the 
investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. In the sample period, there are an 
average of 2 sub-cases per case with a maximum of 8 and a minimum of 1. Each regression also includes a 
constant. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each 
legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; **5% level and ***1% level (two-tailed test). 
Marginal effects for “less developed country” and “non-market economy” are for discrete changes in the 
variables from 0 to 1. In column (1) 166 observations, corresponding to two years and ten industries, are 
eliminated because decisions are deterministic. Either an affirmative or negative decision is always made. In 
column (4) 18 observations, corresponding to five industries, are similarly eliminated.
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electric machinery (ISIC 383. 41 observations), transport equipment (ISIC 384, 22 
observations) and other industries (ISIC 390, 7 observations)39. The industrial sector for 
which a decision on dumping is negative is plastic products (ISIC 356,1 observation). Only 
the year dummy for 1992 and two industry dummies (metal products and non electrical 
machinery) are significant at the 10% level. The t-statistics suggests that investigations 
initiated in 1992 and those relating to metal products (ISIC 381) and non-electrical 
machinery (ISIC 382) are less likely to have a positive decision on dumping. We can reject 
the hypothesis that all coefficients in the dumping regression except the intercept are zero at 
the 0.05 level (Waldx2 -  36.4, d f  =23, p  < 0.05). The pseudo-R2 statistic is 0.19. Technical 
variables were found to be jointly significant as indicated by the likelihood ratio test (tf2 (4) 
= 13.15, P-value = 0.01). A similar test was conducted for the political economy variables 
and they were found to be jointly significant ix (5) = 13.15, P-value = 0.01) as well. 
Similarly, yearly dummies were found to be jointly significant (tf2 (7) = 17.38, P-value = 
0.02) but industry dummies were found jointly insignificant (x (7) = 8.22, P-value = 
0.31).
Period 1995-2003
The analysis of the recent period (1995-03) is presented in columns (1) to (3) in Table
4.3.2. The results confirm that Europe is operating a double track AD mechanism. The 
results are consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. We can reject the 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the dumping regression except the intercept are zero at the 
0.05 level {Waldx -83.9, d f =17, p  < 0.01). The pseudo-R2 statistic is 0.27. Technical 
variables were found to be jointly significant as indicated by the likelihood ratio test ( f2 (4) 
= 11.64, P-value = 0.02). However, the test for the political economy variables shows that 
they are jointly insignificant (tf2 (4) = 9.04, P-value = 0.06). Similarly, yearly dummies 
were found to be jointly insignificant ix (4) = 7.65, P-value = 0.11) and industry 
dummies were found jointly insignificant (4) = 4.62, P-value = 0.33) as well.
The results for this period are similar to the previous one in several respects. 
Variables such as case size, the labour share in value added and the average wage per 
worker are significant at conventional level and the estimated coefficients have the
39 The products involved are: clogs, Kraft liner paper and board, fibreboard and hardboard, photo albums, 
thermal paper, Portland cement, tubes for bicycles and bicycles, electric motors, microwaves, TV, radio, 
video, CD-players, mobile phones and fax machines.
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expected sign. Affirmative findings are associated with relatively labour intensive 
industries and with high wages, as before. The results are in accordance with other studies 
(Rodrik, 1996 and Tharakan and Waelbroeck 1994).
One of the main differences with the results for the previous period is that the non- 
market economy dummy is insignificant in the decisions on dumping. This could be 
explained by the transition towards market economies that most of the Eastern European 
countries have experienced. Some of these countries have become part of the European 
Union from May 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). As emerges from the legal documents, in some investigations the European 
Commission would considered countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania as market economies towards 2001. Therefore, the protectionist built- 
in mechanism to calculate dumping margins is less applicable to these countries and the 
subsequent bias less severe.
5 . 2  In ju ry  D e c is io n s
Political track variables are important in the determination of injury confirming Hypothesis 
2. The case size is a significant determinant of the injury decisions. Injury is more likely to 
be found if the case is big in terms of imports.
The political track
After controlling for industry heterogeneity and macroeconomic effects, the domestic 
political variable case size (SIZE) is statistically significant in the decisions on injury as can 
be seen in Columns (4), (5) and (6 ) in Table 4.3.1. Among the domestic political 
determinants, having big imports in the case (SIZE) has a significant effect on the 
probability of injury (z  = 2.49,/? < 0.05 for a two-tailed test). This means that higher 
imports of the product are associated with a positive finding of injury occurs. This variable 
has a positive sign in all specifications and is significant at conventional levels.
The proportion of EU exports to the country of the defendant (X) is not significant 
(z  = -1.28,/? < 0.20 for a two-tailed test). The sign of this variable is negative suggesting 
that the higher the proportion of EU exports to the country involved in the case (X) the less
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likely it is that a positive decision on injury is made. Blonigen and Bown (2003) find 
similar results when they investigate the effects of the threat of foreign retaliation on US 
antidumping case filing behaviour. Their results indicate that retaliation exposure and, in 
particular, the threat of foreign reciprocal AD duties can reduce the likelihood of US AD 
cases being filed against certain countries40. Although this variable is not significant in this 
specification it becomes significant when the cost of filing against multiple countries is 
introduced (see Section 6 ).
The dummy variable for less developed countries (LDC) is not significant and 
enters positively in the specification with industry and year controls. Unlike in the dumping 
decisions, Europe does not seem to favour less developed countries in the determination of 
injury. The industrial concentration (CON) variable is not significant and should not be 
considered an important determinant of the injury decisions.
The technical track
There are no statistically significant technical track variables in the specification presented 
in Table 4.3.1. Among the comparative costs measures the capital intensity (K/L) is not 
significant and enters with the expected sign. The results suggest that affirmative findings 
are more likely in relatively labour intensive (low capital-labour ratio) industries. The 
average wage per worker (AVWAGE) is not a significant determinant of the decisions of 
injury and the estimated coefficient is positive. Having high average wages per worker 
increases the probability of injury in line with the strategic trade policy theory, in a similar 
fashion as in the dumping decisions. The non-market economy dummy does not have a 
significant effect on the probability of injury. No evidence of a bias against non-market 
economies is present in the decisions on injury. This is a reasonable result since the bias 
arises mainly from the comparison of the exporters’ price and the price sold in the EU, 
which is embedded in the calculation of the dumping margin, but is not necessarily related 
to the economic material injury. Finally, the technical precision variable (TECH) is not 
significant but the sign of the estimated coefficient suggests that the bigger the number of 
products in the case the less likely it is that injury is found, as hypothesised.
After controlling for macroeconomic effects and industry heterogeneity 18 
observations are dropped because injury is either always positive or negative. The
40 They find that US agencies are less likely to rule affirmatively against WTO members that have recourse to 
dispute settlement procedures.
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industries for which there is always a positive decision on injury are the manufacture of 
footwear (ISIC 324, 2 observations), rubber products (ISIC 355, 2 observations), transport 
equipment (ISIC 384, 5 observations) and other manufactures (ISIC 390, 7 observations)41. 
The industry for which a negative decision is made is plastic products (ISIC 356, 2 
observations)42. Also, only three yearly dummies for 1988, 1989 and 1992 are statistically 
significant at the 5% level of confidence. The t-statistics suggests that investigations 
initiated in those three years are less likely to have a positive decision on injury. Only one 
industry dummy variable (metal products, ISIC 381) is statistically significant in the 
decisions on injury at 1 0 % level of confidence and has a negative sign suggesting that 
investigations in the metal products sector are less likely to obtain a positive decision on 
injury. We can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients in the injury regression except the 
intercept are zero at the 0.01 level (Waldx2 = 61.9, d f  = 30, p  < 0.01). The pseudo-R2 is 
0.26. Technical variables were found to be jointly insignificant as indicated by the 
likelihood ratio test (tf2 (4) = 1.80, P-value = 0.77). A similar test was conducted for the 
political economy variables and they were found to be jointly significant (X2 (5) = 20.96, 
P-value = 0.00). Similarly, yearly dummies were found to be jointly significant (x (9) = 
46.06, P-value = 0.00) and industry dummies jointly significant as well ( f2 (12) = 41.6, P- 
value = 0.00).
The results discussed above are robust. They have been obtained using two 
alternative econometric methods. In the first one, all variables and controls are included as 
reported. The second one starts by the inclusion of all variables and controls and eliminates 
the least significant variable, one at the time, until a specification with only significant 
variables is reached. When using this last method, the proportion of EU export to the 
country of the defendant becomes significant and has the correct sign suggesting that the 
“fear of retaliation” hypothesis may be relevant in the injury decisions.
Period 1995-2003
The analysis of the recent period (1995-03) is presented in columns (4) to (6 ) in Table
4.3.2. The results confirm that Europe is operating a double track AD mechanism. The 
results are consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. We can reject the 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the injury regression except the intercept are zero at the
41 The products are: clogs, tubes for bicycles, bicycles and other miscellaneous.
42 The product is polyester film.
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Table 4.3.2: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions by the 
European Union (1995-2003): Main Specification
Dumping Injury
(1) (2) (3) • (4) (5) (6)
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Notes: z-values presented in italics. The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the 
investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. Each regression also includes a constant. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each legal case. * 
indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed test). Marginal 
effects for “less developed country” and “non-market economy” are for discrete changes in the variables from 
0 to 1. In column (1) 26 observations, corresponding to two years, are eliminated because decisions are 
deterministic. An affirmative decision is always made. In column (3) 34 observations, corresponding to two 
years and the “less developed country” dummy are dropped. An affirmative decision is always made. In 
column (5) 13 observations, corresponding to two years, are similarly eliminated.
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0.01 level (W a ld /  =43.4, df=18, p  < 0.00). The pseudo-R2 statistic is 0.25. Technical 
variables were found to be jointly insignificant as indicated by the likelihood ratio test ix 
(3) = 6.21, P-value = 0.10). However, the test for the political economy variables shows 
that they are jointly significant ( jf (5) =17.65, P-value = 0.00). Yearly dummies were 
found to be jointly significant ix (4) = 18.00, P-value = 0.00) and industry dummies 
were found jointly insignificant (x (4) = 8.32, P-value = 0.08).
Unlike in the previous period, three of the political economy variables are found to 
be significant at conventional levels and the estimated coefficients have the expected sign, 
confirming the importance of domestic political influences in the injury decisions. The 
industrial concentration variable is significant at the 5% level of confidence, confirming the 
pressure group hypothesis. Finally, the share of EU exports to the country of the defendant 
is associated with a positive probability of dumping.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
The aim of this section is to check the robustness of the results presented in Section 5. It 
focuses on three concerns. First, since different specifications of the model can be 
constructed and several different proxies used, it is important to ascertain that it is not a 
particular choice of regressors that drives the results. In fact, different proxies can represent 
the same effect. For this reason, several other proxies are considered with different 
variations for the domestic political influences and comparative costs. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 
report some of the results of the different specifications used in the dumping and injury 
regressions, respectively. Table 4.4 below documents alternative specifications of the 
regressions on dumping using other proxies for domestic political influence and 
comparative costs. In column (1) the results of column (2) of Table 4.3.1 are reproduced, 
for ease of comparability. In column (2) two different proxies for domestic political 
influences are used. A relative measure of the case size (SIZE2) - defined as the 
percentage of the value of imports of the products mentioned in the case in the total 
European imports - is introduced instead of the value of imports (SIZE1 in hundred million 
constant 1990 dollars). The second variable introduced is a relative measure of employment 
(RLAB) - representing the share of the number of people employed in European industry i
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Table 4.4: Sensitivity Analysis: Domestic Political Influences and Comparative Costs.
Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994)




Share of EU exports -0.937 -1.034 -1.004* -1.068 -1.170**
-1.63 -1.61 -1.69 -1.61 -2.10
Less Developed Country ? -0.060 -0.070 -0.065 -0.073 -0.062
-1.17 -1.21 -1.25 -1.26 -1.33
Domestic Political
Influences
Concentration + -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
-0.82 -1.11 -0.76 -1.02 -1.24
Case size: imports + 0.322** 0.322** 0.302**
2.46 2.41 2.23
Relative Case Size (in %) + 14.23** 13.95**
2.13 2.10
Industry Size: + 0.296 0.395 0.386
Employment 0.83 0.86 1.03
Relative Size: + -9.67 -10.89
Employment (share) -0.66 -0.62
*Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital Intensity -0.122* -0.156* -0.131*
-1.67 -1.91 -1.75
Average Wage p/worker ? 0.043* 0.054** 0.048**
1.86 2.18 2.04
Labour Share + 0.307 1.120
0.34 1.26
Non-market Economy + 0.081** 0.084* 0.086** 0.088** 0.073*
2.03 1.89 2.12 1.98 1.78
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) -0.008 -0.010* -0.008 -0.009 -0.010*
-1.51 -1.65 -1.44 -1.63 -1.80
Number of Countries -0.065*
-1.77
(Number of Countries)2 0.007*
1.76
GDP growth 0.423 0.067* 0.048 0.064 0.065*
1.60 1.68 1.33 1.54 1.79
Trade Deficit 0.003 0.0005* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005*
1.43 1.80 0.36 0.55 1.68
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 253 253 253 253 253
Wald x2 (degrees of 36.4**(23) 39.7**(23) 33.0(22)*** 35.5(22)** 37.1(25)*
freedom)
Log likelihood -90.0 -91.1 -91.6 -92.6 -88.2
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.20
See note in Table 4.3.1. z-values presented in italics. Each regression also includes a constant. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each legal case. * 
indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed test). In all 
regressions, 166 observations corresponding to two years and ten industries are eliminated because decisions 
are deterministic. Either a positive or negative decision is always made.
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over the total number of people employed in the whole European manufacturing sector.43 
The significant determinants of the dumping decisions remain the same as in the original 
specification. The relative measure of case size becomes significant and has the expected 
sign. In Column (3) the use of an alternative measure of comparative costs is investigated. 
Instead of the capital-labour ratio and the average wage per worker, the labour share (LS) -  
defined as the ratio of wages as a proportion of value added -  is introduced. The results 
remain the same indicating that labour costs do not significantly contribute to a positive 
finding of dumping. Column (4) includes both alternative variables for domestic political 
influence and comparative advantage. The results remain unaltered. Finally, Column (5) 
investigates the relevance of the number of countries involved in a case, as this can be 
relevant to the likelihood of a positive decision being made. In general, the belief is that the 
more countries, the more likely an affirmative decision will be made. But, acting against a 
bigger number of countries may increase or decrease the effectiveness of filing and this 
could have an impact that is different in the decisions on dumping and injury. The 
presumption is that the total cost of filing is probably increasing in the number of countries 
but there may be economies of scale. Since the information provided by the petitioning 
firms constitutes the basis on which the Commission investigates, we suspect that it may 
have an impact in the decisions made. In Europe, unlike in the US, the information on 
which the decisions are made is kept confidential. The variables used are the number of 
countries named in each case and the square of the number of countries involved to explore 
if non-linearity exists. Both variables are significant at the 10% level of confidence. The 
results show that the probability of a positive decision on dumping and injury initially 
decreases but it later increases with the number of foreign countries named in the 
investigation. Furthermore, when introducing this variable the share of EU exports to the 
country of the defendant (X) becomes significant at the 5% level of confidence, whilst the 
qualitative results of the other variables are unchanged. In all specifications, the hypothesis 
that all coefficients in the dumping regression except the intercept are zero is rejected.
In a similar fashion, the same robustness exercise is carried out for the injury 
decisions using different alternative proxies of domestic political influences and 
comparative costs. The results are reported in Table 4.5 and remained qualitatively
43 Other proxies of size like value added (VA) and relative value added (RVA) are highly correlated with 
measures of employment and are, therefore, not included in the regressions reported. The relative wage bill 
(RWAGE) was found to be highly correlated with employment (LAB) and value added (VA) and is excluded 
in the results reported as well.
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Table 4.5: Sensitivity Analysis: Domestic Political Influences and Comparative Costs
Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Injury Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994)




Share of EU exports - -0.823 -0.859 -0.857 -0.880 -1.131**
-1.28 -1.36 -1.41 -1.44 -1.99
Less Developed Country ? 0.024 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.033
0.31 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.42
Domestic Political
Influences
Concentration + 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00007 -0.0002
0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05










Industry Size: + -0.107 0.096 -0.133
Employment -0.56 0.81 -0.79




















Non-market Economy + 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.038 0.028
0.86 0.86 1.01 0.99 0.68
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) - -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 -0.003
-0.12 -0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.41
Number of Countries -0.141***
2.93
(Number of Countries)2 0.017***
2.63
GDP growth 0.121** 0.124*** 0.092** 0.094** 0.134***
2.51 2.57 2.10 2.17 2.83
Trade Deficit 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004
1.03 1.42 0.70 0.75 1.38
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 422 422 422 422 422
Wald x2 (df) 61.9***(28) 64.0***(30) 72.7(29)*** 74.8(29)*** 75.2(32)***
Log likelihood -169.1 -168.4 -166.9 -167.1 -162.6
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29
See note in Table 4.3.1. z-values presented in italics. The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is 
defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. Each regression also 
includes a constant. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering 
on each legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; **5% level and ***1% level (two- 
tailed test). Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1. In all 
regressions, 18 observations corresponding to five industries are eliminated decisions are deterministic. Either 
a positive or negative decision is always made.
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unaltered. Using a relative measure of case size does not introduce any changes. Using the 
labour share in value added instead of the capital labour ratio and the average wage per 
worker, seems relevant in the injury decisions. The variable is significant at the 10% level 
of confidence and enters negatively, suggesting that injury is less likely to be found in cases 
where the share of labour costs in value added is high. The variable number of countries is 
significant at conventional levels (column 5). The bigger the number of countries named in 
the case the lower the probability of injury initially, but this probability increases when the 
number of foreign countries named in the investigation is larger than four. When the 
number of countries is introduced, the proportion of European exports to the country of the 
defendant (X) becomes significant.
Second, so far we have ignored the cumulation rule by which the Commission can 
cumulate imports when an AD investigation involves imports from multiple sources. 
Without cumulation, imports are evaluated on a country-by-country basis. When 
cumulation is applied the Commission aggregates all “like” imports from all countries 
under the investigation and assesses the combined impact on the European industry. 
Without cumulation, the imports originating in a single country are less likely to represent a 
significant share of the domestic market and is, therefore, less likely to cause injury. When 
imports from different competitors are aggregated they are more likely to impact on the 
domestic industry. Hansen and Prusa (1996) find that cumulated cases are 20-40 per cent 
more likely to result in duties than non-cumulated cases for the US. So, one would expect 
that this is also relevant in the European investigations. In this section, we add a new 
variable (SIZE OTHERS) that represents the cumulated imports from all other countries 
except the one considered in the sub-case whereas in section 5 the variable represented only 
the imports originating in the country investigated in the sub-case. I proceed in this manner, 
so that I do not restrict the coefficients of both these two variables to be the same. One 
would expect that the market share contributed by the other named countries to be 
important in the injury decision, since the cumulation provision is more relevant for the 
determination of material injury. The econometric results for the period 1985-94 are 
summarised in Table 4.6.1 Both the imports from the country in the sub-case and the 
cumulated imports from the other countries named in the legal case are highly significant.
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Table 4.6.1: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions 
__________________by the European Union (1985-1994): Cumulation__________
Dumping Injury
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Share of EU exports - -0.827* -1.67 -1.011* -1.82
(0.475) (0.540)




Concentration + -0.002 -0.92 -0.0001 -0.44
(0.002) (0.003)
Case size -own country + 0.236** 2.08 0.141** 2.38
(0.075) (0.047)
Case size-other countries in + 0.214** 2.29 0.092** 2.45
the case
(0.102) (0.036)




Capital intensity - -0.110* -1.79 -0.038 -0.88
(0.076) (0.044)
Average wage ? 0.038** 2.00 0.011 0.59
(0.025) (0.018)
Non-market economy + 0.066* 1.89 0.030 0.74
(0.043) (0.041)
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) - -0.009* -1.93 -0.004 -0.58
(0.005) (0.006)
Number of countries -0.060** -1.97 -0.151*** -3.34
(0.032) (0.052)
Number of countries square 0.005 1.38 0.017*** 2.83
1 (0.004) (0.007)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
No. observations 253 422
Wald x?(df) 52.1*** 89.6***
(26) (30)
Log. Likelihood -84.0 -169.1
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.31
See notes in Table 4.3.1: z-values presented in italics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 
5% level and ***1% level (two-tailed test). Marginal effects for “less developed country” and “non-market 
economy” are for discrete changes in the variables from 0 to 1. In column (1) 166 observations, corresponding 
to two years and ten industries, are eliminated because decisions are deterministic. Either a positive or 
negative decision is always made. In column (4) 18 observations, corresponding to five industries, are 
similarly eliminated.
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The econometric results for the period 1995-03 are summarised in Table 4.6.2. The 
cumulation rule seems more relevant in the dumping than in the injury regressions since the 
estimated coefficient of the variable (SIZE OTHERS) - representing the cumulated imports 
from all other named countries except the one being investigated - is significant at 
conventional levels only in the dumping regressions. On the contrary, cumulation does not 
appear to apply to the decisions in this period for the injury regression.
Third, another area of interest is to what extent some industries may be driving the 
results. Instead of using disaggregated industry dummies, five major industry categories 
dummies were defined44.1 proceed by eliminating each industrial sector in turn: chemicals, 
iron and steel, textiles, and electronics and electrical machinery and others to analyse if 
there are any significant changes. The sample is reduced successively, excluding each 
industrial sector at the time. Results for the dumping and injury decisions are reported in 
Table 4.19 and 4.20 in Appendix 4A, respectively. The results discussed in section 5 
remain mostly unchanged with some minor changes that are summarised in what follows. 
The chemical sector and the electronics and electrical machinery sector deserve special 
attention since they filed 37% and 19% of all cases respectively. It is worth recalling that, 
on balance, the European chemical sector is a net exporter of AD investigations. The sector 
files more cases against other countries than it is the recipient of AD investigations. A total 
of 192 investigations were initiated by this industry in Europe against other countries and 
only 78 investigations were initiated in other countries against European firms between 
1985 and 1994.
Dumping decisions
When the chemical sector is excluded, the comparative costs variables -  with the exception 
of the dummy for non-market economies -  become non significant. Instead two additional 
political track variables are significant at conventional levels: the dummy for LDC and the 
concentration variable. They both enter negatively as they do when all sectors are included. 
This is a significant result because it would indicate that when excluding chemical products 
the only determinants are political track variables, contradicting Hypothesis 1. When the 
electronic and electrical machinery sector is excluded, the main determinants remain 
unchanged but
44 The sectors are chemicals, iron and steel, textiles, electronics and electrical machinery, and others (see 
Table 4.22.1 and 4.22.1 for details).
141
Table 4.6.2: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping and Injury Decisions 
by the European Union (1995-2003): Cumulation
Dumping Injury
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Share of EU exports - 0.860*** 2.88 -0.047 -0.03
(0.821) (1.792)
Less Developed Country ? 0.221 1.64
(0.224)
Domestic Political Influences
Concentration + -0.0004 -1.51 0.004** 2.01
(0.0005) (0.002)
Case size -own country + 0.00002 0.55 0.001** 2.28
(0.00003) (0.0003)
Case size-other countries in + 0.0001** 2.02 -0.00001 -0.09
the case (0.00009) (0.0001)




Labour Share + 0.095 1.40 0.052 0.18
(0.097) (0.483)
Average wage ? 0.0007 0.53 -0.016* -1.82
(0.001) (0.013)
Non-market economy + 0.010* 1.93 0.019 0.60
(0.013) (0.034)
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) - 0.002 1.55 -0.013** -2.16
(0.003) (0.008)
GDP growth 0.002 0.33 0.006* 0.24
(0.008) (0.026)
Trade Deficit -5.89e-14 0.48 8.76e-13* 1.72
(1.19e-13) (5.35e-13)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
No. observations 163 181
W aldjftdf) 37.2*** 45 4***
(18) (19)
Log. Likelihood -33.1 -51.5
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.25
Notes: z-values presented in italics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
for clustering on each legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% 
level (two-tailed test). Marginal effects for “less developed country” and “non-market economy” are for 
discrete changes in the variables from 0 to 1 In column (1) 26 observations, corresponding to two years, are 
eliminated because decisions are deterministic. An affirmative decision is always made. In column (3) 13 
observations, corresponding to two years, are similarly eliminated.
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an additional political track variable is significant. This is the share of EU exports to the 
country of the defendant. However, the Wald test is not very robust in this regression45. 
Finally, when the observations corresponding to the steel sector are excluded the non- 
market economy dummy becomes insignificant. This is not a surprising result since the 
steel industry is the one that most targets these economies. Nearly 56% of investigations in 
the steel industry are directed towards firms operating in non-market economies.
Injury decisions
When the chemical sector is excluded, an additional comparative costs variable becomes 
significant: capital intensity. It enters negatively confirming that being labour intensive 
increases the probability of injury. This result would indicate that when excluding chemical 
products not only are political track variables important but also one technical track 
determinant is significant. When the electronic and electrical machinery sector is excluded, 
the main determinants remain unchanged but an additional political track variable is 
significant. This is the share of EU exports to the country of the defendant as it was the case 
in the dumping decisions.
7 The Determ inants o f Affirmative Findings
In this section, I analyse the political and technical determinants of the affirmative findings 
of dumping and injury where either duties are imposed or price undertakings accepted. 
Unlike in Section 5, the cases analysed here are those cases in which dumping an injury 
were found, the causation of the injury was established and definitive penalties were 
imposed. The dependent variable takes a value one when both dumping and injury are 
found and zero, otherwise. This variable is defined over the total number of investigations 
initiated. The results for the period 1985-1994 are presented in Table 4.7.1
Column (1) and (2) analyse the determinants of affirmative findings including all 
investigations filed for the main specification. It is expected that the probability of an 
affirmative finding of dumping increases with the case size -  measured as the value of
45 The hypothesis that all coefficients in the dumping regression except the intercept are zero is rejected at the 
10% level of confidence.
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Table 4.7.1: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Affirmative Findings by the European Union:
1985-1994
All cases initiated





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of EU exports (-) -1.244 -1.546* -1.282* -1.509**
-1.50 -1.95 -1.71 -2.12
Less Developed Country (?) -0.054 -0.041 -0.042 -0.033
Domestic Political Influences
0.53 -0.40 -0.46 -0.36
Concentration (+) 0.0003 -0.001 0.00004 -0.0008
-0.07 -0.28 0.01 -0.22
Case size (imports) (+) 0.089*** 0.097*** 0.124*** 0.131***
2.63 2.57 2.65 2.71
Industry size: employment (+) -0.151 -0.149 -0.116 -0.117
* Technical Track
Comparative costs
-0.63 -0.63 -0.45 -0.49
Capital intensity (-) -0.041 -0.047 -0.043 -0.048
-0.62 -0.71 -0.71 -0.82
Average wage (?) 0.023 0.025 0.010 0.013
0.87 0.95 0.41 0.56
Non-market economy (+) 0.138** 0.129** 0.073 0.065
Technical Precision
2.20 2.09 1.28 1.15
(Number of products) (-) -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0009
Number of Countries (?) 











Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 506 506 464 463
Positive findings (%) 65.4 65.4 71.3 71.3
W aldjftdf) 69.6***(31) 81.2***(33) 60.1 **(31) 71.8***(33)
Log. Likelihood -257.1 -251.5 -218.8 -214.5
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23
See notes in Table 4.3; z-values presented in italics. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 
5% level and * * * 1% level (two-tailed test). 13 observations corresponding to five industry dummies are 
eliminated because the outcome for those industries was deterministic. Either a positive or negative decision 
was always made.
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imports in the year the case was initiated -  and when the country named is a non-market 
economy. In Column (2), the specification includes the number of countries named. In this 
specification, an additional significant determinant is the share of EU exports to the country 
of the defendant. This indicates that the fear of retaliation increases the probability of an 
affirmative decision.
Often cases are filed and then withdrawn or terminated because they lead to 
arrangements between firms or other collusive outcomes. Thus, retaliation threats would be 
more relevant when withdrawn and expired cases are excluded. The evidence presented in 
Column (3) and (4) confirms this. When the dependent variable is the probability of an 
affirmative antidumping decision the fear of retaliation hypothesis is confirmed by the data. 
Column (1) reports results when all cases initiated are included, whereas Column (3) 
excludes those cases in which investigations were withdrawn or in which the period of 
investigation expired. We exclude those observations based on the fact that cases 
withdrawn were those cases in which dumping either did not exist or firms colluded and 
reached a settlement of some kind without the intermediation of the Commission.
Similarly, cases in which the period of investigation has expired can be interpreted 
in a similar fashion to those withdrawn. Generally, the period expires because domestic 
firms do not provide the necessary evidence in the time stipulated by the regulations. The 
number of countries enters in a non-linear way (Columns 2 and 4). The probability of an 
affirmative finding decreases with the number of countries named initially but increases 
after a critical point. When the cases withdrawn or expired are left out, the results change 
slightly and only political track determinants are significant. The probability of an 
affirmative finding increases with the case size as well in this case. However, the non- 
market economy dummy is no longer significant. Instead, the fear of retaliation hypothesis 
is confirmed. The probability of an affirmative finding of dumping decreases with the 
proportion of European exports to the country of the defendant. The technical determinants 
(comparative costs) are not important.
Period 1995-2003
As can be seen in Table 4.7.2, the results do not change in any significant way from those 
corresponding to the earlier period.
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Table 4.7.2: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Affirmative Findings by the European Union:
1995-2003
All cases initiated





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of EU exports (-) -6.217*** -5.635*** -4.422*** -4.359***
-3.27 -3.09 -2.80 -2.76
Less Developed Country (?) -0.302* -0.286 -0.072 -0.078
Domestic Political Influences
-1.75 -1.59 -0.47 -0.52
Concentration (+) -0.0009 0.0009 0.006 0.011*
-0.17 0.15 1.12 1.71
Case size (imports) (+) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0003
0.65 0.87 1.78 1.40
Industry size: employment (+) 1.520 1.763* 1.969** 2.652***
* Technical Track
Comparative costs
1.60 1.78 2.14 2.72
Labour Share (+) 0.993 1.135 1.235 1.104
0.87 1.01 1.02 0.91
Average wage (?) 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015
0.19 -0.05 -0.07 -0.44
Non-market economy (+) 0.089 0.088 0.156* 0.165**
Technical Precision
1.09 1.10 1.85 1.96
(Number ofproducts) -0.044*** -0.048*** -0.050*** 0.050***
Number of Countries (?) 











GDP growth 0.078 0.066 0.004 0.072
0.55 0.46 0.03 0.48
Trade Deficit 4.88e-13 1.22e-12 8.43e-13 2.99e-12
0.17 0.41 0.28 1.01
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 261 261 216 216
Positive findings (%) 61.7 61.7 71.3 71.3
Waldjftdf) 83.5***(25) 105.9***(25) 80.6***(23) 110.0***(25)
Log. Likelihood -139.3 -138.0 -98.7 -95.5
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.26
Note: z-values presented in italics. The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the 
investigation against each single named country in and AD legal case.* indicates significant at the 10% 
confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed test). In column (1) and (2), 10 observations 
corresponding to two industry dummies and one year dummy are eliminated because the outcome was 
deterministic. Either a positive or negative decision was always made. Similarly in column (3) and (4), 15 
observations corresponding to three industry dummies and one year dummy are eliminated because the 
outcome was deterministic.
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8  Economic Significance
In this section, the economic relevance of the econometric findings presented in Section 5 
corresponding to the analysis of the period 1985-94 is discussed. When using probit 
regression the marginal effects are not straightforward to interpret. The regressors are of a 
very different nature and are measured in substantially different units. For this reason, it is 
more appropriate to discussed standardised results. The results of the main specifications 
are presented in Table 4.8. They show the percentage change in the probability of dumping 
and injury for a one standard deviation change in each of the relevant independent 
variables, holding all other variables at their mean values. In this manner, the percentage 
change in the probability of dumping and injury accounts for how large a given change is 
with respect to the initial probability. For the number of countries several intervals of 
change are considered. Dummy variables (LDC and NME) show the discrete change from 0 
to 1. For the number of countries named in the investigations changes are measured in four 
intervals of dimension 2.
Dumping decisions
The results in Table 4.8 show that the capital-labour ratio has the largest effect. A one- 
standard deviation increase in the capital-labour ratio reduces the probability of a positive 
finding on dumping by 100%. This is a substantial effect. However, a remark is necessary, 
because a one-standard deviation in the capital-labour ratio corresponds to nearly 80.000 
US dollars at constant 1990 prices. A one-standard deviation in the case size increases the 
probability of a positive decision on dumping by nearly 7%. The one-standard deviation 
represents more than 100 million dollars. The impact of employment is similar. A one- 
standard deviation -  representing about 627.000 people -  increases the probability of 
dumping by about 7%. The impact of the average wage per worker is 7% and significant. A 
one-standard deviation represents about 9,700 US dollars per worker per year. Filing 
against more than one country decreases the probability of dumping to start with and up to 
a certain number but exhibits that increasing returns to scale are present and are significant.
Injury decisions
The results for the decisions on injury are very similar to those of the dumping decisions,
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Hypothesis and Variables Sign
* Political Track
International Political Influences 








Domestic Political Influences 
Concentration + -6.01 -3.23 -0.32
Case size: imports + 6.80** 7.26*** 13.27***
Industry size: employment + 6.78** 7.07** -16.70
* Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital intensity - -100.00*** -100.00*** -82.02*
Average wage per worker ? 6.80** 7.26*** 11.98**
Non-market economy + 8.13** 9.18** 2.83**
Technical Precision
Number of products - -4.99 -4.03 -1.12
Countries: 1 to 2 
2 to 4 













Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 253 253 422
Notes: * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level. Expected sign next 
to variable name. Robust standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
except for the impact of the share of EU exports to the country of the defendant and the 
LDC dummy. A one-standard deviation in the share of EU exports to the country of the 
defendant -  representing 3.5 per cent of European total exports - decreases the probability 
of injury being found by about 5%. The change in the probability of injury increases by 
more than 3% when the petition is against a less developed country. Filing against more 
than one country decreases the probability of injury to start with and up to a certain number 
but exhibits a non-linear form.
Overall, the empirical analysis supports the conclusions anticipated previously and 
the determinants represent a meaningful economic significance.
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9 Comparison o f the R esults w ith those for the US
A comparison of the analysis in this study and results from previous ones is summarised in 
Table 4.21 in Appendix 4A. The results refer to those sub-cases investigated. Previous 
research (Finger et al. 1982 and Tharakan and Waelbroeck 1994) has found that AD 
decisions in the US and in the EU are influenced by factors other than technical criteria 
envisaged by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In previous research the dumping decisions have 
been found to be mainly dominated by technical criteria, whilst the injury decisions have 
been found to be more open to political economy considerations. In this study, political 
economy factors were also found to be relevant in the decisions on dumping.
The econometric analysis discussed in this chapter is based on a sample of 525 legal 
cases initiated between 1985 and 1994. The specification used in this thesis differs from 
previous ones in that it introduces several controls that account for macroeconomic effects 
and industry heterogeneity. The phenomenon of having an affirmative decision on dumping 
or injury can be explained by the general features of the double track model of administered 
protection.
Dumping decisions
One of the similarities between the results in this study and previous ones is that mainly 
technical determinants (comparative costs) are individually and jointly important in the 
decisions on dumping. The significant technical determinants in this study, as well as in 
previous ones, are the average wage per worker and the capital-labour ratio. The average 
wage per worker has a negative sign for the US whilst it is positive for Europe, in 
accordance with the strategic trade policy theory. The differences in performance of the 
human capital variable for the US and Europe suggest that the European Commission is 
receptive of implications of the strategic trade policy theory. This could be viewed as a 
more interventionist approach or as an indication of the underlying preferences of the 
decision-makers that emphasises strategic issues in the domain of antidumping. The capital 
intensity variable was found to be a significant determinant of the dumping decisions in this 
study as it was for the US and a previous study for the EC. Whereas the results for Europe
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are in accordance with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage, those for the 
US are possibly more in line with the Leontief Paradox. Among the technical determinants, 
the dummy for a non-market economy was found to be significant in this study as it was 
previously found for European decisions on dumping. This confirms that the built-in 
technical artifice makes the non-market economies more vulnerable to dumping findings in 
Europe. A very aggressive response is geared towards non-market economies, for which 
there is significant effect in the dumping and injury decisions. Whether this strong effect of 
non-market economies then translates into penalisations such as the imposition of definitive 
duties or ends up in the acceptance of undertakings as a softer remedy is further analysed in 
Chapter 5.
When controlling for macroeconomic effects and industrial sector heterogeneity, the 
only significant political determinants in the dumping decision in Europe in the period 
1985-94, is case size. A likelihood ratio test indicates that political economy variables are 
jointly significant in the dumping decisions. However, variables other than case size are 
jointly insignificant. Industrial concentration was previously found to be significant for the 
US but had the wrong sign. The dummy variable for less developed countries was found to 
be significant in a previous study for the EC, but was found to be insignificant here.
Injury decisions
The similarity between the results in this study and previous ones is that mainly political 
track variables are significant in the injury decisions. No comparative costs variables were 
found to be significant. In stark contrast with previous research, the analysis for European 
injury decisions between 1985 and 1994 shows that only one domestic political determinant 
-  that is, case size - is statistically significant and very robust (at least 5% level of 
confidence in all specifications). No international political determinants were found to be 
significant with the exception of the fear of retaliation variable in some specifications.
Two other proxies for industry size were significant for the US; namely, 
concentration and employment. However, only employment had the expected sign. In a 
previous study for Europe, industry concentration and value added were found to be 
significant and had the expected sign. But as pointed out earlier, value added is likely to be 
highly correlated with employment and either one or the other of these variables should be 
taken to capture industry size effects. Furthermore, none of these two variables are found to 
be important determinants after controlling for macroeconomic effects and industry
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heterogeneity. The capital intensity variable was found to be significant in a previous study 
for Europe, but it is not significant here, except in the specification that excludes the 
chemical industry.
The Commission is obviously more responsive to the firms whose cases are big in 
terms of imports. This may be cause for concern but it could also have another 
interpretation. Import values originating from the countries named in an investigation are 
often high at the time of initiation. Very often these high import values represent new 
importers entering the European market very aggressively. And, because imports are one of 
the things contained in the European Commission checklist for injury, it should not be 
surprising that it is found to be an important determinant of the injury decisions.
A final caveat is that the results for the period 1995-2003 should be interpreted with 
caution since the sample contains all new AD investigations and only some review cases. In 
Europe, AD measures are imposed for a period of 5 years and after that, they ceased 
automatically (provided there is no review of the case). The reviewed cases are, therefore, 
like new cases. Data limitations resulted, in most review cases being omitted in the recent 
period (only 15 are included in the sample). Review cases represented 36% of all 
investigations (188 out of 525 investigations) in the period 1985-94.
io  C onclusions
This chapter examined the political and technical determinants of AD investigations in 
Europe in the period 1985-2003. The results presented in the previous sections are 
consistent with the hypotheses formulated. The findings in this study suggest that Europe is 
operating a double track AD mechanism. In the period 1985-94, mainly economic variables 
are significant in the dumping decisions whereas only political determinants are important 
in the injury decisions. In the most recent period, the results confirm more clearly 
hypotheses 1 and 2. This pattern is similar to the mechanism in the US. In spite of 
Europe’s less cohesive political structure, the main features are similar.
The present study improves upon previous research in that by using a unique dataset 
with information collected from the reports published in the Official Journal of the 
European Commission and other sources, gathers a data set of 805 legal cases covering the
151
period 1985-2003. First, the econometric analysis improves on previous studies in that it 
explicitly controls for industry heterogeneity and macroeconomic effects. It is shown that a 
decision on dumping and injury being positive can be explained by the general features of 
the double track model of administered protection as captured by the main regressors. 
Several comparative costs variables are individually significant in the determination of 
dumping. Moreover, the relevance of the number of countries named in the investigations 
in the probability of dumping and injury being positive is analysed. The econometric 
analysis shows that there is a non-linear effect on the probability of a decision on dumping 
and injury. Filing investigations against a larger number of countries decreases the 
probability of dumping and injury to start with until it reaches a critical value of four 
countries. When more than four countries are named in the investigation the probability of 
dumping and injury increases. The model is robust to the use of different proxies. Second, 
the results are similar when cumulated imports -  by which the European Commission can 
cumulate imports from all the countries named in the investigation -  are analysed. There 
are no major variations when excluding different sectors of economic activity. Third, the 
economic significance of some of the determinants is of considerable magnitude.
The analysis in this chapter contributes to the debate that the AD laws are serving 
different purposes. The fact that the determinants of injury are political rather than technical 
goes in favour of the presumption that because the criteria for injury are less clear, political 
economy factors would tend to be more prevalent. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis formulated. However, for the earlier period (1985-94) only one or two political 
variable, namely case size and the share of EU exports were found to be significant in the 
dumping regression. The finding that imports are significant on injury decisions is in 
accordance with previous findings. However, the fact that the variable “case size” is a 
determinant of the dumping and injury decisions could also be interpreted as the fact that 
new exporters enter the EU market very aggressively with very high levels of imports in the 
year in which the investigations are filed. This result seems to be in accordance with other 
studies that find that protection -  when considering tariff levels or the change in tariff 
levels - is higher if the industry has experienced an increase in import penetration (Treffler 
1993). There is some evidence of the significance of traditional measures of industry 
power, such as industry size and concentration.
The empirical evidence of cross-country industry determinants of protection shows 
that protection is higher when the industry is labour intensive, low-skill and low-wage
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(Rodrik, 1996). However, the econometric analysis in this study finds support for a higher 
probability of dumping when the industry is high skill, high-wage. The analysis of the 
dumping decisions in the European Union indicates that the probability of a positive 
decision on dumping increases in industries with high human capital content, as shown by 
the significant and robust importance of the average wage per worker in the industry filing 
an investigation. This is an indicator of how much the European Commission is concerned 
with protecting industries with high levels of human capital.
The results for the recent period (1995-03) suggest that the share of EU export to 
the country of the defendant is positively and significantly associated with an affirmative 
decision on dumping. The EU is more likely to find dumping in cases involving those trade 
partners with a higher proportion of European exports. However, this variable may not be 
measuring only the threat of retaliation. Instead it could also be a proxy for the stability of 
trade relations between the EU and its trading partners. If this was the case, affirmative 
decisions against trade partners may not affect the trade flows with these partners. Another 
possible interpretation of the results is that the variable used may be capturing the fact that 
countries with a large share of EU exports are using antidumping against the EU and 
Europe is likely to retaliate.
In recent years there have been changes in the regulations that are likely to affect 
the way in which measures are approved by the Council of Ministers. The voting rule 
changed in 1994. Since then the decisions in the COM have to be approved by simple 
majority instead of qualified majority. Abstentions were counted against the imposition of 
AD measures. Since 1995 there have been more disagreements between the EC and 
member states and among member states. In practice, Austria, Luxemburg and Belgium -  
which are small countries -  are swing voters and decide whether a simple majority for 
definitive measures is achieved. The ascension of Austria, Sweden and Finland has added 
two countries to the anti-duties block.
Two additional changes occurred in 2004. First, a change in the voting rules 
occurred in March 2004. Since then abstentions in the COM count in favour of the 
imposition of measures (Evenett and Vermulst 2005). Second, ten countries have acceded 
to the European Union in May 2004. They are small countries that do not use AD measures 
heavily and are likely to abstain. So with the new rules introduced in March 2004 their 
abstentions will count in favour of measures. It will be more difficult to obtain a simple
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majority against measures. It is possible that these new developments could affect the 
outcome of antidumping activity.
A final caveat to be kept in mind is that all the econometric analysis discussed in 
this chapter is conditional on the European firms filing a petition. The determinants of a 
decision on dumping and injury are analysed once firms have filed their investigations. 
Further research is needed to explain the determinants of a decision to file an investigation 
by European firms and is beyond the scope of this study. In the econometric analysis 
presented in this chapter there is a potential problem of self-selection in the petitions filed. 
It could be that only cases that have a good chance of being won are actually initiated and 
are then part of the sample. Acknowledging this possibility implies that the interpretation of 
the results must be clearly associated with the investigations actually initiated by the 
European Commission. The inclusion of sector dummies that control for sector 
heterogeneity can capture to some extent a possible selection bias.
The next chapter will extend the analysis further. After dumping and injury have 
been found, legal provisions allow the investigating authorities to settle antidumping cases 
either by levying duties or by demanding price undertakings from the foreign exporting 
firms. Price undertakings are price agreements between firms that allow the dispute to be 
settled, as long as the injury is eliminated. They have been used in Europe, although less 
frequently in the period 1985-2003 than before. The rules for its acceptance are no clear- 
cut, so the chapter empirically assesses several hypotheses regarding these decisions.
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Appendix 4A
Table 4.9: Number of AD Investigations (cases) and Sub-cases in Europe (1985-2003), by Year
Years Number of legal cases Number of sub-cases
Average number of countries 
in each legal case
1985 24 51 2.1
1986 19 48 2.5
1987 23 45 2.0
1988 37 71 1.9
1989 28 53 1.9
1990 31 66 2.2
1991 22 37 1.7
1992 30 56 1.9
1993 21 42 2.0
1994 26 56 2.2
Sub-total 261 525
1995 16 34 2.1
1996 10 28 2.8
1997 17 42 2.5
1998 9 21 2.3
1999 26 65 2.5
2000 11 31 2.8
2001 13 31 2.4
2002 13 21 1.6
2003 4 7 1.8
2004 17 29 1.7
Sub-total 136 309
Total 397 834
Source: European Commission, Official Journal, series C and L 
Note: A sub-case is a subdivision of a petition (legal case) in which each country named is considered as an 
individual unit
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DUMPING 0.889614 0.3136673 0 1 2.836353
Regressors
X 0.022504 0.0341157 0 0.218096 1.515985
SIZE1 50.156 167.414 0 1,456.577 3.337932
SIZE2 0.01032 0.03593 0 0.33431 3.481309
VA 0.6561708 0.341904 0.0981229 1.527312 0.521059
RVA 0.0505337 0.0271799 0.0073249 0.1078681 0.536795
LAB 1.245057 0.8191313 0.261018 3.19632 0.657379
RLAB 0.0431728 0.028658 0.009888 0.1058202 0.663797
AVWAGE 35.87628 10.0847 14.14347 61.15977 0.281097
RWAGE 0.0514861 0.0318809 0.0077365 0.1284103 0.619213
LS 0.6419541 0.0751564 0.5132412 0.7992101 0.117074
LDC 0.8075117 0.394718 0 1 0.488808
NME 0.4295775 0.4955979 0 1 1.115369
K/L 15.12007 7.703729 2.336526 30.9690 0.509504
CON1 35.391 16.35426 5 73 0.462102
CON2 0.7701422 0.4212406 0 1 0.546965
TECH 2.788732 3.657381 1 26 1.311149
NOC 3.136792 2.018863 1 8 0.643607
Note: It refers to 426 observations. The unit of observation is the sub-case. Statistics are calculated for each 
sub-case. A sub- case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. 
See Appendix 4C for more details on data construction and sources.






DUMPING 0.921182 0.270120 0 1 0.293232
Regressors
X 0.015720 0.019255 0.00277 0.207874 1.224882
SIZE1 6.54e+07 1.96ef08 0 l,85e+09 2.996108
SIZE2 0.008350 0.026139 0 0.248979 3.130260
VA 15.04811 12.54616 0.051718 36.96233 0.833737
LAB 0.024530 0.164168 0.001546 0.788804 0.669247
AVWAGE 24.11379 6.694185 9.624306 33.65210 0.277608
LS 0.447883 0.080087 0.297706 0.592907 0.178813
LDC 0.940887 0.236420 0 1 0.251273
NME 0.403941 0491899 0 1 1.217750
CON1 32.71357 15.8407 3 65 0.484224
TECH 3.024752 2.790243 1 12 0.922470
NOC 4.103448 2.440203 1 10 0.594671
Note: It refers to 203 observations. The unit of observation is the sub-case. Statistics are calculated for each 
sub-case. A sub- case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. 
See Appendix 4C for more details on data construction and sources.
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INJURY 0.7616927 0.4265233 0 1 1.785817
Regressors
X 0.0234294 0.0349984 0 0.2499166 1.493781
SIZE1 48.916 163.3341 0 1,456.577 3.339055
SIZE2 0.0100432 0.035045 0 0.33431 3.489426
VA 0.6593378 0.3531017 0.0981229 1.527312 0.535540
RVA 0.0507651 0.0279397 0.0073249 0.1078681 0.550374
LAB 1.26704 0.8436427 0.261018 3.19632 0.665837
RLAB 0.0438096 0.0293697 0.009888 0.1058202 0.670395
AVWAGE 35.46483 10.24339 14.14347 61.15977 0.288323
RWAGE 0.0518981 0.0329712 0.0077365 0.1284103 0.635306
LS 0.6430946 0.0756168 0.5132412 0.7992101 0.117583
LDC 0.7928731 0.4056993 0 1 0.511683
NME 0.4432071 0.4973182 0 1 1.122090
K/L 14.68912 7.814726 2.336526 30.969 0.532008
CON1 34.54628 16.66646 5 73 0.482439
CON2 0.7404706 0.4389073 0 1 0.592793
TECH 2.63029 3.422166 1 26 1.301061
NOC 3.12975 2.018121 1 8 0.644718
Note: It refers to 449 observations. The unit of observation is the sub-case. Statistics are calculated for each 
sub-case. A sub- case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. 
See Appendix 4C for more details on data construction and sources.






INJURY 0.879227 0.326653 0 1 0.371523
Regressors
X 0.015699 0.0192829 0.000187 0.207974 1.228265
SIZE1 6.50e+07 1.95e+08 0 1.85e+09 2.992298
SIZE2 0.008311 0.025941 0 0.248979 3.121170
VA 14.56344 12.41765 0.051718 36.96233 0.852659
LAB 0.237274 0.161739 0.001546 0.788040 0.681654
AVWAGE 24.19649 6.557643 9.624306 33.65210 0.288323
LS 0.450613 0.080411 0.297706 0.592907 0.271843
LDC 0.932367 0.251724 0 1 0.269983
NME 0.410628 0.493140 0 1 1.200942
CON1 32.34236 15.81326 3 65 0.488933
TECH 3.131068 2.924631 1 12 0.934068
NOC 4.236715 2.426993 1 10 0.572848
Note: It refers to 207 observations. The unit of observation is the sub-case. Statistics are calculated for each 
sub-case. A sub- case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. 
See Appendix 4C for more details on data construction and sources.
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Table 4.12.1: Correlation Matrix (1985-1994)
LAB VA AVWAGE K/L CON1 SIZE2 LDC X NME
LAB 1
VA 0.87* 1
AVWAGE - 0.25* 1
K/L -0.46* - 0.59* 1
CON1 -0.13* 0.14* 0.61* 0.42* 1
SIZE2 0.09* - -0.16* -0.14* - 1
LDC 0.17* 0.10* - 0.19* - 0.27* 1
X - - - - - 0.10* -0.63* 1
NME -0.23* -0.18* 0.13* - - -0.12* 0.40* 1
Note: The above tables report pair wise correlations using all 525 observations^*) indicates partial correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level of confidence.
Table 4.12.2: Correlation Matrix (1995-2003)
LAB VA AVWAGE LAB.SH CON1 SIZE2 LDC X NME
LAB 1
VA 0.70* 1
AVWAGE - 0.64* 1
LAB. SHARE 0.26* -0.80* -0.62* 1
CON1 -0.23* 0.22* 0.70* -0.29* 1
SIZE2 - - - - - 1
LDC - - - - - 0.50* 1
X - - - - - 0.57* -0.57* 1
NME - - - - - - 0.20* - 1
Note: The above tables report pair wise correlations using all 280 observations^*) indicates partial correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level of confidence
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______ Table 4.13: Correlation Matrix, Sensitivity Analysis (1985-1994)____________________
RLAB RVA LS RWAGE CON1 SIZE2 LDC X NME
RLAB 1
RVA 0.89* 1
LS 0.40* 0.11* 1
RWAGE 0.93* 0.97* 0.45* 1
CON1 -0.18* 0.16* - - 1
SIZE2 0.12* - - - - 1
LDC -0.14* -0.14* -0.16* -0.17* - 0.27* 1
X - - - - - 0.10* -0.63* 1
NME -0.23* -0.14* -0.16* -0.17* - -0.12* 0.40* 1
See note in Table 4.12.1
Table 4.14: Correlation Matrix: Sensitivity Analysis (1985-1994) (continuation)
LDC RLAB SIZE2 CON1 LS NME TECH
LDC 1
RLAB -0.17* 1
SIZE2 0.27* 0.12* 1
CON1 - -0.18* - 1
LS -0.16* 0.40* - - 1
NME 0.40* -0.23* -0.12* - 0.16* 1
TECH - - - - - -0.11* 1
See note in Table 4.12.1
Table 4.15.1: Number of Cases (1985-1994), by Sector of Economic Activity
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 Total Percentage
Chemicals 1 27 23 27 18 30 14 15 16 21 192 36.6
Iron steel 4 3 6 20 6 17 10 15 8 12 101 19.2
Textiles 7 0 0 0 7 12 1 6 3 14 50 9.6
Electronics/Electrical Machinery 16 11 12 14 9 4 7 16 9 3 101 19.2
Other 23 7 4 10 13 3 5 4 6 6 81 15.4
Total 51 48 45 71 53 66 37 56 42 56 525 100.0
Percentage 9.7 9.1 8.6 13.5 10.1 12.6 7.0 10.7 8.0 10.7 100
Source: European Commission, Official Journal, C and L series
Table 4.15.2: Number of Cases (1994-2003), by Sector of Economic Activity
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Total Percentage
Chemicals 12 0 7 2 26 17 10 6 5 85 30.4
Iron steel 7 9 3 7 18 3 19 5 0 71 25.4
Textiles & Footwear 8 13 9 4 5 0 0 5 0 44 15.7
Electronics/Electrical Machinery 4 0 14 0 10 1 0 0 0 29 10.4
Other 3 5 9 8 6 10 2 0 2 45 16.1
Total 34 28 42 21 65 31 31 21 7 280 100.0
Percentage 12.1 10.0 15.0 7.5 23.2 11.1 11.1 7.5 2.5 100
Source: European Commission, Official Journal, C and L series
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Table 4.16.1: Industrial Indicators (mean), by Sector of Economic Activity (1985-1994)
K/L AVWAGE LAB VA Observations
Chemicals 21.37727 43.55046 0.9459345 0.6960006 192
Iron steel 16.06133 35.18207 0.7465987 0.3802396 101
Textiles 7.65459 20.45051 1.5530480 0.5218228 50
Electronics &Elect. Mach. 6.48965 31.60105 2.5450630 1.1027020 103
Other 9.20601 26.68881 0.9303072 0.3982149 79
Total 14.30508 34.87450 1.2774500 0.6541346 525
Source: European Commission and OECD STAN 
Note: Five major industry categories are defined using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision (see
Table 4.22.1)
Table 4.16.2; Industrial Indicators (mean), by Sector of Economic Activity (1995-2003)
LABOUR
SHARE
AVWAGE LAB VA Observations
Chemicals 0.38 30.339 0.229870 26.260 85
Iron steel 0.49 25.439 0.123244 6.551 71
Textiles 0.49 14.173 0.180290 5.107 44
Electronics &Elect. Mach. 0.47 23.868 0.253265 12.968 29
Other 0.48 17.291 0.272934 9.701 45
Total 0.45 23.645 0.225543 13.630 280
Source: European Commission and EUROSTAT (Structural Business Statistics) 
Note: as in table 4.16.1
Table 4.17: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping Decisions by the European Union 
(1985-1994), Main Specification (with and without controls)





Share of EU exports -0.197 -0432* -0.544 -0.937
-1.07 -1.67 -1.50 -1.63
Less Developed Country ? -0.014 -0.028 -0.037 -0.060
-0.72 -0.83 -1.24 -1.17
Domestic Political
Influences
Concentration + -0.00003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.002
-0.01 -0.24 -0.42 -0.82
Case size: imports + 0.099* 0.222** 0.121 0.322**
1.7 2.28 1.61 2.46
Industry size: employment + 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.296
0.46 0.04 0.14 0.83
* Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital intensity - -0.0009 0.005 -0.003 -0.122*
-0.61 0.26 -1.00 -1.67
Average wage ? 0.0004 -0.002 0.0008 0.043*
0.39 -0.28 0.30 1.86
Non-market economy + 0.025* 0.044** 0.046* 0.081**
1.90 2.06 1.94 2.03
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) - -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* -0.008
-1.29 -1.00 -1.92 -1.51
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes
No. observations 419 315 341 253
W ald^(df) 9.7(9) 21.3(16) 33.0***(16) 36.4**(23)
Log. Likelihood -121.7 -110.1 -102.1 -90.0
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.19
Notes: z-values presented in italics. Dependent variable: y=l if  a dumping decision is positive; y=0 otherwise. 
The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the investigation against each single country 
named in an AD legal case. In the sample period, there are an average of 2 sub-cases per case with a 
maximum of 8 and a minimum of 1. Each regression also includes a constant. Robust standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% 
confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed test). Marginal effects for dummy variables are 
calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1. In column (2), (3) and (4) two year and ten industry dummies -and 
the corresponding observations - are eliminated because a decision has always been positive or negative for 
those years and industries.
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Table 4.18: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Injury Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994), 
_________________________Main Specification (with and without controls)_________________________





Share of EU exports - -0.813 -1.057* -0.814 -0.823
-1.35 -1.71 -1.9 -1.28
Less Developed Country ? 0.050 -0.023 0.056 0.024
0.73 -0.31 0.76 0.31
Domestic Political
Influences
Concentration + 0.002 0.0006 0.001 0.0001
0.98 0.19 0.65 0.03
Case size: imports + 0.182** 0.161** 0.187*** 0.181**
2.54 2.09 2.66 2.49
Industry size: employment + -0.022 -0.646* -0.021 -0.108
-0.57 -1.75 -0.63 -0.56
* Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital intensity - -0.006 -0.073* -0.004 -0.038
-0.90 -1.85 -0.64 -0.80
Average wage ? 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.011
1.02 1.33 0.46 0.57
Non-market economy + 0.024 0.033 0.032 0.036
0.53 0.75 0.81 0.86
Technical Precision
(Number ofproducts) - -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.0008
-0.44 0.40 -1.19 -0.12
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 440 422 440 422
Wald x^(df) 20.2**(9) 40.0***(21) 38.4***(18) 61.9***(30)
Log. Likelihood -218.7 -192.2 -197.6 -169.1
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.26
Notes: z-values presented in italics. Dependent variable: y=l if an injury decision is positive; y=0 otherwise. 
The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the investigation against each single country 
named in an AD legal case. In the sample period, there are an average of 2 sub-cases per case with a 
maximum of 8 and a minimum of 1. Each regression also includes a constant. Robust standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% 
confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed test). Marginal effects for dummy variables are 
calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1. In column (2) and (4) five industry dummies - and the 
corresponding observations - are eliminated because a decision has always been positive or negative for 
certain industries.
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Table 4.19: Industrial Sectors, Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Dumping Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994)
All sectors Chemical
excluded








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
^Political Influences
International
Share of EU exports - -0.937 0.094 -0.211 -0.200 -1.195** -0.414
-1.63 0.09 -0.86 -1.34 -1.98 -1.53
Less Developed Country 9 -0.060 -0.058** -0.0007 -0.013 -0.073 -0.027
-1.17 -2.40 -0.02 -1.22 -1.52 -1.12
Domestic
Concentration + -0.002 -0.003** -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0004
-0.82 2.52 0.49 -0.24 -0.61 0.05
Case Size: Imports + 0.322** 0.084** 0.107** 0.081** 0.360*** 0.122**
2.46 2.11 2.29 2.46 2.61 2.01
Industry Size: + 0.296 0.107 0.013 0.016 -0.008 0.037
Employment 0.83 0.67 0.52 1.31 -0.17 1.42
^Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital Intensity - -0.122* -0.002 -0.002 -0.0005 -0.004 -0.006**
-1.67 -0.36 -0.73 -0.36 -0.69 -2.14
Average Wage 9 0.043* 0.005 0.00004 -0.002 0.0006 0.005
1.86 1.07 0.02 -1.09 0.10 1.29
Non-market Economy + 0.081** 0.053** 0.014 0.025** 0.064* 0.047**
2.03 2.46 0.75 2.43 1.70 2.43
Number of products - -0.008 -0.003 -0.009** -0.003* -0.01* -0.005
-1.51 -0.95 -2.03 -1.83 -1.94 -2.04
No. observations 253 172 271 307 279 297
Wald x2 (df) 36.4**(23) 41 8* * * (17) 34.0**(19) 41.1(19)*** 29.6*(19) 38.5(19)***
Log likelihood -90.0 -48.9 -77.1 -83.8 -91.4 -89.2
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.21
Marginal effects; z-values presented in italics. All regressions contain a constant and industry and yearly dummies. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; 
** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed test). Marginal effects for “less developed countries” and “non-market economies” are calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 
1. In Column (2), 74 observations corresponding to four years (1986, 1987, 1991 and 1994) are eliminated because dumping decisions are always positive. In Columns 
(3), (4), (5) and (6), 60, 77,66 and 73 observations are excluded respectively, because dumping decisions are always positive in two years (1987 and 1994).
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Table 4.20: Industrial Sectors, Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of Injury Decisions by the European Union (1985-1994)
All sectors Chemical
excluded








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
♦Political Influences
International
Share of EU exports - -0.823 -1.600 -0.844 -0.721 -1.550* -0.342
-1.28 -1.58 -1.25 -1.16 -1.73 -0.61
Less Developed Country 9 0.024 0.028 0.046 0.068 -0.047 0.145*
0.31 0.36 0.54 0.87 -0.53 1.72
Domestic
Concentration + 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.0007 0.001 -0.0003
0.03 1.12 0.87 0.27 0.31 -0.14
Case Size: Imports + 0.182** 0.139** 0.158** 0.166** 0.486*** 0.176**
2.49 2.10 2.36 2.49 2.91 2.49
Industry Size: + -0.108 -0.094 0.005 -0.032 -0.107 -0.030
Employment -0.56 -1.63 0.09 -0.59 -1.25 -0.53
♦Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital Intensity - -0.038 -0.056** -0.0001 -0.006 -0.0003 -0.007
-0.80 -2.87 -0.01 -0.82 -0.03 -1.18
Average Wage ? 0.011 0.021 -0.0003 0.002 -0.005 0.008
0.57 1.45 -0.40 0.34 -0.44 1.14
Non-market Economy + 0.036 0.025 0.006 0.017 0.050 - 0.034
0.86 0.47 0.12 0.41 1.00 0.98
Number of products - -0.0008 -0.003 0.016 -0.011* -0.015** -0.009*
-0.12 -0.49 -1.02 -1.83 -2.03 . -1.87
No. observations 422 242 356 406 355 380
Wald x2 (df) 61.9***(30) 47 9***(20) 42.4***(21) 45.2***(18) 47.7***(21) 41.9(21)***
Log likelihood -169.1 -102.9 -153.7 -175.1 156.9 -153.5
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.19
Marginal effects; z-values presented in italics. All regressions contain a constant, industry and year dummies. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% 
level and ***1% level (two-tailed test). Marginal effects for “less developed countries” and non-market economies” are calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1. In 
Column (2), 21 observations corresponding to year 1991 are eliminated because injury decisions are always positive.
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Table 4.21: Comparison of Results for US (1975-1979), the EC (1980-1987) 
_______________________and the EU (1985-1994)_______________________
Hypothesis and Variables
Dumping Injury
US EC EU US EC EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
* Political T rack
International Political Influences
Share o f EU exports - + - - - -
Less Developed Country - _* - - - -
Domestic Political Influences
Concentration - + - - +* -
Case Size: Imports - - +* + - +*
Industry Size: Employment + - + +* - +
Industry Size: Value Added - + n/a - +* n/a
^Technical Track
Comparative costs
Capital Intensity +* _* _* + _* -
Average Wage per Worker _* +* +* + - +
Scale Economies _* + n/a - - n/a
Non-market Economy n/a +* +* n/a - +
Technical Precision
Number of Products - - - - +* -
Constant +* - - - +* +*
Number of countries
Year Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 183 280 253 57 296 422
Successfully predicted (%) 69% 88% 84% 87%
Correctly classified (%)
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.26
Sources: Finger et al. (1982), Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) and Table 4.3.1 in this chapter.
Columns (3) and (6) are the same as in Table 4.3.1. Different aspects o f industry heterogeneity and 
macroeconomic effects are captured by industry and year dummies. A proxy for scale economies is 
omitted. The industry size variable, value added, is omitted because is highly correlated with 
employment. * indicates significant at the 10% level of confidence or less and not contradicting the 
hypothesised sign. In columns (1) and (4) the null hypothesis is that the sign is not the expected one (one- 
tail test) whereas in the rest of the table the null hypothesis is that the individual coefficient is different 
from zero (two-tailed test).
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Table 4.22.1: Major Sectors of Economic Activity (1985-94)






1) Chemicals 351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals
352 Manufacture of other chemical products
355 Rubber products
356 Plastic products N.E.C.
2) Iron and Steel 371 Iron and Steel basic industries
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
3) Textiles and Footwear 321 Manufacture of textiles
322 Manufacture o f wearing apparel except footwear
323 Manufactures prods. Leather except footwear and apparel
324 Manufacture footwear except rubber or plastic
4) Electronic and 382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical
Electrical Machinery 383 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies
385 Prof., scientific, measuring and control equipment
5) Others 331 Manufacture wood, wood and cork products, except furniture
341 Manufacture of paper and paper products
362 Glass and glass products
369 Other non-metallic mineral products, N.E.C
381 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
384 Transport equipment
390 Other manufacturing industries
Source: International Standard Industrial Classifications (ISIC), Revision 2, Major Division 3
(Manufactured goods).
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Table 4.22.2: Major Sectors of Economic Activity (1995-03)






1) Chemicals 241 Manufacture of basic chemicals
244 Manuf. of pharmaceuticals, medical chems. and botanical pts.
246 Manufacture of other chemical products
247 Manufacture o f man-made fibres
252 Manuf. of plastic plates, sheets tubes and profiles
2) Iron and Steel 271 Manufacture o f basic metals
272 Manufacture of cast iron tubes
273 Other first processing of iron and steel
274 Manufacture o f basic precious and non-ferrous metals
3) Textiles and Footwear 171 Manufacture o f textiles
172 Textile weaving
174 Manufactures of made-up textile articles, except apparel
175 Manufacture o f carpets and rugs
192 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like
193 Manufacture o f footwear
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.
4) Electronic and 291 Manufacture of machinery mechanical power
Electrical Machinery 292 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery
295 Manufacture o f other special purpose machinery
321 Manufacture o f electronic valves, tubes & other components
322 Manufacture o f television and radio transmitters
323 Manufacture of television and radio receivers
5) Others 202 Manufacture veneer sheets, plywood, etc.
204 Manufacture o f wooden containers
231 Manufacture of coke oven products
267 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
268 Manufacture of other non metallic mineral products
287 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products
315 Manufacture o f lighting equipment and electric lamps
316 Manufacture o f electrical equipment n.e.c.
354 Manufacture o f motorcycles and bicycles




Estim ation o f Capital-labour Ratios for European 
Industries
Capital Stocks were calculated from investment figures based on the perpetual 
inventory model setting the steady state estimates of the initial capital stock, using data 
from the OECD STAN database for the period 1970-94, where K t =(1 - S ) K t_x + / M
and 8  is the depreciation or obsolescence rate which is assumed to be 5 percent. The 
benchmark for K  was calculated following the procedure used by Coe and Helpman
suggested by Griliches (1980), as K 0 = — ——  where g  is the average annual growth
( g+$)
of investments over the period for which the investment data were available, 70 is the
first year for which data were available and K 0 is the benchmark for the beginning of
the year. Investment in local currencies was deflated by the value added implicit 
deflator for each industry and country and converted into U.S. dollars using the 
exchange rates from OECD-STAN. Capital stocks are calculated for the whole of 
Europe. Capital stocks are measured in US dollars at constant 1990 prices using the 
exchange rate for the relevant countries and years from OECD STAN46. The calculated 
benchmarks are reported in Table 4.23 and the capital stock series in Table 4.24 and 
4.25.
King and Levine (1994) present an excellent and critical review on the methods 
to compute capital stocks. There are four main methods to calculate capital stocks. The 
first is the steady state estimates used by Summers and Heston’s (1991) 
K i  I
—L = ---------  , where z. is the Investment-output ratio —, y ; is the marginal increase
Yt (;Yj +S j ) 7 P Y rj
in output and 8.  is the depreciation rate. It assumes that each country is at a steady
46 Investment data for each industry for Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands was available up to 1991, 
1992 and 193 respectively. For Denmark and Greece, the series o f investment were estimated using the 
share of investment o f each industry in the total investment in the manufacturing and extrapolating. For 
The Netherlands data for 1994 total investment was kept constant at the same level as in 1993, as most 
European countries’ investment remained constant.
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state continually and capital-output ratios are constant47. The second method is the 
standard perpetual inventory model using an initial capital stock of zero. The third one, 
in the perpetual inventory model setting the steady state estimates of the initial capital 
stock. King and Levine (1994) prefer the third method in spite of the assumption that 
capital-output ratios are constant. A fourth method for estimating capital stocks was 
considered, the permanent inventory method, where K t+l = E ( i  -  S)J I t_ . . Series of the
capital stock per industry for the whole of Europe were estimated using the second, 
third and fourth methods. The series with better explanatory power was the one 
estimated by the third method - the perpetual inventory model setting the steady state 
estimates of the initial capital stock -  and it is the one reported in this section and in the 
econometric analysis.
Table 4.23: Capital Stocks Benchmarks (a)
Capital Stocks Capital
Industries-Europe Available Average growth rate Benchmark
321 (g) 1970-91 0.017784 99,535,642,624
322 (c) 1970-91 0.014672 20,371,879,936
323 1970-91 -0.019468 28,717,897,728
324 (c) 1970-91 0.024638 8,416,914,432
331 (d) 1970-91 0.030185 25,835,520,000
341 1970-91 0.044963 50,297,630,720
351 1970-91 0.023444 189,115,138,048
352 (e) 1970-91 0.051092 29,161,676,800
355 1970-91 0.024411 32,035,850,240
356 (b) (c) 1970-91 0.067977 14,656,048,128
362 (b) (f) 1970-91 0.050665 10,999,067,648
369(b) (9 1970-91 0.020363 83,893,067,776
371 (d) 1970-91 0.011871 198,525,599,744
372 1970-91 0.035886 32,764,968,960
381 (d) 1970-91 0.024287 131,125,190,656
382 (d) 1970-91 0.009904 207,250,964,480
383 (d) 1970-91 0.060184 53,633,257,472
384 (d) 1970-91 0.041017 166,162,268,160
385 (d) 1970-91 0.035229 34,695,577,600
390 (c) 1970-91 0.000047 33,376,942,080
(a) Denmark: Estimated investment series from 1992.
Greece: Estimated investment series from 1993.
The Netherlands: Estimated investment series from 1994.
(b) Belgium: Investment data not available for the whole period 1970-1994.
(c) France: Investment data not available for these industries for the whole period 1970- 
1994.
(d) Spain: Investment data not available in 1970-1977. Capital series starts in 1978.
(e) Italy: Investment data not available.
(f) Italy: Investment data not available in 1970-1974. Capital series starts in 1975.
(g) Belgium: Investment data not available in 1970-1973. Capital series starts in 1974.
47 Manuelli (1994) highlights the shortcoming of this method. He points out that the necessary 
assumptions to validate the steady state calculations are clearly violated in the data since they also find 
that the capital-output ratio is increasing in the level of income and not constant, as assumed.
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Table 4.24: Capital Stocks (millions US dollars constant 1990 prices), per Industry (a)
Industries 321 322 323 324 331 341 351 352 355 356
(g) (c) (c) (d) (e) (b)
Year
\\)
1970 99536 20372 28718 8417 25836 50298 189115 29162 32036 14656
1971 101306 20671 28159 8624 26615 52559 193549 30652 32818 15652
1972 102464 20766 27672 8642 27288 53731 196902 31794 34030 16445
1973 103789 20912 27415 8764 28123 54476 196927 32669 34898 17413
1974 106590 21215 27099 8930 29148 55322 196697 33755 35278 18629
1975 109631 21683 26575 9177 30089 56208 196708 35213 35369 19661
1976 110570 21816 25887 9312 30653 56482 198430 36070 34987 20301
1977 111777 22060 25411 7434 31449 57036 201226 37133 34776 21362
1978 111927 22320 24913 9664 32337 57984 204463 38340 34808 22784
1979 112195 22502 24397 9914 33191 58768 206900 39952 34822 24340
1980 113124 22861 24058 10180 34213 60554 208136 41921 35151 26388
1981 114633 23212 23645 10372 35682 62666 209361 43822 35463 28542
1982 115194 23303 23281 10500 36603 63649 209110 45481 35430 29621
1983 115378 23375 22952 10619 36965 63977 208522 47076 35358 30616
1984 115561 23479 22496 10758 37353 64387 207780 48784 35213 31885
1985 116362 23733 22121 10848 38235 65068 207294 50791 35245 33740
1986 116981 23870 21762 10780 38544 66513 207894 53542 35639 35861
1987 118084 24059 21365 10935 39188 69307 209215 56498 36162 38057
1988 119994 24404 20912 11002 40042 73250 212608 59361 37043 40777
1989 122926 24802 20589 10982 41269 77831 215328 62898 38337 43917
1990 126124 25191 20167 10985 42637 82690 220527 67471 39951 47386
1991 129178 25781 19726 11036 43953 88059 228969 71338 41723 50796
1992 131373 26079 19207 11261 45103 93511 237421 75440 42885 53998
1993 132102 26316 18735 11347 46142 97240 243716 79738 43404 56207
1994 131221 26200 18245 11374 46388 99685 245323 82938 43509 57616
(a) Denmark: Estimated investment series from 1992.
Greece: Estimated investment series from 1993.
The Netherlands: Estimated investment series from 1994.
(b) Belgium: Investment data not available for the whole period 1970-1994.
(c) France: Investment data not available for these industries for the whole period 1970- 
1994.
(d) Spain: Investment data not available in 1970-1977. Capital series starts in 1978.
(e) Italy: Investment data not available.
(f) Italy: Investment data not available in 1970-1974. Capital series starts in 1975.
(g) Belgium: Investment data not available in 1970-1973. Capital series starts in 1974.
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Table 4.24: Capital Stocks (in millions U.S. dollars constant 1990 prices), per Industry(a) 
_________________________________ (continuation)_________________________________
Industries 362 369 371 372 381 382 383 384 385 390
(b) (b) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (c)
(*) (f)
Year
1970 10999 83893 198526 32765 131125 207251 53633 166162 34696 33377
1971 11556 85601 200882 33941 134310 209304 56861 172987 35918 33379
1972 12122 87459 207994 35049 137426 209953 59347 179262 36845 33554
1973 12461 89352 214712 35766 140063 209698 61592 182091 37589 32888
1974 12963 91650 216960 36551 143671 211185 64973 186174 38414 32529
1975 13619 93457 215988 37103 146865 213047 69277 192268 39764 32227
1976 14282 93816 215887 37377 148527 212166 72377 194872 40612 31633
1977 14785 95072 215994 38183 150870 211498 75330 196294 41317 31030
1978 15721 96779 214170 39542 152905 211802 78951 199639 42089 30563
1979 16665 98516 210214 40844 155005 212835 83157 204803 42979 31135
1980 17661 100618 206402 42167 159118 214305 88524 212043 44601 29814
1981 18703 102640 204587 43289 163100 216368 94134 221267 46250 29482
1982 19262 104009 202531 44404 165297 216664 99225 229007 47699 28897
1983 19989 103989 198970 45192 166428 215515 103528 237919 48664 28409
1984 20708 103872 195487 45593 167365 214093 108058 244441 49590 27722
1985 21498 104162 192523 46042 168658 213136 114144 249078 50955 27074
1986 22054 104232 191976 46310 170183 213412 122240 254462 53487 26437
1987 22751 104399 190871 47533 172016 215117 131011 261468 55759 26042
1988 23778 105272 188976 49059 174593 215981 139542 269749 57634 25699
1989 25083 107184 186484 50450 178491 217591 147789 278129 59624 25347
1990 26772 110094 184275 52129 184589 220790 157685 288586 61943 25250
1991 28404 112689 185198 54571 190661 224555 168357 301600 64362 25188
1992 29574 115108 186759 56910 196029 227028 178295 317004 66566 25094
1993 30447 117071 186949 58980 199597 226676 186694 330199 67851 24922


































Table 4.25: Capital Stocks (1985=1), per Industry (a)
321 322 323 324 331 341 351 352 355 356
(g) (c) (c) (d) (e) (b)
(c)
0.855 0.858 1.298 0.776 0.676 0.773 0.912 0.574 0.909 0.434
0.871 0.871 1.273 0.795 0.696 0.808 0.934 0.603 0.931 0.464
0.881 0.875 1.251 0.797 0.714 0.826 0.950 0.626 0.966 0.487
0.892 0.881 1.239 0.808 0.736 0.837 0.950 0.643 0.990 0516
0.916 0.894 1.225 0.823 0.762 0850 0.949 0.665 1.001 0.552
0.942 0.914 1.201 0.846 0.787 0.864 0.949 0.693 1.004 0.583
0.950 0.919 1.170 0.858 0.802 0.868 0.957 0.710 0.993 0.602
0.961 0.929 1.149 0.870 0.823 0.877 0.971 0.731 0.987 0.633
0.962 0.940 1.126 0.891 0.846 0.891 0.986 0.755 0.988 0.675
0.964 0.948 1.103 0.914 0.868 0.903 0.998 0.787 0.988 0.721
0.972 0.963 1.088 0.938 0.895 0.931 1.004 0.825 0.997 0.782
0.985 0.978 1.069 0.956 0.933 0.963 1.010 0.863 1.006 0.846
0.990 0.982 1.052 0.968 0.957 0.978 1.009 0.895 1.005 0.878
0.992 0.985 1.038 0.979 0.967 0.983 1.006 0.927 1.003 0.907
0.993 0.989 1.017 0.992 0.997 0.990 1.002 0.960 0.999 0.945
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.005 1.006 0.984 0.994 1.008 1.022 1.003 1.054 1.011 1.063
1.015 1.014 0.966 1.008 1.025 1.065 1.009 1.112 1.026 1.128
1.031 1.028 0.945 1.014 1.047 1.126 1.026 1.169 1.051 1.209
1.056 1.045 0.931 1.012 1.049 1.196 1.039 1.238 1.088 1.302
1.084 1.061 0.912 1.013 1.115 1.271 1.064 1.328 1.134 li404
1.110 1.086 0.892 1.017 1.150 1.353 1.105 1.405 1.184 1.506
1.129 1.099 0.868 1.038 1.180 1.437 1.145 1.485 1.217 1.600
1.135 1.109 0.847 1.046 1.207 1.494 1.176 1.570 1.231 1.666
1.128 1.104 0.825 1.048 1.213 1.532 1.183 1.633 1.234 1.708
Denmark: Estimated investment series from 1992.
Greece: Estimated investment series from 1993.
The Netherlands: Estimated investment series from 1994.
Belgium: Investment data not available for the whole period 1970-1994.
France: Investment data not available for these industries for the whole period 1970- 
1994.
Spain: Investment data not available in 1970-1977. Capital series starts in 1978. 
Italy: Investment data not available.
Italy: Investment data not available in 1970-1974. Capital series starts in 1975. 
Belgium: Investment data not available in 1970-1973. Capital series starts in 1974.
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Table 4.25: Capital Stocks (1985=1), per Industry(a) (continuation)
Industries 362 369 371 372 381 382 383 384 385 390
(b) (b) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (c)
( 0 (f)
Year
1970 0.512 0.805 1.031 0.712 0.777 0.972 0.470 0.667 0.681 1.233
1971 0.538 0.822 1.043 0.737 0.796 0.982 0.498 0.694 0.705 1.233
1972 0.564 0.840 1.080 0.761 0.815 0.985 0.520 0.720 0.723 1.239
1973 0.580 0.858 1.115 0.777 0.830 0.984 0.540 0.731 0.738 1.215
1974 0.603 0.880 1.127 0.794 0.852 0.991 0.569 0.747 0.754 1 .201
1975 0.633 0.897 1 .1 2 2 0.806 0.871 1.000 0.607 0.772 0.780 1.190
1976 0.664 0.901 1 .121 0.812 0.881 0.995 0.634 0.782 0.797 1.168
1977 0 .6 8 8 0.913 1 .1 2 2 0.829 0.895 0.992 0.660 0.788 0.811 1.146
1978 0.731 0.929 1 .1 1 2 0.859 0.907 0.994 0.692 0.802 0.826 1.129
1979 0.775 0.946 1.092 0.887 0.919 0.999 0.729 0.822 0.843 1.113
1980 0.822 0.966 1.072 0.916 0.943 1.005 0.776 0.851 0.875 1 .101
1981 0.870 0.985 1.063 0.940 0.967 1.015 0.826 0 .8 8 8 0.908 1.089
1982 0.896 0.999 1.052 0.964 0.980 1.017 0.869 0.919 0.936 1.067
1983 0.930 0.998 1.033 0.982 0.987 1 .011 0.907 0.955 0.955 1.049
1984 0.963 0.997 1.015 0.990 0.992 1.004 0.947 0.981 0.973 1.024
1985 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1986 1.026 1.001 0.997 1.006 1.009 1.001 1.071 1.022 1.050 0.976
1987 1.058 1.002 0.991 1.032 1.020 1.009 1.148 1.050 1.094 0.962
1988 1.106 1.011 0.982 1.066 1.035 1.013 1.223 1.083 1.131 0.949
1989 1.167 1.029 0.969 1.096 1.058 1.021 1.295 1.117 1.170 0.936
1990 1.245 1.057 0.957 1.132 1.094 1.036 1.381 1.159 1.216 0.933
1991 1.321 1.082 0.962 1.185 1.130 1.54 1.475 1.211 1.263 0.930
1992 1.376 1.105 0.970 1.236 1.162 1.065 1.562 1.273 1.306 0.927
1993 1.416 1.124 0.971 1.281 1.183 1.064 1.636 1.326 1.332 0.921




(Basic legal cases information): The information on a legal case (petition) decision to 
build dichotomous dependent variable for dumping and injury was obtained from the 
Commission of the European Communities, Official Journals (C and L series) available 
on CD-Rom. The estimations were based on the compilation of a data set built on a 
case-by-case basis where several pieces of information were obtained for each legal 
document: the investigation (legal case) number, date in which the investigation was 
initiated, product under investigation, countries named in the investigation (country of 
the defendant), the final decisions reached (injury or no injury, dumping or no dumping) 
and the year in which the investigation ended. Up to 1988 EUROSTAT reports data 
using the NIMEXE 6-digit product codes, whereas after 1988 the 8-digit Combined 
Nomenclature (CN) codes48 are used to identify products. The products involved in each 
case are identified at the NIMEXE 6-digit level and CN 8-digit level. Different series of 
related industry level data were used to match the case information. The industry 
associated with each trade NIMEXE-CN product was obtained by using the 
International Concordance published jointly by U.S. Department of Commerce, 
EUROSTAT and Statistics of Canada. The econometric analysis refers to industries in 
the manufacturing sector. This is not at all restrictive since in the whole period only two 
investigations occurred in industries other than manufacturing. For the period 1995- 
2003, the information was obtained from the Global Antidumping Database Version 2.0 
available in http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global ad/ .The data collection project 
was lead by Chad Bown, Brandeis University (Bown, 2006).
There are two methods of counting investigations. The first one considers a 
petition initiated as a case, including all countries named in the legal document that 
initiates the legal proceedings. Firms located in more than one country could be named 
in an investigation. If all countries are included as a case (observation), the size of an 
AD case would include aggregate imports of the product involved from all the countries 
named in the investigation. The second and better method consists of considering each 
country named in an investigation as one separate sub-case. This is a preferred approach 
since the dumping and injury final decisions and margins are calculated separately for
48 The Combined Nomenclature is also referred to as the Harmonised System.
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each country o f origin. When more than one country is named in the investigation, each 
country is considered as one sub-case and therefore, as one observation in the 
econometric analysis. As a result, a larger dataset is obtained and technical and political 
variables, e.g. imports, will refer just to the country of the defendant and product 
included in that sub-case. According to the second method, there are 525 sub-cases 
during the period analysed49. A detail of the number of cases, sub-cases and average 
number of countries per case in each year is described in Table 1 in Appendix 4A. They 
involve 58 countries and 20 different industries (3-digit ISIC Rev. 3).
(X): For each investigated country, annual export trade from the EU was collected from 
EUROSTAT-COMEXT, External Trade figures NIMEXE-CN exports and imports and 
from the United Nations COMTRADE database.50 It is measured as the share of the 
value of European exports to the country of the defendant in the value of total European 
exports.
(LDC): A dummy variable that takes the value one when the country named in the 
investigation is a developing country. Less developed countries are defined in a broad 
sense including Albania, Algeria,. Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic 
Republic, Georgia, Hong-Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Lithuania, Macao, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, USSR, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe
(SIZE1) and (SIZE2): For each investigated product, annual import trade was collected 
from EUROSTAT: COMEXT, NIMEXE-CN and EUROSTAT: Intra AND Extra EU 
Trade (annual data, combined nomenclature) for the relevant years. The number of 
NIMEXE 6-digit and CN 8-digit codes that define a product involved in each one of the 
sub-cases was identified from the relevant issues of the EC Official Journal. For the 
period 1985-94, the import values are measures in hundred million (108) US dollars.
49 They represent 269 investigations initiated (legal cases) according to the first method. Each case 
involves one product. After dropping observations for which no complete series could be constructed we 
were left with 519 products.
50 Adjustments were made to those countries that were separated into separate countries or regions (Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) and to those countries that ceased to exist (German Democratic 
Republic, in 1990).
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Originally in ECU they are translated into US dollars using the exchange rate ECU-US 
dollars (International Monetary Fund) and in constant prices of 1990 using the US 
implicit value added deflator for the manufacturing sector from OECD STAN database. 
For the period 1995-2003, import trade data of the EU at the product CN (Harmonised 
System) at 6-digit level by source were collected from United Nations COMTRADE 
trade statistics. It is measured in US dollars and expressed in constant 1996 prices using 
the US GDP deflator.
(CON): Two different proxies for industry concentration were used. The first one is the 
market share of the 5 biggest firms in an industry in the European Union, CON1. The 
data used is reported in B. R. Lyons and S. W. Davies (1996) for most industries at 3- 
digit NACE Rev. 1, available for 1989. For some textile and chemical industries, the 
information was obtained from the European Commission (1989) "Horizontal merges 
and competition policy'. The second proxy, CON2, is a dummy variable which takes the 
value one if  the market share of the industry is bigger than 25%, and zero otherwise. 
The proxy CON I proved to be more significant and it is, therefore, included in the 
regressions reported51.
(LAB, VA, AVWAGE, LS): OECD STAN database for the relevant years in the period 
1985-94. LAB is the number engaged (total employment) in the industry and it is 
measured in millions. VA is the value added in the industry measured in hundred billion 
(1011) dollars. AVWAGE is the average wages and salaries per worker measured in 
thousands of dollars. VA and AVWAGE are measured in constant 1990 prices of local 
currencies and transformed into millions of US dollars using the exchange rate (IMF, 
International Financial Statistics). The NIMEXE 6-digit and CN 8-digit product codes 
were correlated with the industry codes using correspondence tables. For the period 
1995-03, the data was collected from EUROSTAT Structural Business Statistics (SBS). 
It corresponds to industries define at the 3-digit level in classification NACE Revision 
1.1. VA is measured in hundred billion (1011) Euros. AVWAGE is measured in 
thousands of Euros. Value added is measured in 100 billion Euros and transformed into 
constant prices of 1995 using the GDP deflator for 15 countries in Europe (EU-15).
51 Although information contained in the reports could ensure that the various economic factors related to 
the decisions of the commissioners coincide with the particular tariff-line items covered by the 
investigations, its relevance depends on the nature of the variable used. Pressure groups are not organised 
at the level o f the most detailed tariff line item but at the industry level, with the correspondent higher 
level of aggregation.
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Average wage per worker is measured in thousands of Euros at 1995 prices. The data 
was extrapolated for certain industries, countries and years.
(RVA, RLAB, RWAGE, LS): OECD STAN database for the relevant years.
(K/L): Capital Stocks series were calculated from investment (gross fixed capital 
formation) figures based on the perpetual inventory model, OECD STAN database for 
the relevant years (see Appendix 4B). They are measured in tens of thousands (104) 
dollars constant 1990 prices. They are calculated in local currencies and translated into 
US dollar using the exchange rate.
(NME): Dummy variable that takes value one if the affected country is a non-market 
economy and zero otherwise. This group is broadly defined and it includes: Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Kazaquistan, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Russia, USSR, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Vietnam and Yugoslavia.
(TECH): Represents the number of products covered by the case and was obtained from 
the relevant issues of the Official Journal. Up to 1988, NIMEXE 6-digit product code 
were used in the investigations and EUROSTAT reports data using this classification, 
while after 1988 the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) is used to identify products. 
However, the variable for number o f products (TECH) is built using the CN 8-digit 
code. The NIMEXE 6-digit codes were correlated with the CN 8-digit codes using 
correspondence tables.
(NOC): Represents the number of countries named in an antidumping investigation and 
was obtained from the relevant issues of the Official Journal.
(GDP) A series of GDP growth rate for Europe was constructed using GDP at constant 
prices from the World Economic Outlook (GEO) database for the period 1985-94 and 
Eurostat for the period 1994-03. The composition of Europe has changed in 1985 and 
1995. A correction was applied to reflect this change (EU-10, EU-12 and EU-15).
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Chapter 5 The determ inants o f price
undertakings in  Europe
1 Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the determinants of the European decisions on dumping 
and injury. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically assess several hypotheses about 
what factors are associated with the European Commission’s choice of the acceptance 
of price undertakings as opposed to imposing definitive antidumping duties in those 
cases in which both dumping and material injury have been found. A dataset of 
European antidumping decisions initiated in the period 1985-2003 is used to analyse the 
hypothesised determinants of the acceptance of undertakings. Using a probit model, I 
analyse the importance of certain variables on the probability that the AD authority in 
Europe would accept price undertakings.
The final outcome of an AD investigation could be: a rejection of the claim 
because no dumping or injury is found or it is in the community’s interest not to impose 
penalties; the imposition of an antidumping duty; and, the acceptance of undertakings .
In the WTO 1994 AD agreement there is a provision for firms to offer and 
accept price undertakings once the Member country has made at least a preliminary 
affirmative determination of dumping and injury caused by the dumping. A price 
undertaking is an agreement by the foreign exporter to eliminate injury by increasing its 
price. Article 8  of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) AD Agreement establishes 
that:
“...Proceedings may be suspended or terminated without the imposition of 
provisional or antidumping duties upon receipt of voluntary undertakings from 
any exporter to revise its price or to cease exports to the country in question at 
dumped prices so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of 
dumping is eliminated..
Price undertakings are common in Europe and Australia, but less frequent in the 
US and Canada. In the US antidumping law a similar provision is made, the Suspension
52 Other reasons for the termination of a case are firms’ withdrawals or expiry of the time required for the 
investigation to be completed.
53 Article 8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), 1994.
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Agreements. These agreements can remove dumping or the injury or they may require a 
temporary withdrawal from the market, but they are very rare in practice. While these 
agreements are very seldom used, private price arrangements could occur and lead to 
the withdrawal of petitions, as shown in Prusa (1992). So, the fact that Suspension 
Agreements are not the most commonly used channel towards price agreements, does 
not mean that price agreements do not exist or are unimportant. Moreover, the US 
government has intervened with other market arrangements, like VER, for high profile 
industries such as steel and semiconductors.
There are two main differences between price undertakings (PU) and vertical 
export restraints (VER). The first difference is that while a PU usually restricts trade 
through a price agreement, a VER restricts trade through volumes. The second and more 
important difference is that the former is an agreement between the exporters and the 
government of the importing country whereas the latter is an agreement between 
governments.
A clause in the European antidumping law allows the EU administration to settle 
antidumping actions either by levying duties or by demanding price undertakings from 
the foreign exporting firms in accordance with the GATT/WTO regulations54. The 
undertaking could take the form of a price increase by the exporter (or importer) or of a 
restraint of the volume of exports. Undertakings shall be accepted after the European 
Commission (EC) has made at least a preliminary affirmative determination of 
dumping, injury and causality. Until December 1995, undertakings could be accepted 
even when an investigation on injury had not yet finished. But, even when undertakings 
had been accepted the Commission would complete the injury investigation if it so 
decided, if  exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved or the 
country of export requested it. However, if  no injury were found the undertakings would 
automatically lapse. The most frequent situation is that in which the Commission would 
only accept undertakings once dumping and injury had been found. From December 
1995, the regulation states that undertakings shall not be sought or accepted unless a 
provisional affirmative decision of dumping and injury caused by such dumping has 
been made.
54 The European regulations are contained in Article 10 of Council Regulation (EEC) 2176/84, Article 10 
o f Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88 and Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) 384/96 of 22 December 
1996. In this last regulation the EU has also agreed to grant a preferential treatment of price undertakings 
in disputes with its future member states from 1994. The Essen Summit in 1994 sets this principle against 
Central and Eastern European countries. This, however, does not affect the analysis discussed since it 
falls outside the period of study.
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Once the undertaking is accepted, it would be closely monitored by the 
Commission and in a case of violation would be heavily penalised. The Commission 
would then request from the parties involved to provide periodically information 
relevant to the fulfilment of the undertaking and to allow the verification of data.
Price undertakings may be suggested by the exporters) or by the EC. When 
price undertakings are suggested by the Commission, it remains unclear what the 
motivation and the criteria for suggesting them are. Furthermore, very little information 
is available in the legal documents as to the motives for this suggestion.
It is important to compare the welfare effects of price undertakings with those of 
imposing AD duties. Although the level of price undertakings is not mentioned in the 
legal documents, it should be equivalent to the level of the AD duty that would have 
been imposed and that is necessary to eliminate the injurious effect of dumping. In 
Europe there exists a "lesser duty rule" by which the level of any antidumping duty is 
limited to the amount required to eliminate the injury to the Community industry where 
this is less than the margin of dumping. This should also apply to price undertakings.
The optimal tariff argument states that under perfect competition the distortions 
of consumption and production decisions created by the imposition of a tariff may be 
offset by the terms of trade gain, provided the tariff is small enough to keep the volume 
of trade (imports and exports) at the level most favourable to the country imposing the 
tariff but big enough to improve its terms of trade. In a similar fashion one can think 
that imposing an AD duty could be beneficial for a large trading block like the EU. 
Regarding the elimination of the injury, AD duties are equivalent to price undertakings. 
However, for the country imposing AD measures, duties are more attractive since the 
increase in revenue (duties) accrues to the country imposing measures whereas if  a price 
increase for exporters is accepted this revenue is captured by the country o f  the 
defendant. Imposing AD duties would lead to larger welfare gains for a large country 
than price undertakings. The acceptance of price undertakings generates rents for the 
foreign firms that could be captured by the importing country if duties are imposed 
instead.
The welfare effects of undertakings could also be negative in the presence of 
imperfect competition and when market structure is not exogenous. Veugelers and 
Vandenbussche (1999) analyse the effect of AD on market structure when initially there 
exists a European cartel and no foreign entry. The authors analyse how AD regulations 
provide incentives for domestic and foreign firms to engage in a full cartel after entry 
occurs. They find that the use of AD measures can both have a pro-competitive or an
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anticompetitive effect, depending on the government objective function, cost 
asymmetries and product heterogeneity. Their welfare analysis shows that the 
imposition of duties in the equilibrium market structure increases domestic welfare. The 
rent shifting from foreign producers more than compensates consumer losses. This 
scope for rent shifting is larger with larger cost asymmetries. If AD cases end with the 
imposition of price undertakings, the welfare effects tend to be negative. The benefits to 
domestic producers are smaller than the loss in consumer welfare and the losses due to 
an anti-competitive effect of antidumping.
The only one written guideline for the rejection of undertakings is contained in 
the GATT/WTO AD Agreement that states that:
“ ...undertakings offered need not be accepted if their acceptance is 
considered impractical, if  such as where the number of actual or potential 
exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including reasons o f general 
policy. . . ”55
However, there are no written guidelines in the regulations of European AD. 
The EU administration has considerable discretion in allowing price undertakings. The 
absence of clear-cut rules for the possible acceptance or rejection of price undertakings 
and the enormous discretion held by the Commission and the Council of Ministers, 
makes it plausible that a number of political economy considerations could play a role 
in the decisions. In a previous study, factors such as the prevalence of bilateral trade 
deficits, the country of origin of certain defendants - more specifically, Japan - and the 
lobbying potential of the domestic industry were found to be correlated with the 
decision to refuse the offer of undertakings (Tharakan, 1991b). However, this study 
analyses the decisions made in the period 1980-87 in which more than two thirds of 
affirmative decisions ended with the acceptance of undertakings. The intensity in its use 
has changed dramatically in the years that followed and there is no reason to believe 
that the hypothesised determinants might be the same.
With all these ideas as motivation, this chapter analyses these and other 
determinants of the undertaking decisions. A legal data set of all European AD 
investigations initiated between 1985 and 2003 is compiled, together with other 
associated trade and industrial statistics, and used to empirically test several hypotheses.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the related literature. Section 3 contains a descriptive analysis o f price
55 Idem, footnote No. 56.
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undertakings in Europe in the period 1985-2003. Section 4 contains a description of the 
main hypotheses formulated. Section 5 presents the econometric specification and the 
variables used. The results are discussed in Section 6 . Finally, the conclusions are 
presented in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
A number of papers, including Belderbos et al. (2004) and Vandenbussche and Wauthy 
(2001), have analysed the effects of price undertakings in Europe. Belderbos et al. 
(2004) analyse the effects of undertakings on foreign direct investment (FDI). They 
show that the decision to accept an undertaking will depend on the objective function of 
the EU administration that may range from protecting only industry interests to 
including the interest of consumers and other users. When considering the possibility of 
FDI, if the EU values producers’ surplus only, it is more likely to negotiate price 
undertakings rather than impose duties. FDI increases price competition in the EU 
market due to the cost advantage o f foreign producers and the option of undertakings 
acts to persuade the foreign firm not to engage in FDI. Furthermore, they show that 
undertakings are less likely to occur if the EU also values the positive effect of inward 
foreign investment on employment and wages. Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001) 
analyse the effects of price undertakings on the choice of product quality in vertically 
differentiated industries. They show that price undertakings lead to lower product 
quality in the protected industries. Although price undertakings loosen price 
competition when the quality of products is given, in the presence of vertically 
differentiated products, quality choices are affected in a detrimental way to European 
firms compared to free trade. When quality is endogenous, price undertakings make the 
foreign firm compete more aggressively in quality terms.
In a related fashion, some other papers (Prusa, 1992 and Zanardi, 2004a) have 
analysed the possibility of AD being used as a collusive device. In the US, from the 
number of petitions initiated, nearly one third of antidumping cases are withdrawn or are 
voluntarily terminated and only one third of them actually result in dumping duties. Prusa 
(1992) argues that the mere existence of AD law can affect trade flows even in periods 
in which no petition is actually filed. He shows that, in the presence of imperfect 
competition, cases withdrawn can have as big an effect as the cases that resulted in duties.
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Petitions are used by domestic industries to threaten and induce foreign industries into a 
collusive agreement. He presents a model of the bargaining process leading to an 
agreement. Even when the agreement must be in the public interest, the ability to avoid 
dumping duties and cooperate on pricing decisions makes it strictly preferred to the 
expected International Trade Commission (ITC) decision. Antidumping petitions serve as 
a vehicle for achieving cooperative levels of profits.
Zanardi (2004a) argues that according to the model developed by Prusa, all 
antidumping investigations should be withdrawn. However, he points out that in 
practice we do not observe that all investigations are withdrawn. He develops a 
theoretical model in which only some petitions are withdrawn in equilibrium. The 
decision to withdraw a petition depends on the coordination costs and the bargaining 
power of domestic and foreign firms. The empirical results for the US verified the 
theory, suggesting that antidumping law is used as a collusive device.
Other research has focused on the effects of European AD policy on market 
structure. More specifically, Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) show that AD 
protection can result in collusive outcomes. The initial situation is one in which there 
exists a domestic European cartel and there is no foreign entry. They then proceed to 
analyse how AD regulations provide incentives for foreign and domestic firms to 
engage in a full cartel after foreign entry occurs. AD measures can have a pro- 
competitive or an anticompetitive effect depending on the objective function of the 
European government, on the costs asymmetries and on the degree of product 
heterogeneity between domestic and foreign firms. European welfare could increase or 
decrease accordingly. They show that when the government’s objective function 
includes only domestic producers’ welfare, undertakings are the only type of measures 
observed whatever the cost differences and the degree of product heterogeneity. When 
the government cares additionally about tariff revenue, undertakings will still 
predominantly be used. The third possibility is that the government additionally cares 
about consumer welfare. Only then, will the AD measures be predominantly duties, 
provided that cost differences are not too small.
Everaert (2003) suggests that technology adoption is always delayed in the 
presence of price undertakings compared to free trade and the result is valid when 
protection is either temporary or permanent.
Finally, a study by Tharakan (1991b) analyses empirically the determinants of 
price undertakings in the period 1980-1987. The explanatory hypothesis are formulated 
based on three sources: the reasons given by the EC in the legal documents which
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terminates the case; the arguments provided by the theory of the political economy of 
protection and antidumping; and, the explanations provided by the practitioners 
(lawyers and government officials). Factors such as the prevalence of bilateral trade 
deficits, the country of origin of certain defendants (Japan) and the lobbying potential of 
the domestic industry are found to be correlated with the decision to refuse the offer of 
undertakings. European price undertakings were frequently used in the beginning of the 
1980s. More than 72% of all affirmative decisions reached between 1980 and 1987 
ended with the acceptance of price undertakings. As will be shown in the next section, 
the use of undertaking has decreased dramatically towards 1990 and has continued to 
decrease towards 1994 and it is likely that the variables associated with its acceptance 
may also have changed considerably. The econometric analysis discussed in the next 
sections builds on this work.
3 Descriptive A nalysis o f Price Undertakings in  
Europe, 1985-2003
This section presents a descriptive analysis of price undertakings in Europe. Although 
the total number of price agreements could also include those investigations that have 
been withdrawn, in this chapter, the focus will only be on those investigations formally 
terminated by the acceptance of price undertakings. Withdrawn investigations will be 
ignored.
In the European Union a very small proportion of investigations are withdrawals 
as such. Between 1985 and 1994 only 7% of cases were withdrawn after the 
investigations were formally initiated by the European Commission. However, a 
considerable number of complaints are made every year in which no investigation is 
officially opened. Previous to the initiation of an AD investigation, there is a 
consultative stage where the Commission advises the industry about filing a petition. If 
the industry does not have a case, an investigation is never opened, even though there is 
a gathering of information on behalf of the firms in the industry and a consultation with 
Commission officials takes place. These complaints are never reported but Kempton 
(2001) estimates that between 30% and 50% of the total number of complaints are 
rejected at this stage. Information about this consultative stage is not publicly available 
and it is, therefore, impossible to quantify its full scale. The only available information 
is contained in the decisions published in the Official Journal for those cases formally
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terminated due to the acceptance of price undertakings and this will be the source of the 
analysis in this chapter.
A summary of the final outcomes of all investigations in each year of the period 
of study is presented in Table 5.0. In the period 1985-94, decisions were negative in 
26% of the total number of cases, 44% ended with definitive duties, 21% with the 
acceptance of undertakings and 7% of cases were withdrawn. As can be seen in Figure 
5.1, there has been an increasing trend in the use of AD duties. More than one third of 
total cases ended with duties between 1985 and 1989, whereas this amounted to nearly 
55% in the 5-year period that followed.
Table 5.0: Final Outcome of AD Investigations in Europe (1985-2003), by year







1985 51 18 12 21 0
1986 48 8 20 17 3
1987 45 5 31 9 0
1988 71 26 23 22 0
1989 53 30 11 6 6
1990 66 20 27 12 7
1991 37 1 28 7 1
1992 56 14 29 7 6
1993 42 8 26 4 4
1994 56 8 24 7 17
Total 525 138 231 112 44
Percentage 100 26 44 21
1995 34 7 14 5 n/a
1996 28 11 12 4 n/a
1997 48 12 17 5 n/a
1998 21 4 4 9 n/a
1999 65 10 34 12 n/a
2000 31 9 18 2 n/a
2001 31 7 21 2 n/a
2002 21 6 8 0 n/a
2003 7 0 6 1 n/a
Total 280 66 134 40
Percentage 100 23 48 14
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L)
Note: The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the investigation against each
single country named in the AD legal case.
Even though the number of investigations in Europe has remained relatively 
constant between 1985 and 1994, undertakings have played a diminishing role in the 
termination of AD cases in Europe. An average of 27.2% of all investigations initiated 
ended with the acceptance of price undertakings between 1985 and 1989, whereas the 
proportion was only of 14% in the following 5-year period. Price undertakings have 
been important in the beginning of the 1980’s but their dominance has declined over 
time. Out of 249 cases in which an affirmative decision was reached during the period
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1980-87 more than 72% were terminated with the acceptance of undertakings whereas 
this proportion only amounts to one third of the 343 cases during the period 1985-94 as 
shown in Table 5.4. The decreasing frequency in the use of price undertakings has 
continued until more recent years. Between 1994-03, 48% ended with definitive duties 
and only 14% with the acceptance of undertakings. Zanardi (2004b) reports a slightly 
higher proportion (40.6%) for the twenty-year period that ranges from 1981 until 2001. 
Only for Japan, Finland and Sweden (before entering the‘EU) was this proportion 
higher than that for Europe.
The incidence of undertakings, as measured by the average annual value of 
imports, is on average smaller than that of duties. The average size of the cases that 
ended up with the imposition of duties is 1 2 % higher than the average size of those that 
ended with the acceptance of price undertakings (Table 5.4). However, the average 
value of imports in cases ending with undertakings is extremely large in certain years, 
especially in 1989 and 1992. This is mainly because in four out of the thirteen cases 
decided in these years, the cases correspond to products like photocopiers, serial dot 
printer parts, video recording parts and dynamic random access memories (DRAMs) 
originating from Japan which have very high values of imports. These high values 
illustrate how aggressively new importers can enter the EU market.
There exists a country and a sector bias in European undertakings. The biggest 
number of undertakings involve imports from Russia and Eastern European countries 
(Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria) followed by those from 
Japan and South Korea. The products involved are predominantly chemicals (46%) and 
iron and steel products (20%) as shown in Table 5.8. The range of products originating 
in Russia and Eastern Europe are homogeneous and similar to those produced in the 
EU. However, those originating from Japan and the South East Asian countries are 
differentiated products.
The incidence of undertakings - measured by the average case size - is very 
asymmetrical when analysed by groups of countries. Even though the majority of 
undertakings accepted involve non-market economies (NME), for these countries the 
average value of imports is very small (6.5 million ECU) as can be seen in Table 5.6. At 
the other extreme, price undertakings involving Japanese products are 60 times bigger 
on average in terms of imports (396 million ECU), followed by those originating in 
Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC). The incidence is very different for less 
developed countries as well as shown in Table 5.7. For these countries, the average 
annual value of imports amounts to 14 million ECU.
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4 The H ypotheses
Several hypotheses have been suggested to explain the choice of the European 
authorities (the Commission and the Council of Ministers) and their preference for price 
undertakings over definitive AD duties. Zanardi (2004a) analyses a model for the US in 
which some AD petitions are withdrawn because firms reach a collusive agreement. In 
his model, coordination costs among firms and bargaining power are crucial elements in 
reaching a collusive agreement. The probability of withdrawing a petition is negatively 
related to the coordination cost, for a given bargaining power.
In Europe, however, it is not possible to conduct statistical analysis with the 
withdrawn investigations due to the small number of cases that fall in this category. One 
can establish a parallelism between withdrawn petitions in the US and the use of 
undertakings in Europe. There might be an element of “mediated” collusion -  similar to 
the one suggested by Prusa (1992) and Zanardi (2004a) - in the kind of formal 
acceptance of price undertakings observed in Europe. But, the main difference between 
the withdrawal of investigations and undertakings is the process of mediation exercised 
by the European Commission.
In what follows, I present the explanatory hypotheses. They incorporate 
elements of the theory of the political economy of protection and antidumping and are 
based on the previous research outlined.
i) Ability to monitor
An important factor influencing the decision to accept price undertakings is the 
possibility to monitor the price agreement. This ability to monitor the price undertaking 
is clearly established in the WTO AD Agreement (1994) and in the EU regulations. It is 
clearly stated that when undertakings have been accepted the importing countries may 
request periodic “...information relevant to the fulfilment of such an undertaking and to 
permit verification of the data...”. The ability to request and verify data is related to the 
number of products involved in the case, among other things. The definition of a 
product is expressed in 6 -digits NIMEXE and 8 -digits CN codes for the period under 
investigation. The number of NIMEXE-CN codes mentioned in the legal case is used as 
a proxy for the number of products involved in each case (TECH). Accordingly, the
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expected sign for this variable is negative, suggesting that a price undertaking involving 
a big number of products is more difficult to monitor than one that involves just a few. 
Therefore, the bigger the number of products the lower is the probability that price 
undertakings will be accepted. The variable that captures this effect is TECH. Another 
variable is used as a proxy for the ability to monitor for the period 1995-03, the number 
of foreign firms (NOFF).
ii) Bilateral trade deficits
There is a rent transfer to exporters implicit in price undertakings. On political economy 
grounds, it is feasible that these transfers will be conceded to countries, which do not 
have excessive surpluses in their trade with the EU. Moreover, lawyers working in AD 
cases believe that price undertakings are difficult to negotiate in cases in which the EU 
and the country of the defendant face persistent trade deficits as reported by Tharakan 
(1991b). Several proxies of these trade balances are considered. Some refer to the trade 
balance of just one year whilst some include the effect of several years of trade previous 
to the price undertaking being accepted. The expected sign of the dummy variables is 
negative, meaning that the EU trade deficits with the country of the defendant are 
associated with an increase in the probability of duties being imposed. When the 
variables are measured as the average trade deficit the expected sign is positive since the 
dummy takes value one when there is a deficit. The variables capturing these effects are 
specified in the next section and data sources in Appendix 5B.
iii) Fear o f retaliation
Being on good terms with trade partners seems to be a plausible and desirable target of 
any trading nation. Retaliation is expected to be higher the higher the proportion of 
exports from the EU to the country of the defendant. If the “fear of retaliation” induces 
the European authorities to accept undertakings instead of applying AD duties, this 
variable should have a positive sign. Deciding on “softer” remedies like the acceptance 
of undertakings instead of duties might reduce the negative effect from potential 
retaliation. While this argument has never been made explicit by the Commission in the 
decisions published, it may be influencing the discretion it benefits from the existing 
regulations. So, it could be an implicit determinant influencing the decision not to 
impose AD duties. RETAL denotes the variable that captures this effect.
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iv) Constructive remedy
The GATT/ WTO Agreement recommends that the possibility for constructive remedies 
should be explored before imposing AD duties in those cases where developing 
countries are involved. The WTO AD Agreement (Article 15) states that:
“It is recognised that special regard must be given by developed country 
Members to the special situation of developing country Members when 
considering the application of antidumping measures under this Agreement. 
Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be 
explored before applying antidumping duties where they would affect the 
essential interests of developing country Members”.
Two dummy variables are included to test whether the EU is being especially “tough” 
or “soft” with less developed countries (LDC) and with the newly industrialised 
countries (NIC). A preliminary examination of the data suggests that a high proportion 
of less developed countries are involved in the acceptance of undertakings (table 5.7). 
These variables are defined very broadly. The dummy variable for NIC includes semi­
industrialised and South East Asian (SEA) countries. See Appendix 5B for a 
classification of countries
v) Domestic Political Influences-bargainingpower
It is possible that political influences relative to industry size or lobbying power could 
play an important role in the acceptance of price undertakings. The smaller the number 
of firms operating in an industry the more likely they are to overcome coordination 
failure problems. Coordination costs are lower. The more concentrated an industry - 
measured by the output of the five biggest firms - the more likely that a case would end 
with the imposition of duties. According to Zanardi (2004a) an important channel that 
can affect domestic is the pressure to obtain import relief. Employment is a potentially 
good indicator of bargaining power. More employees lead to stronger political influence 
because injury from unfair imports would negatively affect more workers. Another 
proxy for bargaining power is the size of the case - as measured by the percentage of 
EU imports of product k  from country j  in the total of EU imports. However, higher 
imports could simply indicate the relevance of the case and bear no link to the 
industry’s potential political influences. Industry size can also be approximated by the 
value added in the industry (VA). But, since this variable is highly correlated with 
employment as can be observed in Table 5.10, it is not included in the results reported. 
The variables used are an industry concentration (CON), industry employment (LAB) 
and case size (SIZE).
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vi) Protection o f  high technology industries
The hypothesis is that the Commission is more reluctant to accept the offer of price 
undertakings by foreign exporters in high technology industries in order to foster the EU 
industries. The Commission has an important concern to foster high technology 
industries. Practitioners involved with European AD do not rule out the possibility that 
the “softer” option to end AD cases might be denied to exporters selling hi-tech 
products in the European market (Tharakan, 1991b). Although, different variables can 
be used to capture this effect, the variable used is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one when a product is classified as a high technology product (EUROSTAT, 1989) and 
zero, otherwise (HI-TECH). The hypothesis formulated is that cases are less likely to 
end with a price undertaking for high technology products.
vii) Japan
A dummy variable is introduced to capture the effect described by many practitioners 
that cases involving Japanese firms are likely to reject the offering of undertakings 
(JAP).
viii) China
A dummy variable is introduced to capture the effect observed in recent year that cases 
involving Chinese firms are likely to reject the offering of undertakings (CHINA).
iv) Non-market economies
A  dummy variable is introduced to capture the effect that in cases involving firms from 
non-market economies the EC is more likely to accept the offering of undertakings 
(NME). Many firms in non-market economies operate under a “soft budget constraint” 
which gives more importance to quantity targets than profitability. When this is the 
case, the choice of AD duties may induce the exporting firms to decrease prices even 
more with no effect on imports, since the state would absorb the firms’ losses.
The data
The data set used consists of all European AD investigations initiated between 1985 and 
2003 which ended either with the imposition of definitive AD duties or with the 
acceptance of price undertakings. Each observation considers the decision made for an 
individual country named in the investigation. The sample covers 517 decisions and
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involves 47 countries. In this period, 365 investigations ended with the imposition of 
AD duties (71%) and 152 in price undertakings (29%).
Table 5.1: Variables and Expected Signs: Acceptance of Price Undertakings
Hypotheses and variables Name Sign
Ability to monitor
Number of products covered by the case TECH -
Number o f foreign firms NOFF -
Trade tension
1) Bilateral trade deficit in previous five years B T D 5 +/-
2) Bilateral trade deficit in previous three years BTD 3 +/-
3) Bilateral trade deficit in the preceding year B T D 1 +/-
Fear of retaliation
Share of EU exports imported by the country of the defendant RETAL +
Constructive remedy
1) Dummy for Less Developed Country LDC +
2) Dummy for Newly Industrialised Countries NIC +
Domestic political influences- bargaining power
1) Market share of the biggest 5 firms in the industry CON -
2) Value of imports of the product from defendant’s country SIZE +
3) Number o f people employed in the industry LAB +
4) Value added in the industry VA +
Protection of high technology industries, Dummy HI-TECH -
Dummy for Japan JAP -
Dummy for China CHINA -
Dummy for Non-Market Economy NME +
Information contained in the legal documents is used to construct the data set. It 
includes the date of initiation and termination of the case, the product name and code, 
the number of product codes (NIMEXE 6 -digit and CN 8 -digits codes), the countries 
named, the number of foreign firms and the type of final measures imposed. 
Investigations terminated by the Commission because the investigation period expires 
or because of withdrawals are excluded. These cases never reached the definitive- 
decision stage.
A dichotomous dependent variable is specified based on the type of definitive 
measures imposed. Provisional measures are disregarded. The information is obtained 
from the Commission of the European Communities, Official Journals (C and L series). 
Within an investigation, price undertakings are granted to individual firms. In most 
investigations price undertakings are accepted for all the firms involved in the export of 
the relevant product to the EU. However, in some cases, the final measures may consist 
of a mixture of undertakings and AD duties. For example, price undertakings may be 
granted to several individual firms and a residual AD duty may be applied to the 
remaining firms in the case. Between 1985 and 1994, 231 investigations ended with the 
imposition of AD duties applied to all firms in the case (67%), 90 in price undertakings 
to all firms (27%) and only 22 cases ended with a combination of undertakings and 
duties (6 %). Between 1995 and 2003, 132 investigations ended with the imposition of
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AD duties applied to all firms in the case (76%), 35 in price undertakings to all firms 
(20%) and only 7 cases ended with a combination of undertakings and duties (4%). The 
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value one when price undertakings 
are accepted from all firms in the case or when a combination of price undertakings and 
residual duties are imposed. The variable takes the value zero when AD duties are 
imposed to all firms in the case.
For each case, annual import and export trade data of the EU by source is 
collected from EUROSTAT COMEXT External Trade and United Nations 
COMTRADE. This data is used to calculate bilateral trade deficit ratios and to define 
the share of European exports to the country of the defendant over total European 
exports. A correction of country codes is applied to Easter European countries that were 
split into separate countries like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union or 
have ceased to exist, like the German Democratic Republic.
A series of industrial concentration is constructed using the market share of the 5 
biggest firms in an industry in 1989. The data is obtained from Lyons and Davies 
(1996) “Industrial organization in the EU: structure, strategy and competitive 
mechanism”, for most industries at the 3-digit NACE Rev 1. For the textile and 
chemical industries, the information is obtained from the European Commission (1989) 
“Horizontal mergers and competition policy”.
For each product investigated, annual import trade data of the EU by source are 
collected from EUROSTAT trade statistics (NIMEXE 6 -digit and CN 8 -digit codes) and 
the United Nations COMTRADE database (CN 6 -digit codes). For each product, import 
values by country of origin are collected for the year in which the case was initiated. For 
data collected from EUROSTAT, the import values are translated into US dollars using 
the exchange rate ECU-US dollars (International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics) and expressed in constant prices of 1990. The deflator used is the 
US implicit value added deflator for the manufacturing sector from the OECD STAN 
database. The Commission has changed several classification country codes. 
Corrections are applied to countries that were split into separate countries or have 
ceased to exist. Data obtained from the United Nations, import values are obtained in 
US dollars and expressed in constant 1996 prices using the US GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) deflator.
The econometric analysis refers to industries in the manufacturing sector56. For 
the period 1985-94 the 343 investigations involve 17 industries. Each product is
56 All investigations in the sample occurred in manufacturing industries.
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associated with an industry (3-digit ISIC Revision 3). The industry associated with each 
product is obtained by using the International Concordance published jointly by the 
Department of Commerce, EUROSTAT and Statistics Canada. Two industrial series are 
constructed using the OECD STAN database for the relevant years: employment and 
value added. Value added is measured in constant 1990 prices of local currencies and 
transformed into US dollars using the exchange rate (OECD STAN) for the relevant 
countries and years. The price index used is the value added industry-specific deflator. 
For the period 1995-03 the 174 investigations involve 29 industries. Each product is 
associated with an industry (3-digit NACE Revision 3.1). The industry associated with 
each product is obtained by using correspondence tables from EUROSTAT. Value 
added is measured in constant 1995 prices in Euros. The price index used is the GDP 
deflator for 15 European countries.
Finally, a binary choice variable is specified indicating either that the product is 
a technology intensive one or not. The data is obtained from EUROSTAT (1989) 
“Statistical Analysis of Extra-EUR 12 Trade in Hi-tech Products”. The report lists the 
products that are considered as technology intensive by the European Commission, at 
SITC 5 digit level. The correspondence between SITC 5-digit and NIMEXE 6 -digit CN 
8 -digit codes is made based on EUROSTAT (1988) “External trade, nomenclature of 
goods”.
A series of the growth rate of GDP for Europe was constructed using GDP at 
constant prices from the World Economic Outlook (GEO) database for the period 1985- 
94 and Eurostat for the period 1994-03. A series of bilateral aggregate trade deficit for 
Europe was constructed using trade flows from UN COMTRADE and measured in 
constant prices.
5 The Variables and the Econom etric 
Specification
The aim of the statistical analysis is to determine the influence of political economy and 
regulatory variables on the likelihood of the acceptance of price undertakings. The 
sample covers all 343 cases which ended either with the imposition of definitive AD 
duties or with the acceptance of undertakings.
Using a probit model, I estimate the probability that an affirmative investigation 
ends with the acceptance of price undertakings. The independent variable takes the
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value one when the Commission accepts price undertakings and zero when it imposes 
definitive AD duties. In theory, cases in which undertakings were refused and cases in 
which undertakings are not proposed are clearly different. In practice, however, the 
number of cases in which undertakings are proposed and rejected are minimal. An 
analysis of a random sample of 50 cases where affirmative decisions were reached 
indicates that only 6% of cases fall under this category. The majority of undertakings 
are not proposed according to what is written in the legal documents.
The underlying model is,
y i =P'x i + Uj
where x ,• is a vector of k  regressors and a constant a, /? is a vector of k+7 coefficients 
and m, is a normally distributed error term. The estimates of the coefficients /? can be 
obtained by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). More specifically, the following 
form for the underlying model is considered, when the trade remedy hypothesis refers to 
less developed countries (LDC):
P(y . = 1) = f ( a , TECH, BTD, RETAL, LDC, CON, LAB, SIZE, NME, JAP, z) (2)
Alternatively, when the hypothesis refers to newly industrialised countries (NIC) 
the specification used is:
P(y . = 1) = f ( a , TECH, BTD, RETAL, NIC, CON, LAB, SIZE, VA, NME, JAP, z) (3)
where a is a constant and z is a vector of controls and all variables are as defined as 
specified below. The specification controls for industry heterogeneity and 
macroeconomic effects. A list of data sources is presented in Appendix 5B.
The variables
(TECH): Represents the number of products (NIMEXE 6 -digit and CN 8 -digit codes) 
covered by the case and was obtained from the relevant issues of the Official Journal. 
Since 1985 the classification of products becomes more precise and therefore a bigger 
number of products would mean that the case is more difficult to monitor making it less 
likely that price undertakings are accepted.
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(NOFF): Represents the number of foreign firms named in the investigation.
(BTD): The bilateral trade deficit is defined as the value of imports minus the value of 
exports from and to the country of the defendant. Three different measures of bilateral 
trade deficit are used. The bilateral trade deficit in the year previous to the decision 
made was defined as a proportion of total trade, as
BTDjfollows: RATIO BTD 1. = --------------- . Similarly, the ratio is defined for the previous
-  ( X + M ) jeu
three years as the average 3-year annual ratio,




y(X + MyEIJ; and for the previous five years as the 5-year
5
average ratio,AVRATIO_BTD_5.  = '  b t d ‘eu '
1
j . Alternative proxies are also
y (X  + M ) JEU;
used, namely, BTD5 5, BTD3_5 and B T D l .  BTD5 5 is defined as a dummy variable 
that takes the value one if  there is a bilateral trade deficit in each of the five years 
preceding the case decision and zero, otherwise. BTD3 5 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if a deficit occurred in at least three out of five years preceding the 
case decision and zero, otherwise. BTD l is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if there is a bilateral trade deficit in the year previous to the case decision and zero, 
otherwise.
(RETAL): Defined as the share of European exports to the country of the defendant in
X Jtotal European exports. It is calculated as X j  - —— , where X jEU is the total exports
X Eu
from the EU to country j  and X EU is the total exports of the EU for the year of the
investigation. This variable represents the dependence of EU exports markets on the 
country of the defendant.
(LDC): Indicator variable that takes value one if the country of the defendant is a less 
developed country and zero, otherwise.
(NIC): Dummy variable that takes value one if the affected country is a newly 
industrialised country and zero, otherwise.
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(CON): A proxy for market concentration is defined as the market share (percentage) of 
the 5 biggest firms in an industry in the European Union.
(SIZE): Two different proxies of case size are defined. The first one (SIZE2) is defined 
as the total imports during the year in which the case was initiated by the EU of product 
k  from country j  divided total imports by the E.U rescaled by 1000,
s =
( M )  ^
M EU j
*1,000. The second one (SIZE1) is defined as the value of total imports (at
constant 1990 prices) during the year in which the case was initiated by the EU of the 
products involved in the case from country j ,  M *, where country j  is the country o f the
defendant. The empirical results reported refer to variable SIZE2, although they remain 
qualitatively unchanged is SIZE1 is used instead.
(LAB, VA): OECD STAN database for the relevant years. LAB is the number of people 
employed in the industry, VA is the value added in the industry. For the period 1985-94, 
VA is measured in constant 1990 prices in local currencies and transformed into US 
dollars using the exchange rate for the relevant country and year and deflated using the 
US value added implicit deflator57. Employment and value added are highly correlated, 
therefore, only one of them is included in the results reported. For the period 1995-03, 
value added is obtained from EUROSTAT Structural Business Statistics is measured in 
100 billion Euros and transformed into constant prices using the GDP deflator for 15 
countries in Europe (EU-15). The NIMEXE 6-digit and CN 8-digit product codes were 
correlated with the industry codes using correspondence tables (EUROSTAT).
(HI-TECH): The dummy variable is constructed using a study by the EC (EUROSTAT, 
1989), which contains a list of products that are considered to be technology intensive. 
The study analyses the external trade of the European Community in technology 
intensive products. The information is presented at a much-disaggregated level (STIC 5- 
digits). Each product (NIMEXE 6-digit and CN 8-digit codes) as defined in the Official 
Journal is assigned the respective SITC 5-digit code using European Commission
57 Similarly a variable representing the relative importance of employment and value added in industry j  
in the total European for each industry was created and used in the estimations. The main results remain 
unchanged.
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(1988). This dummy variable takes the value one if the product is defined by the 
European Commission to be hi-tech and zero, otherwise.
(NME): Dummy variable that takes value one if  the affected country has a non-market 
economy and zero, otherwise.
(JAP): Dummy variable that takes value one if the affected country is Japan and zero, 
otherwise.
(CHINA): Dummy variable that takes value one if the affected country is China and 
zero, otherwise.
6 Empirical Results
The econometric analysis of the hypothesised determinants on the choice of the 
European Commission between accepting price undertakings and imposing 
antidumping duties confirms some of the hypotheses presented in the previous section. 
The main results of the estimated probit model are reported in Table 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 
with robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. The observations (sub­
cases) in each legal case are considered as one cluster when estimating the standard 
errors, since the observations within an investigation may not be independent while 
observations across investigations are. The results reported are the marginal effects of 
the probability of acceptance of price undertakings; conditional on an affirmative 
decision being made (after both dumping and injury are found to exist). All the reported 
results include industry, year dummies, GDP growth and the EU trade deficit that 
control for sector heterogeneity and macroeconomic effects. The variables that are 
measured in nominal terms such as case size and value added (originally measured in 
different currencies and converted by using the exchange rate) may capture some of the 
effects of the exchange rate.
The results for the period 1985-94 are presented in Table 5.2.1 and are 
consistent with some of the hypothesis formulated. First, the evidence shows that the 
share of European exports to the country named in the investigation is positively 
associated with the probability of AD duties being imposed. The greater the exports to
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the country of the defendant the lower the probability that price undertakings are 
accepted. The “tougher” remedy of AD duties is more likely to be imposed to those 
countries that are receivers of EU exports. This result is very robust since the variable 
(RETAL) is significant at conventional levels in all specifications of the model.
Second, there is some evidence confirming the political economy hypothesis. 
Some of the domestic political influences are found to be significant in some 
specifications, especially the variables that measure industrial concentration. Third, 
some of the countries’ characteristics are found to be significant. Some of the evidence 
suggests that the EU is less likely to apply the “softer” remedy of price undertaking in 
cases involving non-market economies, especially china (see Column 5).
Column (1) reports the estimates for the hypothesised determinants of the 
decision to accept price undertakings by the European Commission for the main 
specification of the model (equation 2). It uses the five-year average of the proportional 
bilateral trade deficit (AVRATIO_BDT_5) as a proxy for the trade tension hypothesis. 
It includes a dummy for LDC to test for the constructive remedy hypothesis, 
concentration and employment as proxies for domestic political influence. We can reject 
the hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are zero at the 0.05 
level (Waldz2 = 44.9,d f  = 28,/? < 0.05).
The main results are that the proportion of European exports to the country of 
the defendant and the dummy for non-market economies are significant covariates in the 
decision to reject price undertakings. As shown in Table 5.12, a one standard deviation - 
which corresponds to a 3% - increase in the proportion of European exports to the 
country of the defendant decreases the probability of undertakings by 10 percentage 
points holding all variables at their means. This represents a considerable effect since it 
reduces the probability o f undertakings by 36.5%. Exporters from countries absorbing a 
high proportion of EU exports have had difficulties having cases terminated by the 
acceptance of undertakings.
The estimates suggest economically significant effects for one of the control 
regressors on undertakings’ probabilities. Cases involving exports from non-market 
economies have a 14-percentage point lower probability of undertakings being accepted 
at the means of the regressors, everything else being equal. This is a considerable and 
significant effect given that the sample average undertaking probability is 32.7%.
There is no evidence of the technical ability to monitor hypothesis suggested by 
the European regulations. The coefficient of the variable representing the number of
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Table 5.2.1: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Acceptance of Undertaking Decisions by the
_____________________ European Union (1985-1994): Main Specification_____________________
Hypothesis and (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables
* Ability to Monitor(-)
Number o f Products -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 0.006 0.004
-0.44 -0.45 -0.65 0.51 0.33
*Trade Tension (-)
Bilateral Trade Deficit in -0.066 -0.002 -0.062 0.04 -0.002
previous 5 years
(average ratio) -0.48 -0.01 -0.45 0.04 -0.01
*Fear o f  retaliation (+)
Share EU export to country of -3.82*** -2.28** -3.83*** -3.47*** -1 94**
defendant
-2.80 -2.46 -2.76 -2.65 -2.24
Constructive remedy
Less Developed Country (+) -0.261 -0.241 -0.192
-1.29 -1.20 -0.95




Concentration (-) -0.008 -0.009* -0.010* -0.005 -0.006
-1.53 -1.79 -1.84 -1.22 -1.35
Industry Size: Employment (+) 0.183 0.174 0.009 -0.022
1.17 1.24 0.13 -0.32
Industry Size: Value Added (+) 1.605
1.64
Relative Case Size: Imports (+) 1.363 1.532 1.433 1.791* 1.816*
1.41 1.52 1.49 1.87 1.93
*Hi-tech products (-) 0.047 0.065 0.060 0.034 0.094
0.35 0.47 0.46 0.28 0.71
*Non-market economy (?) -0.140* -0.149* -0.121 -0.098
-1.65 -1.93 -1.40 -1.23
*Japan (-) -0.013 0.221 -0.026 -0.002 0.130
-0.06 1.15 -0.12 -0.01 0.80
China (-) -0.303***
-4.07
*GDP Growth rate 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.0123 0.010
0.15 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.16
* European Trade Deficit 0.00004 0.00004 1.52e-6 9.61 e+06 0.00001
0.15 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.06
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies (17) Yes Yes Yes No No
Sector Dummies (5) No No No Yes Yes
No. observations 297 297 297 335 335
Wald x2 (df) 44.9(28)** 39.7(28)* 41.5(28)** 44.8(23)*** 56.1(22)***
Log likelihood -157.9 -158.6 -155.9 -178.5 -171.4
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.19
Notes: z-values presented in italics. The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the 
investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. Each regression also includes a 
constant. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each 
legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and ***1% level (two-tailed 
test). Marginal effects for “’’less developed country”, “newly industrialised country”, “hi-tech products”, 
“non-market economy”, “Japan” and “China” are for discrete changes in the variables from 0 to 1. In 
column (1), (2) and (3), 38 observations corresponding to seven industries are eliminated because 
decisions are deterministic. Either price undertakings are always accepted or always rejected (see text for 
details).
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products (TECH) is not significant. However, it presents a negative sign in nearly all 
specifications. This suggests that the greater the numbers of products in the case, the 
lesser are the chances of a case being terminated with the acceptance of price 
undertakings. Similarly, there is no evidence to confirm the validity of the trade tension 
hypothesis. The variable used as a proxy for trade tension is found to be non significant, 
but it has a negative sign, as expected. Short-term bilateral trade deficits do not seem to 
influence the decision to deny the acceptance of undertakings to the exporters.
It is worth mentioning that the dummy variable representing LDC has a negative 
sign. This would indicate that the European Commission is not following the 
recommendations of WTO/GATT about constructive remedies when the exporters’ 
country of origin is a developing country. This result if  also confirmed in the analysis of 
the most recent period.
The estimates also show statistically significant effects of industrial 
concentration. A one standard deviation increase in the market share of the 5 biggest 
firms decreases the probability of price undertakings by 11 percentage points, at the 
means of the regressors, everything else being equal. This represents a reduction in the 
probability of undertakings of 38% (Table 5.12), considering that the initial sample 
probability was 32.7%. The one standard deviation represents 15% of market share58.
The controls include year dummies, industrial dummies, the rate o f GDP growth 
and the trade deficit. Yearly dummies were found to be jointly insignificant as indicated 
by a likelihood ratio test Of2(7) = 13.95 with P-value = 0.052). A similar test for 
industry dummies indicates that they are jointly significant ( ^ 2 (9) = 54.24 with P- 
value = 0.00). However, the individual t-statistics suggests that none of the industry and 
yearly dummies are significant.
In Column (2), the dummy for newly industrialised countries (NIC) is used 
instead of (LDC) to test the constructive remedy hypothesis. The main results remain 
qualitatively the same, except that the variable representing NIC has a positive sign, 
instead of a negative one, and one variable representing domestic political influence 
(CON) becomes significant. This would indicate that the EC follows the 
recommendations of WTO/GATT about constructive remedies when the exporters’ 
country of origin is a newly industrialised country. This result is also obtained when 
other proxies for the trade tension hypothesis are used, as shown in Table 5.11.
581 refer to the standardised results because the regressors are of a very different nature and measured in 
different units.
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Moreover, the more concentrated the European industry in question the less likely that 
the case would end with the acceptance of price undertakings. The results reported in 
Column (2) should be more relevant than those presented in Column (1). In the latter 
the dummy variables relating to less developed countries and Japan present a relatively 
large and significant partial correlation coefficient of -0.70 (Table 5.10). Yearly 
dummies were found to be jointly significant (%2(9) = 15.20 with P-value = 0.03). The 
same test for industry dummies indicates that they are jointly significant 
(Z 2(9) = 21.70 with P-value = 0.01)
Column (3) in Table 5.2.1 reports the estimates when value added (VA) instead 
of employment is used. The results are the same except that only the proportion of EU 
exports and the concentration variables are significant. Finally, column (4) reports the 
marginal effects estimates when five control dummies corresponding to five aggregated 
sectors of economic activity are considered. The proportion of European exports to the 
country of the defendant and the value of imports are significant variables although this 
last variable (SIZE) is only significant at the 10% level of confidence. Yearly dummies 
were found to be jointly significant ( ^ 2(7) = 29.74 with P-value=0.00) and the 
economic sector dummies are jointly significant ( x 2 (9) = 12.93 with P-value=0.01). 
However, the individual t-statistics suggests that in decisions made in the years 1987 
and from 1989 up to 1994 are less likely to be the acceptance of price undertakings, 
everything else being equal. The t-statistics suggests that none of the economic sector 
dummies are individually significant.
There is no evidence that the EC refuses the acceptance of undertakings in cases 
that involve high technology products. The estimated coefficient for variable HI-TECH 
is positive in all specifications but it is not significant in any of them.
The results do not confirm the hypothesis that in cases involving exporters from 
Japan the EC is likely to reject the acceptance of undertakings. Although the estimated 
coefficient has the expected sign, the variable is not significant in any of the 
specifications of the model. However, the results confirm that in cases involving 
exporters from China it is likely that the EC would impose duties. The dummy variable 
is significant at the 1% level of confidence.
The regression results displayed in Columns (1) to (3) in Table 5.2.1 show that 
there are industrial sectors that always succeed in obtaining acceptance of undertakings. 
These sectors are: wood and wood products (ISIC 331, 5 observations), rubber products 
(ISIC 355, 2 observations), glass and glass products (ISIC 362, 6 observations), other
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non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 369, 1 observation) and metal products except 
machinery (ISIC 381, 2 observations). On the other hand, there are sectors which never 
succeed in undertakings and that always obtain the imposition of duties. These are: 
other chemical products (ISIC 352,17 observations) and transport equipment (ISIC 384, 
5 observations). In total, 38 observations referring to those industries are omitted in the 
results reported.
The results for the period 1995-03 are presented in Table 5.2.2 and are also 
consistent with the hypothesis formulated. First, the evidence shows that bilateral trade 
deficits are associated with the rejection of price undertaking. The bigger the trade 
deficit the more likely it is that cases end up with the imposition of duties. Second, the 
share of European exports to the country named in the investigation is positively 
associated with the probability of AD duties being imposed. These results are very 
robust since the variable (RETAL) and (A V RA TIO BTD 5) are significant at 5% and 
1% respectively in all specifications of the model.
There is also some evidence confirming the ability to monitor hypothesis. The 
number of products in the case is significant at the 1% in the specifications using 14 
industries dummies (Columns 1 to 3) and the number of foreign firms are significant at 
the 5% and 1% in some specifications (Column 1 and 3 respectively).
There is no evidence confirming the constructive remedy hypothesis. The 
dummy for less developed countries is found to be significant at the 5% and 1% in some 
specifications and has a positive sign. This would indicate that the European 
Commission is not following the recommendations of WTO/GATT about constructive 
remedies when the exporters’ country of origin is a developing country.
Some of the domestic political influences are found to be significant, especially 
the variables that measure industrial concentration and industry size (measured by 
employment and value added). Finally, some of the countries’ characteristics are found 
to be significant at the 5% for some specifications (see Column 1). Some of the 
evidence suggests that the EU is less likely to apply the “softer” remedy of price 
undertaking in cases involving non-market economies. This pattern was also prevalent 
in the earlier period.
The regression results displayed in Columns (1) to (3) in Table 5.2.2 show that 
there are industrial sectors that never succeed in obtaining acceptance of undertakings. 
These sectors are: Leather, luggage, handbag and footwear (NACE 19, 6 observations), 
plastic products (NACE 25, 5 observations), machinery and equipment (NACE 29, 3 
observations), electrical machinery (NACE 31,2 observations), radio,
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Table 5.2.2: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Acceptance of Undertaking Decisions by the
European Union (1995-2003): Main Specification
Hypothesis and 
Variables
( 1) (2) (3) (4)
*Ability to Monitor(~) 
Number of Products -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.069*** -0.016
-3.09 -2.83 -3.54 -0.64
Number of Foreign Firms -0.048** -0.038* -0.038*** 0.016
-2.29 -1.81 -2.76 0.93
*Trade Tension (+)
Bilateral Trade Deficit in previous 5 0.361** 0.608*** 0.200*** 0.691***
years 
(average ratio) 2.46 3.14 2.99 2.90
*Fear of retaliation (+)
Share EU export to country of -8.61** -10.49*** -4.676*** -10.98**
defendant
-2.80 -2.77 -3.35 -2.30
Constructive remedy 
Less Developed Country (+) -0.864** -0.939*** -0.013
Newly Industrialised Country (+)












2.83 2.94 3.49 0.29
Industry Size: Employment (+) 4.809*** 4.355*** 0.010
Industry Size: Value Added (+) 










0.66 0.61 1.53 -1.64
*Hi-tech products (-) n/a n/a nidi nidi
*Non-market economy (?) -0.731** -0.131* -0.817 0.089
-2.39 -1.11 -3.49 0.26
*Japan (-) n/a n/a nidi nidi
*GDP growth rate (?) -0.381*** -0.378*** -0.351*** -0.276
-3.57 -3.10 -4.94 -1.59
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies (14) Yes Yes Yes No
Sector Dummies (5) No No No Yes
No. observations 106 106 106 120
Wald x2 (df) 50.8(21)*** 85.2(21)*** 84.9(21)** 39.1(19)***
Log likelihood -29.7 -31.8 -26.1 -48.8
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.53 0.61 0.33
Notes: z-values presented in italics. The unit of observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the 
investigation against each single country named in an AD legal case. Each regression also includes a 
constant. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering on each 
legal case. * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level (two-tailed 
test). Marginal effects for “’’less developed country”, “newly industrialised country”, “hi-tech products”, 
“non-market economy” and “Japan” are for discrete changes in the variables from 0 to 1. In column (1), 
(2) and (3), 34 observations corresponding to five industries, one year, cases involving Japan and Hi-tech 
products are eliminated because decisions are deterministic. Price undertakings are always rejected (see 
text for details).
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television and communication equipment (NACE 32, 2 observations) and manufacture 
o f other transport equipment (NACE 35, 1 observation). In total, 19 observations 
referring to those industries are omitted in the results reported. In this sample, cases 
involving high technology products are always rejected undertakings and 10 
observations are omitted in Columns (1) to (3) in the previous table. The same happens 
with the 6 cases involving Japanese exports. This is consistent with the hypotheses 
formulated.
The sensitivity analysis for the period 1985-94 is presented in Table 5.3.1 
Column (1) replicates the results of Column (1) in Table 5.2.1 for ease of comparability. 
The constructive remedy hypothesis refers to LDC, (equation 2). The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged when different proxies are used to capture the trade tension 
hypothesis. The model is robust to using other proxies for the trade tension hypothesis. 
There is no evidence to confirm the validity of the trade tension hypothesis. The 
variables used as proxies for trade tension are found to be non significant, but they all 
have a negative sign as expected. Whether the trade tension is represented by the 
average ratio of bilateral trade deficit of the five years preceding the decision, or by the 
average of the three previous years (AVRATIOJBTD3) or just the trade balance of the 
year of the decision (RATIO BTD l), the results are qualitatively the same. The sign 
of the estimated coefficient indicates that the EC is more likely to opt for the “tougher” 
measure of imposing AD duties instead of accepting undertakings whenever there are 
trade deficits with the country of the defendant. The marginal effects of the other 
variables are not substantially affected when different proxies are used. Column (4) 
replicates the results of Column (2) in Table 5.2.1 when the constructive remedy 
hypothesis is referred to NIC (equation 3). The marginal effects of the other variables 
remain nearly the same when different proxies are used.
Another sensitivity test was carried out defining the bilateral trade deficit 
variables differently. The estimates when dummy variables are used to test the trade 
tension hypothesis are presented in Table 5.11. One of the variables used is defined as a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when there is a bilateral trade deficit in all of 
the five years preceding the decision and zero, otherwise (BTD5 5). Similarly, BTD3 5 
takes the value one when there is a bilateral trade deficit in at least three of the five 
years preceding the decision and zero, otherwise. BTD l takes a value of one if  there is 
a deficit in the year preceding the decision and zero, otherwise. The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged, except for the dummy that represents a bilateral trade deficit in 
at least three of the five years previous to the decision made (BTD3 5). This variable
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Table 5-3.1: Sensitivity Analysis I: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Decisions to Accept Price Undertaking by the European Union (1985-1994)
Hypothesis and Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
*Ability to Monitor (-) -0005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
Number of Products -0.44 -0.43 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45
*Trade Tension: Bilateral Trade Deficit in previous 5 years (-) -0.066 -0.002
(average ratio) -0.48 -0.01
Bilateral Trade Deficit in previous 3 years (-) -0.080 -0.022
(average ratio) -0.61 -0.17
Bilateral Trade Deficit in preceding year (-) -0.055 -0.008
(average ratio) -0.42 -0.06
*Fear of retaliation (+) Share EU exports to country of defendant -3.82*** -3.81*** -3.83*** -2.28** -2.26** -2.28**
-2.80 -2.79 -2.80 -2.46 -2.43 -2.44
*Constructive remedy: Less Developed Country (+) -0.261 -0.262 -0.259
-1.29 -1.30 -1.28
Newly Industrialised Country (+) 0.079 0.077 0.078
1.08 1.06 1.07
*Domestic Political Influences- bargaining power: Concentration 
(-)
-0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009* -0.009* -0.009*
-1.53 -1.53 -1.52 -1.79 -1.79 -1.79
Industry Size: Employment (+) 0.183 0.184 0.183 0.174 0.174 0.174
1.17 1.17 1.17 1.24 1.24 1.24
Relative Case Size: Imports (+) 1.363 1.359 1.361 1.533 1.534 1.533
1.41 1.40 1.41 1.52 1.52 1.52
*Hi-tech Products (-) 0.047 0.046 0.049 0.065 0.064 0.065
0.35 0.35 0.37 0.47 0.46 0.47
*Non-market Economy (?) -0.140* -0.141* -0.143* -0.149* -0.149* -0.149*
-1.65 -1.65 -1.67 -1.93 -1.93 -1.92
*Japan (-) -0.013 -0.019 -0.008 0.221 0.212 0.218
-0.06 -0.09 -0.04 1.15 1.11 1.13
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies (17) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 297 297 297 297 297 297
Wald x2 (df) 44.9(28)** 45.0(28)** 45.3(28)** 39.7(28)* 39.6(28)* 39.6(28)*
Log likelihood -157.9 -157.8 -157.9 -158.6 -158.6 -158.6
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Note: see note Table 5.2.1
206
Table 53.2: Sensitivity Analysis I; Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Decisions to Accept Price Undertaking by the European Union (1995-2003)
Hypothesis and Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
*Ability to Monitor (-) -0.111*** -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.114*** -0.126*** -0.125***
Number of Products -3.09 -3.11 -3.10 -2.83 -2.84 -2.86
Number of foreign firms -0.048** -0.057*** -0.059** -0.038* -0.044* -0.046*
-2.29 -2.37 -2.35 -1.81 -1.80 -1.82
* Trade Tension: Bilateral Trade Deficit in previous 5 years (+) 0.361** 0.608***
(average ratio) 2.46 3.14
Bilateral Trade Deficit in previous 3 years (+) 0.273 0.560**
(average ratio) 1.52 2.35
Bilateral Trade Deficit in preceding year (+) 0.210 0.469**
(average ratio) 1.21 2.02
*Fear of retaliation (+) Share EU exports to country of defendant -8.61** -9.62** -9.428*** -10.491*** -12.336*** -11.842**
-2.80 -2.44 -2.75 -2.77 -2.64 -2.50
Constructive remedy: Less Developed Country (+) -0.864** -0.993** -0.938***
-2.32 -2.54 -2.69
Newly Industrialised Country (+) 0.067 0.067 0.056
0.86 0.73 0.58
*Domestic Political Influence-bargaining power: Concentration (-) 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030***
2.83 2.83 2.77 2.94 3.02 2.97
Industry Size: Employment (+) 4.809*** 5.461*** 5.496*** 4.355*** 4.860*** 4 j***
3.09 3.14 3.14 2.57 2.62 2.60
Relative Case Size: Imports (+) 5.974 6.469 6.178 5.851 6.281 6.339
0.66 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60
*Hi-tech Products (-) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
*Non-market Economy (?) -0.731** -0.831*** -0.847*** -0.131 -0.161 -0.164
-2.39 -2.57 -2.66 -1.11 -1.18 -1.20
*Japan (-) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
*GDP Growth Rate (?) -0.381*** -0.422*** -0.433*** -0.378*** -0.38***3 -0.390***
-3.57 -3.51 -3.51 -3.1 -2.85 -2.79
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 106 108 108 106 108 108
Wald x2 (df) 50.8(21)*** 43.9(21)*** 41.6(21)*** 85.2(21)*** 77.7(21)*** 79.7(21)***
Log likelihood -29.7 -30.6 -30.8 -31.7 -33.2 -33.7
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.51
Note: see note Table 5.2.1
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has a positive sign although it is not significant. The sign of the estimated coefficient 
indicates that short-term bilateral trade deficits may increase the probability of price 
undertakings being accepted.
The sensitivity analysis for the period 1995-03 is presented in Table 5.3.2. The 
results do not change in any significant way when different proxies for the bilateral 
trade tension hypothesis are used; except that the variable that captures the effect of 
deficits over the 3-year and 1-year period previous to the investigation is found to be 
significant only in some specifications (see Columns 4 and 5, Table 5.3.2). The controls 
used include year dummies, industrial dummies and the rate of GDP growth.
A final caveat is that the results for the period 1995-2003 should be interpreted 
with caution since the sample contains new AD investigations and only 15 review cases. 
Most review cases are omitted. In Europe, AD measures are imposed for a period of 5 
years and after that, they ceased automatically (provided there is no review of the case). 
The review can be requested by the filing firms or by the European Commission. In 
cases that are reviewed a new investigation is carried out. The reviewed cases are, 
therefore, like new cases and in the period 1985-94 represented 36% of all 
investigations (188 out o f 525 investigations).
7 Conclusions
Chapter 3 has provided the background information on the evolution of AD law and its 
implementation whereas the previous chapter has analysed empirically the determinants 
of the dumping and injury decisions in Europe. After dumping and injury have been 
found, investigating authorities can end an investigation by accepting price 
undertakings. This chapter examined the several hypotheses about the decisions of 
acceptance of price undertakings versus the imposition of definitive duties conditional 
on an AD “affirmative” decision on dumping and injury having been made by the EC 
for investigations initiated in the period 1985-2003. The role of undertakings in Europe 
has decreased quite dramatically towards the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 
1990s. This decreasing trend has continued to exist in the most recent period.
The economic benefits of undertakings (relative to duties) for the exporter are 
that it allows it to raise prices instead of paying duties. The less harming option of price 
undertaking allows foreign exporters to capture some of the rents that would otherwise
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accrue to the importing country. But, it is not clear why the European authorities would 
prefer this way of ending affirmative cases instead of imposing duties. This chapter 
statistically analysed several hypotheses related to these decisions.
The results are consistent with some of the hypothesis formulated. First, the 
probit estimates show a statistically significant association between the share of EU 
exports to the country of the defendant and the probability of undertakings. The 
evidence suggests that the potential loss from retaliation has not prevented the 
Commission from imposing AD duties. The “tougher” remedy of AD duties is more 
likely to be imposed on firms located in those countries that are receivers of EU exports. 
These results are robust and found in all specifications of the model and are consistent 
with the findings of a previous study. However, this result should be interpreted with 
caution as this variable could also be seen as a proxy for stable trade relations between 
the EU and its trade partners. Accordingly, using the “tougher” option of AD duties 
may be less likely to affect the exports to trade partners. A third interpretation of this 
result could be that the EU is using “tougher” measures against its trade partner because 
these in turn are using AD heavily against the EU.
There is some evidence that bilateral trade deficits have an impact on the EC 
choice between the acceptance of price undertakings and the imposition of duties.
As shown in the previous chapter, the share of EU exports to the country named 
in the investigation was found to be associated with the Commission’s decisions on 
dumping and injury. These are the decisions that can be challenged in European courts 
and at the GATT/WTO level. However, when choosing between AD duties and 
undertakings -  after dumping and injury have been found - the Commission is 
“tougher” (uses AD duties) on those trading partners that have a bigger share of 
European exports. Bown (2004) empirically assesses the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. He finds that there are various forms of GATT-illegal protection 
against trading partners that are unable to credibly threaten retaliation. In addition, 
Bown et al (2003) suggest that less developed countries are targeted by US AD because 
of differences in administrative capacity and limited retaliatory ability. An analysis of 
some descriptive statistics indicates that the ability to threaten retaliation and the 
limitation in administrative capacity might be important determinants in the explanation 
of the Commission’s choice of “tougher” measures. There seems to be a strong bias in 
the use of AD duties in “affirmative” decisions. The number of cases ending with duties 
is geographically concentrated in South East Asian Countries, China and Russia, 
representing 51% of all affirmative investigations measures (Table 5.13). Between 65%
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and 100% of cases against this group of countries ends up with duties. These countries 
are not heavy users of antidumping against the EU. Their retaliatory ability is limited. 
This may explain why the EC chooses to use AD duties once dumping and injury have 
been found. The extent to which the limited administrative capacity or retaliatory ability 
of the trading partners targeted by European AD affect the choice of measures imposed 
remains an issue for further empirical research.
Second, there is some evidence confirming the domestic political influence- 
bargaining power hypothesis. Some of the variables are found to be significant in some 
specifications. The estimates show statistically significant effects of employment, value 
added and industrial concentration on the probability of undertakings. The results 
suggest that more employment increases the probability of acceptance of undertakings. 
This result is in accordance with results for withdrawal decisions the US antidumping.
Third, the evidence suggests that some countries’ characteristics are significant. 
The results show that the EU is less likely to apply the “softer” remedy of price 
undertaking in cases involving non-market economies and, in particular, China. Not 
only is the Commission more likely to find dumping when exports originate from these 
countries - as shown in Chapter 4 - but also is also more likely to choose the “tougher” 
remedy of AD duties in affirmative cases. This contradicts results from previous studies 
but can be explained because a great proportion of these centrally planned economies 
started a transition towards a market driven mechanism towards the middle of the period 
investigated. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the EC takes into account the 
possibility of constructive remedies when deciding the type o f measures imposed.
There is some evidence to confirm the alleged ease or ability to “monitor” the 
price undertakings hypothesis, as indicated in the guidelines of the GATT/WTO 
Agreement.
One caveat is that the results for the period 1995-2003 should be interpreted 
with caution since the sample contains all new AD investigations and only some review 
cases are included.
The present study uses a unique data set with information gathered from the 
reports published by the EC in the Official Journal and other sources. It contains 
information on 517 AD investigations initiated between 1985 and 2003 in which an 
affirmative decision has been made. The analysis improves on previous studies in that, 
first, it explicitly controls for industry heterogeneity and macroeconomic effects. 
Second, it presents an analysis of the economic significance of the findings.
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The comparative analysis with earlier empirical research on the subject suggests 
that the determinants of the acceptance of price undertakings are partly different. In a 
previous study (Tharakan 1991b) factors such as the prevalence of bilateral trade 
deficits, country characteristics especially for cases related to Japanese imports; and the 
lobbying potential of the domestic industry were found to be correlated with the 
decision to refuse the offer of undertakings. In this study, the evidence shows that the 
share of European exports to the country named in the investigation is associated with 
an increase in the probability of AD duties being imposed. Country characteristics are 
also significant. However, it is imports from non-market economies that are relevant. 
The analysis presented in this Chapter highlighted the importance of slightly different 
variables associated with the decisions. However, the results are similar in that some 
political economy-bargaining power factors are found to be significant. More 
employment is associated with an increase in the probability of undertakings being 
accepted. This is clearly important given that the reasons for accepting undertaking are 
not openly stated in the publications in the Official Journal and, therefore, remain 
mostly unknown. In this way an option that is intended to be mainly corrective is 
influenced by other factors. The differences between the variables found to be 
significant in this study and in the previous one could partly be explained by the 
decreasing overall importance of price undertakings to terminate AD investigations as 
well as a change in the strategic objectives of the investigating authorities. As Veugelers 
and Vandenbussche (1999) suggest an increasing importance of consumer interests in 
the government welfare function leads to an increasing number o f AD duties. They 
show that when consumer surplus has increasing importance in the government’s 
welfare function the number of undertakings decreases, in the presence of national and 
international cartels. This theoretical research suggests that the tendency towards duties 
instead of undertakings may be the result of a change in the European Commissions’ 
preferences. The results of the descriptive and econometric analysis discussed in this 
chapter indicate that it is plausible that the European authorities’ objectives were 
granting greater weight to consumer welfare.
A previous empirical study (Messerlin, 1990) provides evidence o f European 
AD cases that are “twinned” to antitrust cases and suggests that AD action may be part 
o f a strategy of cartelisation. It suggests that AD action may be part of a strategy of 
European cartels to force foreign exporters to the EU to join the cartel. This research 
suggests that collusive agreements may be relevant in Europe. Further research would 
be needed to ascertain their magnitude and extent. Although, one might suspect the
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existence of cartelisation strategies, more research is required to assess its existence and 
impacts on trade.
In a way, price undertaking can be viewed as mediated price agreements. 
Whether the determinants of these mediated price agreements are different when 
requested by the Commission or by the exporters remain an issue for further research.
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Appendix 5A
Table 5.4: Number of Cases and Value of Im ports in European Antidumping. 
Investigations Terminated by the Imposition of Definitive Duties and the Acceptance of
Undertakings: (1985-2003)
Value o f imports during the 
Number o f cases year o f the case decision Average annual “case size”
____________________________ (in 1,000 ECU)______________ (in 1,000 ECU)
Imposition Acceptance of Imposition Acceptance of Imposition Acceptance of
Year of undertakings of definitive undertakings of definitive undertakings
definitive duties duties
duties
1985 12 21 827,957 268,209 68,996 12,772
1986 20 17 771,314 155,723 38,568 9,160
1987 31 9 4,272,045 521,196 137,808 57,911
1988 23 22 418,282 1,681,294 18,186 76,422
1989 11 6 542,688 958,551 49,335 157,759
1990 27 12 623,383 59,202 23,088 4,934
1991 28 7 942,324 290,991 33,654 41,570
1992 29 7 1,486,971 869,832 51,275 124,262
1993 26 4 1,011,728 58,501 38,913 14,625
1994 24 7 834,493 206,555 34,771 29,507
1985-94 231 112 11,731,235 5,070,054 50,785 45,268
Value of imports during the
year of the case decision Average annual “case size”
(in 1,000 US 1996 Dollars) (in 1,000 US 1996 Dollars)
1995 14 5 1,358,608 192,131 97,043 38,426
1996 12 4 1,210,889 151,703 100,907 37,926
1997 17 5 1,235,188 514,451 72,658 10,290
1998 4 9 64,307 112,467 16,077 12,496
1999 34 12 2,386,360 434,958 70,187 36,247
2000 18 2 611,851 32,210 33,992 16,105
2001 21 2 1,032,563 10,183 49,170 5,091
2002 8 0 295,297 0 36,912 0
2003 6 1 257,098 17,697 42,850 17,697
1995-03 134 40 8,452,161 1,002,799 63,076 25,070
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L) and EUROSTAT,
Intra and Extra EU Trade and UN COMTRADE
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Figure 5.1: Number of European Antidumping Investigations Ending in Duties and Price
U ndertakings 1985-1994 (1985=100)
Number of AD investigations: overall, ended in 





Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L)
Table 5.5: Final Outcome of AD Investigations in Europe (1985-2003), by year
Total Rejection of the claim Imposition o f Duties Price Undertakings
Withdrawn Expired
Year
No dumping or Community
Injury Interest Sub-total % of total Sub-total % of total
1985 51 18 0 12 24 21 41 0 -
1986 48 8 0 20 42 17 35 3 0
1987 45 5 0 31 69 9 20 0 0
1988 71 26 0 23 32 22 31 0 0
1989 53 30 0 11 21 6 11 0 6
1990 66 20 1 27 41 12 18 6 0
1991 37 1 0 28 76 7 19 1 0
1992 56 14 1 29 52 7 13 4 1
1993 42 8 0 26 62 4 10 4 0
1994 56 8 0 24 43 7 13 17 0
Total 525 138 2 231 112 35 7
Percentage 100 26 0 44 21 7 1
1995 34 7 0 14 41 5 15 8 n/a
1996 28 11 0 12 43 4 14 1 n/a
1997 48 12 5 17 41 5 12 3 n/a
1998 21 4 0 4 19 9 43 4 n/a
1999 65 10 0 34 52 12 18 9 n/a
2000 31 9 0 18 58 2 6 2 n/a
2001 31 7 0 21 68 2 6 1 n/a
2002 21 6 0 8 38 0 0 7 n/a
2003 7 0 0 6 86 1 14 0 n/a
Total 280 66 5 134 40 35
Percentage 100 23 2 48 14 13
Note: The unit o f observation is the sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in the AD legal case.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L)






























1985 21 6 4,165 5 2,178 2 60,626 8 13,885
1986 17 4 18,483 10 5,418 0 0 3 9,203
1987 9 3 74,060 3 5,053 1 265,809 2 9,025
1988 22 7 11,140 5 1,627 2 721,821 8 18,942
1989 6 1 1,102 0 0 2 440,003 3 25,815
1990 12 4 8,264 5 2,258 0 0 3 4,952
1991 7 3 90,184 3 6,201 0 0 1 1,836
1992 7 3 5,172 0 0 2 426,962 . 2 196
1993 4 0 0 4 14,623 0 0 0 0
1994 7 1 11,267 5 17,168 0 0 1 109,448
Total 112 32 22,830 40 6,565 9 396,070 31 16,524
Note: The unit of observation is the sub-case. See note in Table 5.5. (a) NME excludes Yugoslavia that is classified as Newly Industrialised Country.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L)
Table 5.7: Number of AD Investigations and Average Value of Im ports Terminated by the 
















1985 21 13 5,425 8 24,710
1986 17 16 9,618 1 1,828
1987 9 7 34,821 2 138,723
1988 22 15 5,858 7 227,631
1989 6 4 19,637 2 440,003
1990 12 11 4,595 1 8,661
1991 7 7 41,570 0 0
1992 7 5 3,182 2 426,962
1993 4 4 14,626 0 0
1994 7 7 29,508 0 0
Total 112 89 14,125 23 165,780
Note: The unit of observation is the sub-case. See note in Table 5.5.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L)
Table 5.8: Number of Investigations Terminated by the Acceptance of Price Undertakings, Yearly (1985-1994), by Sector of Economic Activity
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 Total Percentage
Chemicals 0 14 7 9 3 7 3 4 2 2 51 46
Iron steel 0 1 0 7 2 3 3 0 2 5 23 20
Textiles 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 7
Electronics &Elect. Mach. 2 1 2 4 1 0 1 2 0 0 13 12
Other 12 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 17 15
Total 21 17 9 22 6 10 7 9 4 7 112 100
Note: The unit of observation if the sub-case. See note in Table 5.5.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L)







UDT 0.326531 0.469629 0 1 1.43824
Regressors
TECH 2.597668 3.115927 1 24 1.19951
BTD5 5 0.609468 0.488593 0 1 0.80167
BTD3 5 0.707101 0.455767 0 1 0.55668
BTD 1 0.745562 0.436191 0 1 0.58505
RETAL 0.021638 0.030329 0 0.218096 1.40166
CON1 35.90294 16.2198 5 73 0.45177
SIZE1 0.584207 1.835691 0 14.56577 3.14219
SIZE2 0.012036 0.039528 0 0.33431 2.28425
VA 0.669104 0.364031 0.098123 1.52731 0.54406
RVA 0.051474 0.028686 0.007325 0.10787 0.55730
LAB 1.270704 0.869377 0.261018 3.19632 0.68417
RLAB 0.043690 0.030102 0.009989 0.10582 0.68899
HI-TECH 0.157434 0.364742 0 1 2.31679
NME 0.454811 0.498571 0 1 1.09646
LDC 0.810496 0.392481 0 1 0.48425
NIC 0.259475 0.438987 0 1 1.69183
JAPAN 0.104956 0.306945 0 1 2.92450
NOC 3.166181 2.098125 1 8 0.66267
Note: It refers to 343 observations. The unit of observation is the sub-case. Statistics are calculated for
each sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD 
legal case. See Appendix 5B for more details on data construction and sources.







UDT 0.234286 0.4247669 0 1 1.81303
Regressors
TECH 3.051724 2.833306 1 12 0.92835
BTD5 5 0.411767 0.493607 0 1 1.19876
BTD3 5 0.623529 0.485732 0 1 0.77932
BTD 1 0.656977 0.476105 0 1 0.72469
RETAL 0.015065 0.014348 0.000277 0.153022 0.95239
CON1 31.90058 16.11673 3 65 0.50522
SIZE1 5.51e+07. 1.53e+08 0 1.81e+09 2.77695
SIZE2 0.007011 0.020363 0 0.244124 2.90443
VA 15.37376 12.78224 0.051718 36.96233 0.83143
LAB 0.107616 0.101274 0.000018 0.369443 0.94107
HI-TECH 0.057471 0.233413 0 1 4.06138
NME 0.428571 0.496292 0 1 1.15801
LDC 0.942857 0.232781 0 0.24689
NIC 0.137143 0.344985 0 1 5.51552
JAPAN 0.028571 0.167077 0 1 5.84768
NOC 4.068571 2.460232 1 10 0.60469
Note: It refers to 175 observations. The unit of observation is the sub-case. Statistics are calculated for 
each sub-case. A sub-case is defined as the investigation against each single country named in an AD 
legal case. See Appendix 5B for more details on data construction and sources.
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Table 5.10.1: Correlation Matrix (1985-1994)
LAB VA CON SIZE RETAL NME LDC JAP BTD
LAB 1
VA 0.90* 1
CON -0.16* - 1
SIZE - - -023* 1
RETAL - - - - 1
NME -0.17* - - -0.21* -0.25* 1
LDC - - - -0.39* -0.63* 0.44* 1
JAP 0.25* 0.20* 0.16* 0.51* 0.26* -0.31* -0.70* 1
BTD - - - 0.15* -0.15 - 1
Note: The above tables report pair wise correlations using 297 observations;
(*) indicates partial correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level of confidence
Table 5.10.2: Correlation Matrix (1995-2003)
LAB VA CON SIZE RETAL NME LDC JAP BTD
LAB 1
VA 1
CON -0.26* - 1
SIZE - - - 1
RETAL - - - - 1
NME - - - - - 1
LDC - - - -0.37* -0.53* - 1
JAP - - - 0.46* 0.32* - -0.78* 1
BTD - - - 0.20* - 0.20* - - 1
Note: The above tables report pair wise correlations using 166 observations;
(*) indicates partial correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level of confidence
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Table 5.11: Sensitivity Analysis II: Probit Estimates (marginal effects) of the Decisions to Accept Price Undertaking by the European Union (1985-1994)ta i/IV  UVUI91UTA»J r&AAWljaiiV I V*/a»
Hypothesis and Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
*Ability to Monitor (-) Number o f Products -0006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0005
- 0.48 - 0.50 - 0.45 - 0.47 - 0.48 - 0.43
*Trade Tension
Bilateral Trade Deficit in previous 5 years (-) -0.025 -0.041
- 0.40 - 0.68
Bilateral Trade Deficit in at least 3 of the previous 5 years (-) 0.083 0.076
1.33 1.23
Bilateral Trade Deficit in the preceding year (-) -0.024 -0.027
-0.37 -0.42
*Fear o f retaliation (+) Share of EU exports to country of
-2.34**defendant -3 94*** -3.68*** -3.90*** -2.45*** -2.08**
-2.82 -2.68 -2.81 - 2.57 - 2.27 - 2.45
Constructive remedy






Newly Industrialised Country (+) 0.084 0.074 0.080
1.16 1.02 l.ii
*Domestic Political Influences-bargainingpower
-0.009*Concentration (-) -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009* -0.009*
- 1.52 - 1.48 - 1.52 - 1.79 - 1.74 - 1.79
Industry Size: Employment (+) 0.185 0.180 0.179 0.178 0.173 0.171
1.18 1.19 1.16 1.25 1.25 1.22
Relative Case Size: Imports (+) 1.352 1.357 1.371 1.515 1.536 1.543
1.40 1.39 1.42 1.51 1.51 1.53
*Hi-tech Products (-) 0.053 0.047 0.051 0.070 0.062 0.066
0.40 0.36 0.38 0.50 0.45 0.48
*Non-market Economy (?) -0.146* -0.132 -0.143* -0.152* -0.140* -0.149*
- 1.71 - 1.54 - 1.67 - 1.95 - 1.82 - 1.93
*Japan (-) 0.030 -0.015 0.021 0.246 0.193 0.230
0.14 - 0.07 0.10 1.32 1.05 1.24
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies (17) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 297 297 297 297 297 297
Wald x2 (df) 45.0(28)** 48.0(28)** 45.6(28)** 40.5(28)* 40.6(28)* 39.8(28)*
Log likelihood -157.9 -157.2 -157.9 -158.4 -158.0 -158.5
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Note: see note Table 5.2. Marginal effects for “bilateral trade deficit” variables are calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1.
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Table 5.12: Economic Significance: Percentage Changes in the Probability of Acceptance of Price
Undertakings (1985-1994)
Hypothesis and Variables Sign (1) (2)
* Ability to Monitor 
Number o f products -5.92 -6.28
* Trade Tension 
Bilateral Trade Deficit in Previous 5 years - -4.73 -12.39
* Fear o f Retaliation 
Share o f EU Exports to Country of 
Defendant + -36.49*** -22.86**
* Constructive Remedy 
Less Developed Country + -51.84
Newly Industrialised Country + 29.45
* Domestic Political Influences- bargaining power 
Concentration - -37.79* -43.21**
Relative Case Size: Imports + 21.00 23.65
Industry size: Employment + 62.04 58.46
* Hi-tech products - 16.94 23.74
* Non-market economy ? -39.28*** _40.74***










Notes: * indicates significant at the 10% confidence level; ** 5% level and *** 1% level. Expected sign 
next to variable name. Robust standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 5.13: Number of cases ending with AD duties and undertakings, ranked in descending order
by share of EU exports, 1985-1994
Country AD duties Undertakings Total AD Duties Share o f EU exports
name/Country (in %) (in %)
Group
Minimum Maximum
United States 7 0 7 100% 16.9 21.8
South East Asia
Japan 27 9 36 75% 2.7 5.5
Hong Kong 6 1 7 86% 1.4 2.0
Singapore 3 0 3 100% 1.4 1.6
South Korea 15 8 23 65% 0.9 1.9
Taiwan 8 4 12 66% 0.7 1.6
Malaysia 4 1 5 80% 0.3 1.0
Indonesia 5 3 8 63% 0.5 0.9
Thailand 8 3 11 67% 0.6 1.1
China 42 3 45 93% 1.3 2.3
Russia 19 7 26 73% 1.3 3.3
Sub-total 144 39 183
(in %) (62%) (35%) (53%)
Total number of 231 112 343 0 21.8
cases
Note: the unit of observation is the sub-case. See note in Table 5.5.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (Official Journal, Series C and L) and EUROSTAT,




(Basic legal cases information): The information on a legal case decision to build a 
dichotomous dependent variable for AD duties as opposed to price undertakings was 
obtained from the Commission of the European Communities, Official Journals (C and 
L series) available on CD-Rom. Several pieces of information were obtained for each 
legal document: the investigation (legal case) number, date in which the investigation 
was initiated, product under investigation, countries named in the investigation (country 
of the defendant), the final decisions reached (AD duties or price undertakings) and the 
year in which the investigation ended. The products involved in each case are identified 
at the NIMEXE 6 -digit level and CN 8 -digit level. Different series of related industry 
level data were used to match the case information. For the period 1995-2003, the 
information was obtained from the Global Antidumping Database Version 2.0 available 
in http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global ad/ .The data collection project was lead 
by Chad Bown and funded by the Development Research Group of the World Bank and 
Brandeis University (Bown, 2006).
Firms located in more than one country could be named in an investigation. The 
method for counting investigations used consists of considering each country named in 
an investigation as one separate sub-case. This is a preferred approach since the final 
measures are imposed for each country of origin. When more than one country is named 
in the investigation, each country is considered as one sub-case and therefore, as one 
observation in the econometric analysis.
(TECH): Represents the number of products (CN 8 -digits) covered by the case and was 
obtained from the relevant issues of the Official Journal. Since 1985 the classification of 
products becomes more precise and therefore a bigger number of products would mean 
that the case is more difficult to monitor making it less likely that price undertakings are 
accepted.
(BTD): The data was obtained from EUROSTAT-COMEXT, External Trade figures 
NIMEXE-CN exports and imports for the relevant years and from United Nations 
COMTRADE database. The bilateral trade deficit is defined as the value of imports 
minus the value of exports from and to the country of the defendant over total trade.
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Three different measures of bilateral trade deficit were used. The bilateral trade deficit 
in the year previous to the decision made was defined as a proportion of total trade, as
BTDjfollows: RATIO BTD 1. = -------- - - ■. -■. Similarly, the ratio was defined for the three
-  (X  + M )jeu
years previous as the average 3-year annual
ratio, A VRA TIO _BTD _3J = £
1
b t d >eu
y{X  + MYEUJ
5
5-year average ratio, A VRA TIO _ BTD _ 5 j = ^
■j and for the five years previous as the
BTDjeu i . Alternatively,
(X  + M )jeuj
BTD5 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value one when there is a bilateral trade 
deficit with the country of the defendant in each one of the 5 years preceding the 
decision to accept price undertakings, and zero, otherwise. Similarly, BTD3 5 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when there is a trade deficit in at least three of 
the five years preceding the decision, and zero, otherwise. Finally, BTD l is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one when there is a trade deficit in the year preceding the 
decision, and zero, otherwise.
(RETAL): For each investigated country, annual export trade from the EU was collected 
using EUROSTAT-COMEXT, External Trade figures NIMEXE-CN exports and 
imports and from the United Nations COMTRADE database. The data was used to 
construct the share of the value of European exports to the country of the defendant in 
the value of total European exports.
(LDC): A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the country named in the 
investigation is a developing country. Less developed countries are defined in a broad 
sense including Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic 
Republic, Georgia, Hong-Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Lithuania, Macao, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, USSR, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.
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(NIC): Dummy variable that takes value one if  the affected country is a newly 
industrialised country (NIC) and zero, otherwise. This group includes Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Yugoslavia.
(CON): Market share of the 5 biggest firms in an industry in the European Union. The 
data used is reported in B. R. Lyons and S. W. Davies (1996) for most industries at 3- 
digit NACE Rev. 1, available for 1989. For some textile and chemical industries, the 
information was obtained from the European Commission (1989) "Horizontal merges 
and competition policy".
(SIZE1) and (SIZE2): The number of products involved in each one of the cases was 
identified from the relevant issues of the EU Official Journal (NIMEXE 6-digits and CN 
8-digits). For each investigated product, annual imports trade was collected from 
EUROSTAT: COMEXT, NIMEXE-CN and EUROSTAT: Intra AND Extra EU Trade 
(annual data, combined nomenclature) and from United Nations COMTRADE database 
for the relevant years. The number of NIMEXE 6-digit and CN 8-digit codes that define 
a product was identified from the relevant issues of the EU Official Journal. For the 
period 1985-94, the variable SIZE1 representing the import values is measured in 
hundred million (108) US dollars. Originally in ECU they are translated into US dollars 
using the exchange rate ECU-US dollar (International Monetary Fund) and in constant 
prices of 1990 using the US implicit value added deflator for the manufacturing sector 
from OECD STAN database. Value of imports obtained from United Nations are 
expressed in US dollars and expressed in constant 1996 prices using the US Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) deflator.
(LAB, VA): OECD STAN database for the relevant years. LAB is the number engaged 
(total employment) in the industry and it is measured in millions. VA is the value added 
in the industry. For the period 1985-94, it is measured in hundred billion (1011) US 
dollars. It is measured in constant 1990 prices of local currencies and transformed into 
billions of US dollars using the exchange rate (International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics). For the period 1995-03, value added in measured in 
100 billion Euros and transformed into constant prices using the GDP deflator for 15 
countries in Europe (EU-15). The NIMEXE 6-digit and CN 8-digit product codes were 
correlated with the industry codes using correspondence tables provided by 
EUROSTAT.
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(HI-TECH): Obtained from EUROSTAT (1989). The report lists the products 
considered as technology intensive.
(NME): Dummy variable that takes value one if the affected country has a non-market 
economy and zero, otherwise. This group is defined in a very broad sense and it 
includes Albania, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, China, Czech 
Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Russia, USSR, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Vietnam.
(JAPAN)- Dummy variable that takes value one if the affected country is Japan and 
zero, otherwise.
(CHINA): Dummy variable that takes value one if  the affected country is China and 
zero, otherwise.
(GDP) A series of the growth rate of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) for Europe was 
constructed using GDP at constant prices from the World Economic Outlook (GEO) 
database for the period 1985-94 and Eurostat for the period 1994-03. The composition 
of Europe has changed in 1985 and 1995. A correction was applied to reflect this 
change (EU-10, EU-12 and EU-15).
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Chapter 6 C onclusions
The motivation behind this thesis is to understand different aspects of trade theory and 
policy. One of the main objections to the theory of strategic trade policy is that it 
assumes the government has prefect knowledge of things such as the nature of 
competition or the cost structure of certain industries. There is an established body of 
literature that has investigated the implications of incomplete information in strategic 
trade policy theory.
In Chapter 2, I analysed the design of an optimal tariff when a domestic 
government and a local firm do not know the cost level of a foreign competitor. The 
chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. Firstly, it 
concentrates on the design of strategic trade policy in the presence of a particular type 
of informational asymmetry, namely, that between an uninformed domestic government 
and firm and an informed foreign competitor. In the presence of incomplete 
information, output can be taken as a signal of costs to the government and a domestic 
firm. Secondly, unlike other work it concentrates on asymmetries of information about 
the unknown cost efficiency of a foreign firm. Thirdly, it compares the optimal tariff 
and output in the presence of signalling with the situation in which output does not 
signal costs.
The analysis suggests, first, that a firm with low costs has an incentive to 
misrepresent them and to pretend it has high costs in order to obtain a lower import 
tariff on its exports. In equilibrium, this incentive does not exist because the government 
anticipates the action of the foreign firm and acts rationally when choosing the optimal 
tariff. It is shown that a unique separating sequential equilibrium exists and that 
strategic trade policy can effectively be designed in the presence of informational 
asymmetries. The government faces a trade-off. The optimal policy should equate the 
marginal loss of consumer welfare with the marginal gain from profit shifting and tariff 
revenue.
Second, the government chooses a tariff that is lower than the tariff that would 
prevail in the absence of signalling. Because the low cost firm has an incentive to mimic 
the inefficient firm, the latter distorts output away from the complete information 
output. The high-cost firm distorts equilibrium output downwards whereas the low cost 
firm chooses to produce at the full information output level. There is a “signalling” 
effect. Signalling creates a costly distortion in terms of domestic welfare. The 
government sets a first period tariff which is lower than the optimal tariff when no
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signalling occurs because it anticipates the incentive of the foreign firm. In a separating 
sequential equilibrium, incomplete information lessens the rent extracting argument for 
a tariff. Furthermore, pooling equilibria can be ruled out because it requires 
unreasonable beliefs to support them.
Finally, expected foreign output is lower when signalling and domestic output is 
higher, shifting profits to the domestic firm. Because a lower specific tariff is needed to 
commit the home firm to greater expected output, the low-cost firm output is higher due 
to a “lower tariff’ effect. The low-cost firm is able to obtain full information profits but 
its output is greater than when no signalling occurs. On the contrary, for the high cost 
foreign firm the “signalling” effect is stronger than the “lower tariff’ effect. Therefore, 
for a given level of the tariff and domestic firm’s output, the equilibrium output chosen 
by the high-cost foreign firm is lower. Overall, the “signalling” effect prevails over the 
“lower tariff’ effect. Expected foreign production is lower and domestic production is 
higher.
The model can be extended to analyse the filing decision of the domestic. The 
results should not change in any qualitative manner. The government would design 
policy optimally and the outcome will have the desirable property that optimal duties 
are imposed.
Chapter 3 and subsequent chapters focused on the analysis of antidumping. A 
growing amount of research in trade policy has concentrated on the study of this 
frequently used trade policy instrument. Antidumping regulations allow countries to 
impose unilateral measures against dumped imports causing material injury to domestic 
firms. However, they are more often used as trade protection rather than as a trade 
remedy. The complexity of antidumping regulations requires that the necessary 
background information is presented before proceeding to analyse its determinants 
empirically. The descriptive analysis in the third chapter provided a panoramic view of 
the evolution of antidumping activity and legislation worldwide and in Europe. It also 
included a detailed explanation of the investigation procedure in Europe and it 
highlighted the main differences with the implementation of AD laws in the US. 
Finally, it presented a detailed description of the investigation procedure in Europe as 
well as an account of its main institutional features that would help understand the 
results of the empirical analysis discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4 focused on the analysis of the political and technical influences in AD 
investigations in Europe in the period 1985-2003. The results of the empirical analysis
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are as follows. First, the empirical findings suggest that Europe is operating a double 
track AD mechanism. The model is robust to the use of different proxies.
Second, the number o f countries named in AD investigations was found to be a 
significant determinant of the dumping and injury decisions. There is a non-linear effect 
on the probability of an affirmative decision of dumping and injury being made. Filing 
investigations against a larger number of countries decreases the probability of dumping 
and injury to start with until the number of named countries reaches a critical value of 
four. When more than four countries are named in the investigation the probability of 
dumping and injury increases. Third, the results are similar when cumulated imports 
from the other countries named in the case are considered. Finally, the main significant 
determinants remain unchanged when excluding different sectors of economic activity.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following respects. First, 
it controls for macroeconomic factors and sector heterogeneity. A decision on dumping 
and injury being positive is associated with the general features of the double track 
model of administered protection as captured by the regressors and it is not sector 
specific. Second, it assesses the importance of multiple-country filing in the decisions of 
dumping and injury. The effect of the number of named countries in the outcome of an 
investigation is analysed as well as the importance of the cumulation rule by which the 
European Commission can cumulate imports when an AD investigation involves 
several countries. Finally, the economic significance of the results is analysed.
Chapter 5 concentrated on the analysis of different hypotheses relating to 
European price undertaking in the period 1985-2003. The results of the empirical 
analysis are consistent with some of the hypotheses formulated and can be summarised 
as follows. First, the estimates show a statistically significant effect of the proportion of 
European exports to the country against which an investigation is carried out on the 
probability o f price undertakings. Greater exports to the country of the defendant lower 
the probability that price undertakings are accepted. The “tougher” remedy of AD duties 
is more likely to be imposed on those countries that are receivers of EU exports. There 
is also some evidence that bilateral trade deficits have an impact on the EC choice 
between the acceptance of price undertakings and the imposition of duties. There is 
some evidence to confirm the alleged ease or ability to “monitor” the price undertakings 
hypothesis, as indicated in the guidelines of the GATT/WTO Agreement.
Second, several variables confirm the domestic political influence-bargaining 
power hypothesis in the decision to accept price undertakings. There is some evidence 
that higher levels of employment are associated with a probability of “softer” measures
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being imposed. Third, some of the countries’ characteristics are found to be significant. 
There is some evidence suggesting that the EU is less likely to apply the “softer” 
remedy of price undertaking in cases involving non-market economies. The European 
Commission is more likely to find dumping when exports originate from these countries 
but it is also more likely to deny the softer remedy of price undertakings.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following respects. First, 
by using a unique dataset of legal cases and other trade and industrial statistics, it 
controls for sector heterogeneity and macroeconomic factors. A decision to accept price 
undertakings by the European Commission as opposed to AD duties is explained by the 
general hypotheses formulated as captured by the regressors. Second, it assesses the 
importance of political economy determinants. Third, it includes a sensitivity analysis. 
Fourth, it presents the economic significance of the results.
On the whole, I believe that this thesis makes a contribution to our 
understanding of several aspects of trade policy. In particular, the design of an optimal 
tariff policy in the presence of incomplete information with respect to the level of 
competitiveness of a foreign firm. It also contributes to the understanding of the 
political economy and economic determinants of antidumping decisions in Europe and 
it helps to understand the changes that have occurred in the use of European price 
undertaking since the mid 1980s. It also offers some ideas for future research.
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